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“If it weren't for the people, the god-damn people … 
always getting tangled up in the machinery. If it weren't 
for them, the world would be an engineer's paradise.” 
Kurt Vonnegut, Player Piano 
 
 
“No alarms and no surprises, please” 







Digital interventions have great potential to support people to change their behaviour. However, 
most interventions focus on strategies that target limited conscious resources, reducing their 
potential impact. We outline how these may fail in the longer-term due to issues with theory, users 
and technology. We propose an alternative: the direct targeting of nonconscious processes to 
achieve behaviour change.  
We synthesise Dual Process Theory, modern habit theory and Goal Setting Theory, which together 
model how users form and break nonconscious behaviours, into an explanatory framework to 
explore nonconscious behaviour change interventions.  We explore the theoretical and practical 
implications of this approach, and apply it to a series of empirical studies. 
The studies explore nonconscious-targeting interventions across a continuum of conscious attention 
required at the point of behavioural action, from high (just-in-time reminders within Implementation 
Intentions) to medium (training paradigms within cognitive bias modification) to low (subliminal 
priming). The findings show that these single-nonconscious-target interventions have mixed results 
in in-the-wild and semi-controlled conditions. 
We conclude by outlining how interventions might strategically deploy multiple interventions that 
target the nonconscious at differing levels of conscious attention, and by identifying promising 
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This thesis explores the use of technology to target nonconscious processes that affect behaviour. 
Changing human behaviour is a highly complex problem, and many interventions fail in the long 
term. Growth in personal technology has piqued interest in using technology in Digital Behaviour 
Change Interventions (DBCIs). However, DBCIs have not been a panacea. We outline how behaviour 
change failures can be understood because of issues with theory, users and technology.  
We argue that user issues in DBCIs stem broadly from an overreliance on conscious rather than 
nonconscious influences on behaviour. We outline Nonconscious Digital Behaviour Change 
Interventions (NDBCIs) as an alternative: technology-based interventions that target nonconscious, 
automatic cognitive processes, with the goal of behaviour change.  We present the Behaviour 
Alteration Framework to illustrate how Dual Process Theory, modern habit theory and Goal Setting 
Theory indicate how nonconscious processes can impact on behaviour, and strategies to target them. 
We explore technology-based implementations of three promising strategies: Implementation 
Intentions, cognitive bias modification and subliminal priming. 
Our two key research questions are: what are the nonconscious influences on behaviour, and what 
are the opportunities to intervene with these influences to change behaviour; and how can 
technology best exploit these opportunities to intervene in a user-friendly way? 
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION  
Humans persist in behaving in ways they know are harmful [Keeney 2008]. The World Health 
Organisation identified several persistent lifestyle behaviours which impact severely on health, 
accounting for 61% of worldwide cardiovascular deaths, including “alcohol use, tobacco use, high 
blood pressure, high body mass index, high cholesterol, high blood glucose, low fruit and vegetable 
intake, and physical inactivity” [WHO 2009]. Meanwhile, pervasive computing technology offering 
multiple detection methods and intervention points becomes cheaper and more widely owned, 
providing great potential for DBCIs to change behaviour. Smartphone ownership reached 69% in the 
UK in 2015 [Ipsos 2015], worldwide mobile phone shipments reached 1.86 billion in 2017, and are 
predicted to rise into 2018-9 [Gartner 2018], and strong growth is predicted in the wearables market 
[Lee et al. 2015; Wei 2014]. Smartphone DBCIs are prevalent [Fiordelli et al. 2013; Klasnja and Pratt 
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2012; Lathia et al. 2013], and more UbiComp DBCIs are emerging e.g. [Adams et al. 2015; Khot et al. 
2015; Kim et al. 2016].  
Developing effective DBCIs is constrained by issues with theory, users and technology. DBCIs do not 
always apply theory-driven solutions, partly because of a great number of different theories, 
frameworks, models and techniques. DBCIs also fail because of a mismatch between users and the 
intervention. Most DBCIs focus on behaviour-change strategies that target conscious processes: 
tracking, goal setting, reminders and providing information are frequently-used techniques [Cowan 
et al. 2013; Stawarz et al. 2015]. However, users have limited conscious cognitive resources in both 
conscious attention [Norman and Shallice 1986] and in short-term working memory [Cowan 2010; 
Cowan 1988]. Further, users may not respond immediately to ‘just-in-time’ interventions [Pejovic 
and Musolesi 2014]. They may experience reactance, where users reject interventions to preserve 
behavioural autonomy [Brehm 2009]. Users tend to abandon pervasive trackers in the long term, 
partly because of gaps between user expectations and the technology [Goodyear et al. 2017; Yang et 
al. 2015]. Technological issues persist: accurate detection of contextual triggers and behaviour are 
difficult problems that UbiComp has yet to solve [Rogers 2006]. This thesis addresses the theory 
issue by providing an illustrative framework for interventions; and addresses the user and technology 
issues by exploring alternatives to conscious-process targeting. 
THE APPROACH  
We argue that understanding nonconscious processes is central to explaining why behaviour change 
is difficult and why conscious behaviour change interventions tend to fail.  We explore multiple 
NDBCIs as an alternative approach. Similar arguments focusing on nonconscious processes are 
starting to emerge in the domain of health policy [Kelly and Barker 2016] and the health behaviour 
domain more broadly [Marteau et al. 2012; Hollands et al. 2016], but the approach has yet to be 
applied rigorously to DBCIs. The nonconscious research that is starting to emerge in HCI tends to 
focus on custom-built UbiComp solutions, e.g. Adams et al.’s study to change “mindless” eating 
behaviour [2015], and Amores & Maes’ essence prototype necklace that  uses smell as a 
nonconscious prime [2017] . Our research, by contrast, focuses on using existing technology, 
including smartphones and Tabletops, to deliver NDBCIs.  
We address the three issues identified above: theory, users and technology. To answer the first 
research question, what are the nonconscious influences on people’s behaviour, we first focus on 
theory. In Chapters 2 and 3 we construct a theory-driven illustrative framework, the Behaviour 
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Alteration Framework, BAF, from a review of the ability of common behaviour change theories to 
deal with nonconscious behaviour. The BAF synthesises Dual Process Theory, modern Habit Theory 
and Goal Setting Theory to explore how nonconscious and conscious processes together drive 
behavioural decisions.  
To answer the second research question, how can technology alter nonconscious processes, we then 
focus on technology and users. We use the BAF to map current DBCI research onto intervention 
points to identify technology-based research opportunities, and highlight the state of the art 
(Chapter 3). We then explore a subset of the technology-based intervention opportunities in a series 
of NDBCI studies (Chapters 4-6). We carry out a series of experiments and qualitative analyses to 
better understand how to deal with issues of limited conscious capacity, reactance and user-
technology mismatches. Our NDBCI studies span a continuum of cognitive load at the point of 
behavioural action, in line with Dix et al.’s intentional interaction spectrum [2010:651]. We have 
defined NDBCIs as any intervention targeting nonconscious processes. The intervention itself may be 
not obvious to the user and place little cognitive load on their resources, e.g. the use of subliminal 
priming (Chapter 6), or it may impose a high cognitive load by requiring conscious attention at the 
point of action (e.g. just-in-time behavioural reminders trying to support users to form new habits, 
Chapter 4), or lie in between the two (e.g. opportunistic incidental interactions, where user actions 
performed for some other purpose are co-opted for use [Dix 2002; Dix et al. 2010:653; Ding et al. 
2016]).  
Table 1:1 shows the experiments ranging across cognitive load from high (interruption systems), to 
medium (pre-behaviour training), to low (subliminal priming).  Table 1:2 gives an expanded overview 
of the individual experiments including their domain, platform and intervention delivery types.  
 Cognitive load 
 High Medium Low 
Characteristics Just in time alerts.  
Direct attention and 
action requests from 
system 
Intervention co-opting other 
activity; some conscious attention 
requested.  
Training without direct 
behavioural prompts. 






Cognitive Bias Modification 
training (Chapter 5) 
Subliminal priming 
(Chapter 6) 
Table 1:1 DBCIs mapped across continuum of cognitive load of intervention 














intentions   
How can context-aware 
technology support 
Implementation Intentions? 






Can incidental cognitive bias 
modification alter implicit attitudes 
to food? 
Healthy eating Smartphones Opportunistic 
incidental 
interaction 









Can cognitive bias modification 








Subliminal Priming Can incidental subliminal priming 
on smartphones cause 










Subliminal Priming Can subliminal priming increase 
stimulus preference or selection? 
General  Smartphones Task Low Semi-controlled Technical feasibility 
study; single session 
experiments 
6 
Goal setting How can technology support users 
to create automatable goals? 
Physical 
activity 
Smartphones Task Low In-the-wild Survey 7 
Table 1:2 Experimental approaches overview 
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This thesis starts at the high cognitive load end of the continuum with an exploration of the 
application of context-aware technology to Implementation Intentions. After finding evidence of user 
intelligibility issues, frustration with disruptive approaches and low interest in context-aware 
reminders, we moved to the right to explore medium-load DBCIs with lightweight training tasks 
attached to unlock behaviour. We uncovered further user issues with an opportunistic system that 
potentially interrupted other activities, so we then explored time-shifting the cognitive load to a 
training task intended to alter future problematic behaviour without further reminders or 
intervention.  
Finding mixed results for this intervention, and being unable to disambiguate whether the issues 
were rooted in conscious or nonconscious processes, we then moved to the far right of the 
continuum to explore in depth the possibilities afforded by low-cognitive-load interventions that 
explicitly target nonconscious processes in the form of subliminal priming. We found little evidence 
of stable effects for this approach. 
Finally, drawing on our results, in Chapter 7 we outline how technology can strategically combine 
high- and medium-cognitive load approaches to achieve low-cognitive load goal automation. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This thesis addresses the following broad research questions: 
1. What are the nonconscious influences on behaviour, and what are the opportunities to 
intervene with these influences to change behaviour?  
2. How can technology best exploit these opportunities to intervene in a user-friendly way? 
The first research question is addressed from a theoretical level, synthesising existing theory and 
research to map out potential approaches. We then address the second question by running multiple 
experiments in the NDBCI research space.  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This thesis uses a mixed-methods approach [van Turnhout et al. 2014], combining both quantitative 
and qualitative research methods to explore the problem space of NDBCIs. The different techniques 
are shown in Table 1:2. 
Most of our quantitative studies use a pre-post-control design to avoid interference between 
conditions, and for most of our subliminal experiments to avoid participants becoming aware of the 
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purpose of the intervention by detecting differences in the conditions [Hornbæk 2011]. Exceptions 
were pilot 4.1 which had no control, and experiment 6.4, which used a within-subjects design. We 
based the latter on an existing psychology experiment and so used the same design to ease 
comparison with the original. 
STATISTICAL APPROACH  
Pre-post-control design introduces temporal pseudoreplication [Crawley 2005], since we gather 
repeated pre- and post- measures from the same individuals within each intervention group. To deal 
with this, in line with Larson-Hall [2016], we use mixed ANOVAs  on mean data (e.g. for Likert scale 
means), with intervention group as a between-subjects factor, and time of measure as a within-
subjects factor, and (generalised) linear mixed-effects regression ((G)LMER) models for reaction time 
and binary data. (G)LMER are used because they allow us to model random effects, for example 
random variations within individual participants.  Judd et al. argue that including random variations is 
particularly important to deal with stimulus sampling issues within experiments on implicit reactions 
[2012].  (G)LMER models also make more realistic assumptions than ANOVA (e.g. they do not assume 
sphericity), provide higher power and broader validity [Larson-Hall 2016], and can analyse individual 
rather than mean responses [Lo and Andrews 2015]. Bolker et al. argue that (G)LMER are the most 
appropriate method to analyse non-normal data that involves random effects [2009]. For binary 
outcomes, GLMERs help to avoid  spurious results generated by using ANOVA to analyse proportions 
or percentages, and improve statistical power compared to ANOVA [Jaeger 2008]. The exception to 
(G)LMER-for-reaction-time-data rule is in Experiment 5.3, where in line with existing approaches, we 
calculated an approach-bias score based on median RT values. 
All statistical analysis was run on R, version 3.1.1 [Pinheiro et al. 2014]. Mixed ANOVAs were run 
using afex [Singmann 2017]. (G)LMER models were constructed using lme4 [Bates et al. 2015], with p 
values generated by the lmerTest package [Kuznetsova et al.], which use  Satterthwaite 
approximations for degrees of freedom. There is some debate over the appropriate measurement of 
how well a (G)LMER model fits the data, i.e. how much variance in the data is explained by the model 
[Nakagawa and Schielzeth 2013; Colin Cameron and Windmeijer 1997].  In line with Baayen & Milin 
[2015], for non-binomial models we provide a simple pseudo-R-squared measure (R2PS ) which 
estimates the correlation between fitted and observed values. For binomial models we provide 
marginal R squared (R2M) which estimates how much the model’s fixed effects explain data variance, 
and conditional R squared (R2C) which estimate how much the model explains variance as a whole, 
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from the MumIn package [Barton 2017].  However, we also note that providing R2 measures is 
controversial [Bates 2006]. We provide p values because it is convention within HCI, and R2 values to 
give some simple indication of model fit. However, we note that the provision of p values for 
(G)LMER is also controversial and no Bonferroni corrections [Wolfram] were made, increasing the 
chance of a Type 1 error. We therefore also give estimated marginal values for the fixed parts of our 
models using the lsmeans R library [Lenth 2016],  although note that estimated marginal mean CIs 
can be misleading because they do not include random effects. 
We followed Baayen & Milin to use a combination of model comparisons and outlier removal to 
refine our models [2015]. They advocate minimal data trimming at the outset, combined with model 
criticism where model residuals were visually inspected and trimming applied if problems are 
identified. We started with an LMER model on data with impossible values removed; if model 
residuals violate normality (determined via a Shapiro-Wilk test and/or visual inspection), we 
investigated alternative GLMERs to fit the data in line with Lo and Andrews [2015]. We trimmed 
GLMER model residuals to within 2.5 standard deviations of the mean where visual inspection of 
GLMER residuals indicated violations of homogeneity of variance in line with Baayen & Milin [2015]. 
Where multiple GLMERs converged, we used model comparison on their Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) values, an indicator of model fit [Bates et al. 2010:4], to select the model of best fit. 
Most (G)LMERs use dummy coding for factor contrasts where a baseline (e.g. a control group) is 
available. Exceptions to this are noted in the text. 
DEFINITIONS 
We use the term “nonconscious” in preference to “unconscious” because of the latter’s association 
with Freudian psychology.  We define nonconscious behaviour as behaviour arising from cognitive 
processes that run regardless of conscious intention, outside mental awareness. The focus of this 
thesis is on nonconscious goal pursuit and habits as key automatic drivers of behaviour. We define 
habit as a learned, automatic impulse to behave in a certain way, in response to stable contextual 
cues, and automatic goal pursuit as the activation and enactment of goal-related behaviour without 
conscious intent. This is explored in more detail in Chapters 2, 3, 6 and 7. 




To avoid switching between “I” and “we”, I have used the term “we” throughout. Parts of chapters 4 
and 5 report student projects, where the original ideas were mine, and I supervised the projects, but 
the students carried out the development and data-gathering themselves. Specifically, Study 4.1 
Implementation Intention Pilot, Experiment 5.1: “Accept the banana” and Experiment 5.3: “Push 
away the smartphone” were student projects (with MSc students Adhi Wicaksono (4.1), Rosa Lilia 
Segundo Diaz (5.1) and  Jose Ignacio Rocca (5.3)), while the related work and discussion sections, 
data analysis and additional qualitative surveys 4.2 and 5.2 were my own work. An MSc student, Po-
Wei Chen, carried out data-gathering only for experiments 6.3.B and 6.4. I analysed all the data in 
this thesis, and I am first author on all publications arising from it.  
CONTRIBUTIONS 
The primary contribution of this thesis is to integrate knowledge from multiple fields to establish a 
framework for DBCIs to include nonconscious processes in their interventions and to explore these in 
multiple in-the-wild and semi-controlled studies.  Specific contributions are: 
 A Behaviour Alteration Framework that assimilates a set of theories to illustrate 
intervention strategies for DBCIs that can incorporate nonconscious processes 
(Chapter 3) 
 The practical application of the framework in a series of NDBCI studies (Chapters 4-
7). 
 An in-depth study of the feasibility of subliminal priming on smartphones (Chapter 6. 
 An exploration of the sources of goal setting failures with technology (Chapter 7). 
 A synthesis of the results and a research agenda for future DBCIs that can 
incorporate nonconscious processes (Chapter 8). 
The findings have implications for researchers in behaviour change fields, including HCI, who wish to 
look beyond conscious intentions to altering nonconscious processes. The framework and principles 
distil much related literature and practice to aid the practical application of techniques from 
psychology labs to both in-the-wild and semi-controlled interventions. Overall, we found mixed 
evidence for the efficacy of subliminal priming, the lowest-cognitive load intervention, and evidence 
that single-target higher-cognitive-load interventions still face user and technical restrictions. We 
therefore argue in Chapter 7 that a good future strategy is to strategically deploy multiple 
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interventions that require different levels of cognitive attention. We suggest shifting away from just-
in-time or opportunistic training to focus instead on high- and medium- load creation and rehearsal 
processes to automate goals, such that they will be activated by the user’s context in a low-cognitive 
load fashion.  
THESIS STRUCTURE 
Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical underpinnings of the nonconscious approach. It explores how the 
study of nonconscious processes such as habits can help to understand behaviour change failures in 
the longer term, and outlines relevant domains for intervention. We present an overview of the main 
theoretical approaches in DBCI research to determine their suitability to target behaviour via 
nonconscious processes. We highlight three theories that together explain both conscious and 
nonconscious intervention points for sustainable behaviour change: Dual Process Theory, modern 
Habit Theory and Goal Setting Theory.  
Chapter 3 synthesises these theories into a framework (the Behaviour Alteration Framework, BAF) to 
illustrate the potential intervention points for technology and outline the state of the art for each 
strategy. We outline three promising strategies of research: specialised action plans called 
Implementation Intentions; Cognitive Bias Modification; and subliminal priming.  
The next 3 chapters outline a series of NDBCIs based on these strategies. Chapter 4 describes a pilot 
on smartphones and a qualitative survey that together explore how context-aware technology can 
support Implementation Intentions. Chapter 5 describes two studies and other exploratory work in 
retraining the nonconscious via Cognitive Bias Modification, one experiment on smartphones, and 
the other on a Tabletop surface. Chapters 4 & 5 present exploratory work into NDBCI strategies of 
Implementation Intentions and Cognitive Bias Modification respectively. Together with the 
qualitative research in both chapters, they provide interested researchers with a starting point for 
future research, from domains of interest to multiple potential applied methods of intervention.  
Chapter 6 presents a deeper investigation into the feasibility of subliminal priming techniques on 
smartphones, with multiple experiments from pilots in-the-wild to larger-scale experiments in semi-
controlled conditions. The final experimental chapter, Chapter 7, uses a qualitative analysis of 
physical activity goals users form on smartphones together with the lessons learned from previous 
chapters, to outline how multiple NDBCI strategies can work together to achieve goal automation as 
a promising future strategy.  The thesis concludes in Chapter 8 with an overall discussion and a future 
research agenda.  
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2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK   
OVERVIEW 
This chapter analyses why nonconscious behaviours such as habits are important to behaviour 
change interventions. It: 
 defines nonconscious behaviours including habits and nonconscious goal pursuit, outlines 
evidence for their prevalence, identifies relevant domains, and summarises the mechanisms 
by which these behaviours can become persistent; and 
 assesses key behaviour change theories for their ability to support interventions to alter 
nonconscious behaviours. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF NONCONSCIOUS BEHAVIOURS  
Conscious control of behaviour runs along a continuum, from cognitively-intensive tasks that require 
high levels of concentration to behaviours that people can perform without thinking. For example, 
consider learning to ride a bicycle. At the outset, performing the behaviour involves slow, effortful 
concentration, checking and multiple errors. Over time, with sufficient repetition, the same 
behaviour can be done effortlessly alongside other cognitively demanding tasks such as composing a 
text1.  
DEFINITION  
Bargh & Chartrand defined four properties of automatic behaviour: it is unintentional; 
uncontrollable; performed without awareness; and efficient [1999]. Automatic behaviour comprises 
a broad spectrum of behaviour, from reflexes and compulsive behaviours to habits and goal-related 
automatic behaviours [Verplanken and Aarts 1999]. This thesis focuses on the last two.  
Habitual behaviour is learned behaviour that is “frequently repeated, has acquired a high degree of 
automaticity, and is cued in stable contexts” [Orbell and Verplanken 2010]. Nonconscious goal 
pursuit is the automatic activation and enactment of goal-directed behaviour [Hassin et al. 2009].  
Automaticity means such behaviours can be performed nonconsciously, i.e. “enacted with little 
conscious awareness” [Orbell and Verplanken 2010].  
                                                            
1 We would not recommend texting and cycling.  
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In contrast to common usage of the word habit, we define it as a context-response link driving the 
behaviour, rather than behaviour itself. The occurrence of the context triggers a response impulse. A 
habit is therefore a disposition to perform a given behaviour [Gardner 2015; Neal et al. 2006]. 
Habitual behaviour is the behaviour that results from this impulse. 
Although automatic behaviours are triggered nonconsciously, people are not necessarily unaware of 
their actual behaviour. Instead, they tend to be unaware of the internal nonconscious processes 
driving their behaviour [Stanovich 2005], such as the context-response associations [Wood and 
Rünger 2016]. This inability to introspect underlying processes makes such behaviours difficult to 
change: if the cause of an unwanted behaviour is not clear, then neither is the solution.   
NONCONSCIOUS BEHAVIOUR PREVALENCE AND DOMAINS 
Nonconscious behaviours such as habits are highly prevalent and structure much of everyday life 
[Wood et al. 2014]. People report 43% of their behaviours as being performed without conscious 
thought [Wood et al. 2002], study 2.). Habitual behaviours span multiple domains: health [Gardner 
2015], including eating [Robinson et al. 2013; Rothman et al. 2009; Wansink 2010], exercise 
behaviour [Conroy et al. 2013; Aarts et al. 1997] and physical activity [Rebar et al. 2016], behaviour 
of healthcare workers [Nilsen et al. 2012]; environmental behaviour [Klöckner 2013]. Habits have 
even been shown to be important in our use of technology [Limayem et al. 2007; Bayer and Campbell 
2012; Oulasvirta et al. 2012], including our participation in online communities [Wohn et al. 2012] 
and use of smartphones [van Deursen et al. 2015].  
Despite increasing interest in nonconscious behaviours in health psychology [Gardner 2015], few 
general behaviour change interventions currently use habit formation theory [Lally et al. 2008]. 
Likewise, few DBCI apps target habit constructs [Stawarz et al. 2015] or general nonconscious 
behaviours [Adams et al. 2015]. Adams et al found of 176 DBCI papers, only 11 targeted 
nonconscious behaviour, and only 2 mentioned related theory [2015]. Orji and Moffatt found of 85 
health domain DBCIs, only 3 targeted habits [2016].  
A  CHALLENGE AND AN OPPORTUNITY 
Changing behaviour via nonconscious behaviours is both a challenge and an opportunity. The 
challenge is to break persistent unwanted nonconscious associations between contexts and 
behaviours. The opportunity is to use the same association mechanism to establish wanted 
nonconscious behaviours that are similarly resistant to change.  
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Habit formation can enable the maintenance of wanted behaviours [Sheeran et al. 2017], since 
habitual behaviours are the default behaviour when people are unable or unwilling to make effortful 
decisions about how to behave [Neal et al. 2013]. They are performed automatically with little 
cognitive effort. These properties mean that DBCIs that can successfully form ‘good’ habits and break 
‘bad’ habits are likely to have long-lasting behavioural effects [Verplanken and Wood 2006; Rothman 
et al. 2009; Lally et al. 2011; Sheeran et al. 2017]. However, people often return to their unwanted 
behaviours over time [Bouton 2014]. This failure to sustain behaviour change is likely because of a 
lack of focus on automatic processes [Marteau et al. 2012] including habits. Behaviour change 
research tends to use deliberative interventions that rely on limited conscious resources: the 
provision of information is the most common DBCI technique [Webb et al. 2010b]. Such 
interventions are often unsuccessful in the long term [Hillsdon et al. 2002; Verplanken and Wood 
2006; Davis et al. 2015b]. Reflecting this, habits are one of the key challenges for behavioural change 
policy [Jackson 2005].  
THEORIES OF BEHAVIOUR CHANGE 
A critical component of addressing this gap is by understanding the key behavioural theories that 
contribute to our understanding of behaviour change at present and how they apply to nonconscious 
behaviours. This section reviews the use of theory in behaviour change in general and in DBCIs.  
THEORY USE IN BEHAVIOUR CHANGE RESEARCH   
The behaviour change research landscape is cluttered with multiple theories, frameworks, models, 
techniques, strategies and patterns. Table 2:1 demonstrates the issue: just a few behaviour change 
researchers have identified tens of different behaviour change techniques, multiple ways behaviour 
might change, and numerous related theories and models.  
Theory enables researchers to be more explicit about their assumptions, strategies and intervention 
targets [Rimer and Glanz 2005]. Despite—or perhaps because of—the number of competing models, 
there is a persistent lack of reference to theory in behaviour change research. The problem extends 
to DBCI research. Multiple reviews of DBCI research have found less than 50% specified a theoretical 
basis [Wiafe and Nakata 2012; Orji and Moffatt 2016], while Stawarz et al.’s review of habit 
formation apps found few that used features from habit theory [2015]. Many interventions that 
claim to be based on theory fail to make explicit how the theory relates to the intervention or use 
theoretically predicted measures as evaluating criteria [Michie and Prestwich 2010; Harris et al. 
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2011]. Likewise, few studies provide an in-depth understanding of the underlying mechanisms of 
behaviour and attitude change [Segerståhl et al. 2010; Riley et al. 2011], and few persuasive systems 
justify in detail their choice of behaviour change strategy, or the impact they are expected to have on 
their users [Foster et al. 2011].    
Number of ways behaviour might change   35 [Fogg 2009a] 
  26 [Abraham and Michie 2008] 
Number of behaviour change techniques, strategies or patterns 101 [Lockton et al. 2010] 
 93 [Michie et al. 2013a]  
 56 [Wiafe and Nakata 2012] 
 15 [Hamari et al. 2014] 
   7 [Fogg 2002] 
Number of theories, frameworks or models  83 [Michie et al. 2014b] 
 15 [Wiafe and Nakata 2012]   
Table 2:1 Behaviour change patterns identified in the literature 
This “theoretical gap” [Hekler et al. 2013] makes knowledge transfer between interventions difficult 
because it is not clear how and why a given intervention succeeds or fails [Nilsen 2015]. Under-use of 
theory is likely to impact the efficacy of the intervention, because important design characteristics 
are overlooked [Moller et al. 2017]. There is some evidence that interventions with a strong 
theoretical basis have a stronger association with efficacy [Webb et al. 2010b; Taylor et al. 2012], 
although this point is the subject of some debate [Michie and Prestwich 2010]. The shift to delivering 
behaviour change via technology is a key opportunity to deliver interventions based on systematic 
application of theory [Moller et al. 2017].  
The gap in theory use reflects a lack of clarity around how to apply commonly-used theories to DBCIs. 
Health behaviour theories have been criticised for being “woefully underspecified” [Sheeran et al. 
2017]. The inability of one single theory to address all aspects of behaviour change means 
researchers tend to use a “pick-and-mix” approach for strategies [Honka et al. 2011; Bandura 1998; 
Hekler et al. 2013]. For example, the myBehavior system incorporates elements from the Fogg 
Behavior Model, two decision theory models and Social Cognitive Theory [Rabbi et al. 2015], while 
Consolvo et al.’s set of design strategies incorporates strands from Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
[Festinger 1957] and the Transtheoretical Model [Prochaska and Velicer 1997], amongst others 
[Consolvo et al. 2009b].  
In this pick-and-mix context, theory overlaps mean disagreement about which strategy belongs to 
which theory [Doshi et al. 2003]. This is a particular problem for DBCI designers wishing to target 
nonconscious behaviours because (a) it is not clear how the most commonly-used theories relate to 
such behaviours and (b) the theory is unclear, for example with no theoretical consensus on habit 
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mechanisms [Neal et al. 2006]. This chapter aims to clarify the ability of commonly-used theories to 
explain nonconscious behaviours, and to bring together the most pertinent theories and strategies 
into an explanatory model that can inform the design of DBCIs to target them. 
THEORY SELECTION 
We selected ten prominent theories in the literature and analysed their application to changing 
nonconscious behaviours. They either: directly address nonconscious behaviours (Behaviourism; 
Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour; Dual Process Theory; modern Habit Theory); are commonly used 
in behaviour change and DBCI research (Theory of Planned Behaviour; Social Cognitive Theory; 
Transtheoretical Model; Goal Setting Theory); directly address technology-mediated behaviour 
change (Fogg Behavior Model); or are comprehensive in their coverage (COM-B). To indicate the 
usage of these theories more widely we performed a search within the ACM Digital Library, Google 
Scholar and Scopus. Table 2:2 shows an overview of the current use of these theories through 1) the 
number of mentions in the ACM Digital Library within ACM Journals and Proceedings 2 (ACM search 
column); 2) the citations for the key papers relating to each specific theory (Google Scholar Citation 
and Scopus citations column). For theories with multiple sources (Behaviourism, Dual Process 
Theory, Social Cognitive Theory), we have selected one or two relevant sources as a reference point. 
Since mere mentions and citations do not necessarily reflect implementations, we augmented the 
results with recent applications of each theory from the DBCI research (Recent Implementations 
column) and the domain of application (Behaviours Targeted column). Modern Habit Theory is not 
listed in Table 2:2 because there is no one key paper that defines it. 
This chapter does not aim to provide a comprehensive summary of all possible behaviour change 
theories and models available. Our aim is to consider the utility of applying the selected theories to 
changing nonconscious behaviours and DBCIs, and to highlight recent research using them.
                                                            
2 The search terms used were: theory/model title and (“behaviour change” or “behavior change” or “persuasive technology” 
 








Scholar  Scopus  
Citations 
based on Summary 










Six stages of behaviour, with ten 
processes for change. 
Interventions can move people 
between stages by targeting self-
efficacy and perception of 
advantages and disadvantages of 
behaviour. 
Individual stage of 
change; self-efficacy; 
decisional balance. 
[Paay et al. 2015; Park 
and Gweon 2015; 
Wittekind et al. 2015; 
Southern et al. 2017] 





11673 2882 [Bandura 
2001] 
Behaviour is determined by an 
interaction between existing 
behaviours, the environment 
(including social factors), and 




and personal factors 
including self-efficacy.   
[Rabbi et al. 2015; Khan 
et al. 2012] 
 








  56   50089 19954 [Ajzen 1991] 
Behaviour is rational, determined 
by conscious intentions and 
Perceived Behavioural Control 
(an internal assessment of their 
ability to perform the behaviour). 
Intention and Perceived 
Behavioural Control. 
[Bexheti et al. 2015; 
Chen et al. 2014; 
Comber and Thieme 
2013; Suh and Hsieh 
2016] 





  45a *10981 - [Skinner 
1938] 
Behaviour is learned from 
interacting with the 
environment. This interaction 
forms stimulus-response 
associations.  
External environment. [Cowan et al. 2013; 
Kirman et al. 2010; 
Foster et al. 2011; 
Adams et al. 2009] 
Environmentally friendly 
behaviours;  exercise 
Goal-setting 
theory 




Behaviour occurs where 
intentions are specified with an 
appropriate level of difficulty and 




[Konrad et al. 2015; 
Gouveia et al. 2015; 
Sleeper et al. 2015; 
Lomas et al. 2017] 
Stress; physical activity; 
social network site 
behaviour; learning 
a – 34 Operant conditioning results + 11 behaviourism results 
* –theories that do not have one single article that defines them   
- items missing from Scopus     
 
 








Scholar  Scopus  
Citations 
based on Summary 






   8b 948 214 
[Fogg 
2009b] 
Behaviour is executed when 3 
elements co-occur: motivation, 
ability and a trigger. 
Motivation, ability and a 
trigger. 
[Rabbi et al. 2015; 
Oduor et al. 2014; 
Sleeper et al. 2015; Lee 
et al. 2017a] 
Physical activity and diet; 
social influence; social 
network site behaviour. 
Dual Process 
Theory 





Behaviour is determined by two 
distinct sets of cognitive 
processes:  the Type 1 automatic 
system, formed of associative 
links; and the Type 2 conscious, 
deliberative system.  
Interaction of two sets 
of  cognitive processes: 
Type 1 processes (fast, 
automatic, 
nonconscious, 
associative); and Type 2 
processes (slower, 
deliberative, conscious). 
[Adams et al. 2015; 
Pinder et al. 2015a; 
Wang et al. 2014; 





COM-B model    0d 1123 612 [Michie et al. 2011] 
An interacting system of 




[Lee et al. 2017a; Walsh 
et al. 2016] 




   0d 2085 - 
[Triandis 
1977] 
Extends reasoned-action models 
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2016] 
Use of technology. 
b plus 81 direct citations within ACM  
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Table 2:2 Search results of theory/model mentions in the ACM plus citations and recent implementations 
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A key historical split in behaviour change theories and models is between behaviourism, which 
prioritises the role of the external environment in triggering behaviour, and cognitive theories, which 
argue that behaviour can also be explained by abstract cognitive constructs such as thoughts and 
motivations. More recently, integrated theories and models have emerged to reconcile both 
standpoints since neither theory can account for all the complexities of behaviour change [Prochaska 
and Velicer 1997; Bandura 1998].  We consider our ten theories and models in each of these three 
categories below before addressing their overlaps and omissions. 
BEHAVIOURISM 
Behaviourism is a key theory in understanding nonconscious behaviours because it focuses on the 
effects of the external environment on behaviour. It explicitly rejects the use of cognitive constructs 
to explain behaviour because they cannot be rigorous observed: only directly observable actions are 
considered.  
OVERVIEW 
Behaviourists see nonconscious behaviours as stimulus-response pairs formed outside conscious 
decision-making [West 2006] via two mechanisms of associative learning: classical and operant 
conditioning. A stimulus becomes associated with a particular response via repetition. Classical 
conditioning is the simple pairing of stimuli with responses; operant conditioning is the pairing of a 
stimulus-response with a positive or negative outcome. i.e. a reward for a wanted response, and a 
punishment for an unwanted one.  Rewarding a behaviour increases stimulus-response links and 
makes it more likely to be repeated. With repetition over time, any contextual cues that co-occur 
with a behaviour can trigger it [Davis 2001]. A behaviour is considered habitual when removing the 
reward does not diminish the behaviour, i.e. it is resistant to extinction. For example, a smoker who 
initially felt a positive reward from smoking (operant conditioning) may be prompted to smoke by 
the sight of a cigarette packet (classical conditioning), regardless of subsequent reward.  
A key determinant of the impact of operant conditioning is how reinforcement is delivered, the 
reinforcement schedule [Staddon and Cerutti 2003]. A variable reinforcement schedule, where a 
reward is delivered to an average time or response rate, not always at a given time or response, is 
more effective in producing behaviour that is resistant to extinction, compared to constant or 
random reinforcements [Bijou 1957].  
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RECENT IMPLEMENTATIONS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE   
Erev and Gopher argue that a reinforcement learning model – where the probability of a certain 
behaviour being performed increases when it is positively reinforced – provides “an extremely good 
approximation of behaviour in a wide set of situations” [Erev and Gopher 1999]. However, much 
research applying behaviourism in DBCIs is speculative. For example, Adams et al. suggest that 
pervasive exercise games are a good test-bed to explore behaviourist learning principles, but did not 
test this hypothesis [Adams et al. 2009].   
Some researchers suggest that principles of operant conditioning and variable rewards underpin the 
use of social networks [Fogg 2009a], and the problematic use of both social networks  [Andreassen 
2015] and the internet in general [Davis 2001]. However, neither claim is yet supported by empirical 
evidence.  
There is some evidence that positive reinforcement can impact on unwanted behaviours: a review of 
smoking cessation interventions during pregnancy found the most effective strategy was providing 
incentives [Lumley et al. 2009]. Positive reinforcements via virtual rewards are common in DBCIs, but 
as we discuss in the next chapter, this is not a panacea for motivating behaviour. A recent 
implementation of variable reinforcement found some evidence that operant conditioning can 
change and maintain more secure behaviour, although the sample sizes were small [Villamarín-
Salomón and Brustoloni 2010]. 
[Kirman et al. 2010; Orji Negative reinforcement or punishment strategies are relatively rare in DBCIs 
and Moffatt 2016]. This may be due to ethical concerns [Fogg 2002] and  fear of disengaging users 
[Consolvo et al. 2009b]. Nevertheless, there is evidence that aversive feedback does not necessarily 
[Foster et al. 2011]deter users . One wearable DBCI employing a punishment strategy is Pavlok, 
[Pavlok which allows users to trigger a mild electric shock to punish unwanted habitual behaviours 
2015]. Similarly, researchers have implemented less painful punishment techniques, for example 
[Foster et al. 2011; Cowan et al. 2013]making interaction more tedious , but none have been tested 
over the long term with a large user group. 
THEORETICAL ISSUES  
Behaviourism is unable to explain higher-order behaviour involved in the formation of nonconscious 
behaviours such as goals and conscious expectations of outcome. Kihlstrom et al. argue that implicit 
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learning involves some cognitive abstract representation of the knowledge, above and beyond the 
simple behaviourist associations [Kihlstrom et al. 2007]. 
COGNITIVE THEORY 
Given the limits of behaviourism, we now turn to a key cognitive theory of behaviour change, the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour, which peers into the ‘black box’ of cognitive representations of 
external and internal behavioural drives.  
THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOUR  
OVERVIEW 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour [Ajzen 1991] is a rational-action theory that specifies that 
intentions drive behaviour. A person’s behaviour is determined by their conscious intention to 
perform that behaviour and their Perceived Behavioural Control, an internal assessment of their 
ability to perform the behaviour. This intention is itself determined by behavioural attitudes, 
perception of subjective norms relating to the behaviour and Perceived Behavioural Control [Ajzen 
1991]. It is “the most extensively studied social cognition theory” [Hardeman et al. 2002]. 
RECENT IMPLEMENTATIONS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
Schneider et al. applied the theory to explore motivations of 643 mobile fitness coach users, finding 
that attitude, subjective norm and Perceived Behavioural Control was a good predictor of intention, 
although levels varied across personality types [Schneider et al. 2016]. There is mixed evidence to 
support the theory from metareviews. Hardeman et al.’s review of 24 interventions found few 
studies actually using the theory, and a lack of evidence linking theory components to intervention 
outcomes. Webb & Sheeran’s meta-analysis suggests intentions are insufficient to fully explain 
behaviour change, with “a medium-to-large change in intention … lead[ing] to a small-to-medium 
change in behaviour” [Webb and Sheeran 2006]. Crucially, an intention-behaviour gap persists, 
particularly in the presence of strong habits [Gardner et al. 2011; Webb et al. 2010b].   
THEORETICAL ISSUES  
The Theory of Planned Behaviour is not a theory of behaviour change, and there is evidence that 
determinants of intention change over time [Suh and Hsieh 2016]. The theory thus has limited 
application to habitual behaviours since they only emerge in the presence of intentions enacted 
repeatedly in stable contexts. Sniehotta argues that the Theory of Planned Behaviour has major 
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conceptual flaws, including no testable descriptions of how to modify intentions and therefore 
behaviour [Sniehotta 2009]. The theory omits context, habits and emotions and other nonconscious 
possible determinants of behaviour [Jackson 2005; Schneider et al. 2016; Sniehotta et al. 2014]. The 
inability of the model to deal with the intention-behaviour gap in the presence of habits is 
particularly problematic: several studies show that changing intention tends to impact on behaviour 
only where habits are not involved [Triandis 1977; Webb and Sheeran 2006].  
INTEGRATED MODELS 
Integrated models try to provide more overarching models of behaviour. They address dissatisfaction 
with the polarised view from behaviourists, that individual behaviour is solely determined by the 
environment, and cognitivists, that behaviour is solely determined by internal cognitive factors 
[Bandura 1978]. 
THEORY OF INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOUR  
OVERVIEW  
The Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour [Triandis 1977] extends reasoned-action models by explicitly 
including habitual behaviour and the context. Habit (expressed as frequency of past behaviour) and 
behavioural intention interact with situational conditions to determine behaviour. More frequently 
enacted behaviour weakens the intention-behaviour relationship. Behavioural intentions are the 
product of attitudes, social factors and affect (the experience of emotion), with affect providing a 
largely nonconscious input into behavioural decision making. Thus the intention construct includes 
both nonconscious and conscious components.  
RECENT IMPLEMENTATIONS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
There have been relatively few implementations of the theory. The DBCIs based on it tend to focus 
on issues of technology acceptance. Moody & Siponen applied the theory to explore use of the 
Internet at work for non-work purposes, finding evidence to support the model’s key assumption 
that intention and habits are both significant in predicting the target behaviour [Moody and Siponen 
2013]. However, the research emphasised social factors in the workplace; it is not clear whether the 
results generalise to less social domains. Gimpel et al. found that habit was a predictor of intention 
to use smartphones [Gimpel et al. 2016], although neither habits nor smartphone behaviour were 
measured. 
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THEORETICAL ISSUES  
Low usage in DBCIs means it is difficult to establish efficacy. Low usage may be due to a lack of clarity 
over how to apply it to DBCIs. Further, using just “frequency of past behaviour” to approximate 
habits is insufficient. Danner et al. found evidence that past behaviour frequency only moderates the 
intention-behaviour relationship when information about context stability is also represented 
[Danner et al. 2008]. Although the Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour includes “facilitating 
conditions”, it does not directly address the role of such conditions in forming habits – i.e. context 
stability. It may not therefore adequately capture habitual behaviour.  
SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY  
OVERVIEW  
Social Cognitive Theory [Bandura 2011; Bandura 1978] states that behaviour is determined by an 
interaction between existing behaviours, the environment, and personal cognitive, affective and 
biological influences. Social influence is a particularly important environmental factor. Social 
Cognitive Theory suggests that behaviour change arises from two sorts of belief: firstly that a given 
response will have a desired outcome, and secondly that the individual believes themselves capable 
of the response [Clark and Janevic 2014]. The theory predicts that desired behaviours are performed 
where environmental barriers are low and self-efficacy is high [Armitage and Conner 2000]. It also 
incorporates elements of behaviourism via the mechanism of reinforcement for learned behaviours. 
RECENT IMPLEMENTATIONS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
Implementations of Social Cognitive Theory tend to emphasise the construct of self-efficacy rather 
than testing the theory as a whole e.g. [Rabbi et al. 2015]. Some empirical evidence supports the 
interaction between self-efficacy and behaviour change: a meta-analysis of physical activity studies 
found 3 techniques “associated with [statistically] significant increases in both self-efficacy and 
physical activity behaviour; ‘action planning’, ‘reinforcing effort or progress towards behaviour’ and 
‘provide instruction’” [Olander et al. 2013]. Nevertheless, the overall effect was small, several other 
techniques had non-congruent effects on self-efficacy and physical activity, and the authors found 
that the reporting of intervention techniques was “inadequate” [Olander et al. 2013].  In addition, 
the identified techniques are consistent with Goal Setting Theory [Locke and Latham 2006], and 
behavioural theories of reinforcement, so it is not clear what additional contributions self-efficacy 
might provide, either at the theoretical or empirical level. Overall, Armitage & Conner argue that 
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Social Cognitive Theory-based interventions typically account for small- to medium- levels of variance 
in behaviour [2000]. 
THEORETICAL ISSUES  
Social Cognitive Theory has been criticised for failing to encompass habituation  [Martin et al. 2014]. 
The implication is that habits are hard to change because they are perceived to be hard to change. 
Social Cognitive Theory relies on conscious, rational processing of behaviour change intentions and 
outcome expectancies, which do not reflect the observed automaticity of contexts triggering habitual 
behaviour.  It suggests that self-management is the key to breaking habits [Bandura 1998], but it is 
not clear how individuals can deal with low levels of deliberative cognitive resources to perform self-
monitoring and self-regulation. Further, although the model does include context as a behavioural 
determinant, the focus is on the impact of social pressures such as role models and social support. 
Again, this omits the phenomenon of habits ceding control of behaviour to contextual cues. 
THE TRANSTHEORETICAL MODEL 
OVERVIEW  
The Transtheoretical Model [Prochaska and Velicer 1997]) or “stages of change” model was derived 
from a study of 872 people attempting to give up smoking on their own [Prochaska and DiClemente 
1983]. The model identifies six states of health behaviour change, from pre-contemplation (not even 
considering changing behaviour) to actively modifying their behaviour and/or the environment, 
through to maintaining the new behaviour and possible relapse. The model also identifies a set of ten 
processes for change, each of which has a different suggested emphasis for any given stage 
[Prochaska and Velicer 1997]. Key drivers of movement between the stages are self-efficacy and 
decisional balance (weighing up pros and cons) [Prochaska and DiClemente 1983].  
RECENT IMPLEMENTATIONS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
The Transtheoretical Model has been used widely in health behaviour change [Marshall and Biddle 
2001], and in DBCIs in general [Lin et al. 2006] and Table 2:2. Many implementations focus on the 
pre-contemplation stage, where participants require information about their behaviour to motivate 
change e.g. [Southern et al. 2017; Park and Gweon 2015].  Wittekind et al. used the model in an anti-
smoking DBCI to measure participants’ readiness to quit smoking, rather than to design an 
intervention [Wittekind et al. 2015]. 
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There are reasons to doubt the model’s efficacy. A metareview of smoking cessation interventions 
found no evidence for a statistically significant effect of interventions based on it  [Jepson et al. 
2006]. Aveyard et al. concluded that there was “no evidence that Transtheoretical Model-based 
 [Aveyard et al. 2009]  interventions [are] effective” .
THEORETICAL ISSUES  
Bandura criticised the stages of change as “arbitrary pseudo-stages” rather than genuine stages 
[1998]. West lists several empirical challenges to the Transtheoretical Model [West 2005], and argues 
it should be discarded because of fundamental theoretical flaws. One key flaw in considering habits is 
that the Transtheoretical Model assumes that people make stable rational choices, rather than being 
subject to nonconscious influences. 
COM-B  MODEL AND THE BEHAVIOUR CHANGE WHEEL  
OVERVIEW  
The COM-B model [Michie et al. 2011] emerged from research systematically reviewing and 
combining behaviour change theories and frameworks relating to health behaviours. The model 
states that behaviour is determined by an interacting system with three essential components: 
capability, opportunity and motivation. Together with the Behaviour Change Wheel [Michie et al. 
2011; Michie et al. 2014a], it provides comprehensive guidelines for behaviour change researchers to 
plan interventions. It essentially formalises the pick-and-mix approach. 
The COM-B model addresses some gaps in rational-action models such as the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour by including nonconscious components like “impulsivity, habit, self-control, associative 
learning and emotional processing”. The model includes both automatic and analytical brain 
processes in the motivation concept, which encompasses all brain processes that “energize and 
direct behaviour” [Michie et al. 2011], and is derived from the PRIME model [West 2006]. 
Opportunity includes all factors external to an individual that “make the behaviour possible or 
prompt it”, while capability includes all factors internal to an individual that contribute to their ability 
to perform a behaviour [Michie et al. 2011].  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND RECENT IMPLEMENTATIONS  
Walsh et al. used the COM-B model and Behaviour Change Wheel to devise an app for physical 
activity over 5 weeks [Walsh et al. 2016]. Their intervention group, which featured feedback and 
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information about discrepancy between current behaviour and goal had showed a small-to medium 
statistically significant improvement over the control. Lee et al. recently employed the model in a 
context-aware sleep intervention [Lee et al. 2017a]. However, COM-B was combined with many 
other techniques and strategies (e.g. Fogg’s Behaviour Model; goal setting theory; self-monitoring) 
and it is therefore difficult to make conclusions about the use of the model itself from their work. 
THEORETICAL ISSUES 
The COM-B model is relatively new and therefore relatively untested in HCI [Cibrian et al. 2016]. 
Since it and the Behaviour Change Wheel are explicitly positioned as practical design, rather than as 
explanatory theory, their application to nonconscious behaviours is unclear. Further research is 
required to determine whether they can improve intervention efficacy [Michie et al. 2011], 
particularly in DBCIs responsive to dynamic contexts and individual preferences [Michie et al. 2013b].  
FOGG BEHAVIOUR MODEL  
Several models specifically relate to technology-mediated interventions. For reasons of brevity, here 
we only outline Fogg’s highly-cited research3.  
OVERVIEW  
The Fogg Behavior Model [Fogg 2009b] focuses on computer-based persuasion  [Fogg 2002]. It 
proposes three key determinants of behaviour: motivation, ability and a trigger. All elements must 
occur at the same time to generate a behaviour. Fogg also created: the Behavior Grid [Fogg 2009a], a 
taxonomy of 35 ways behaviour might change; the Behavior Wizard [Fogg and Hreha 2010] which 
attempts to merge the previous two items; and the ‘Tiny Habits” model ([Fogg 2015], not yet 
published in a peer-reviewed form), which suggests DBCIs should change the performance context, 
break the required habitual behaviour into small steps, and reward small step completion.   
RECENT IMPLEMENTATIONS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
Establishing empirical evidence for the Fogg Behaviour Model is difficult because it is a process 
model rather than a theory. Researchers also tend to use it alongside other models, e.g. Cambo et 
al.’s work uses the Fogg Behavior Model with the Health Action Process Approach [Cambo et al. 
                                                            
3 1,984 citations listed in the ACM Digital Library at June 2017, and see Table 2:2 
. 
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2017], which makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the model. Sugarman & Lank used the 
model to inform a qualitative survey of methods to encourage reduction in electricity consumption, 
although again they incorporated elements from other theories [Sugarman and Lank 2015].   
THEORETICAL ISSUES  
Fogg’s work is a behaviour change principles approach [Noar et al. 2008]. The Fogg Behaviour Model 
is a simple conceptualisation of behaviour with clear design implications: provide people with an 
appropriate trigger, motivation and ability to perform a wanted behaviour and it will occur. However, 
the underlying psychological mechanisms of change are less clear. Further, although Fogg sees the 
point of persuasive technology as “fundamentally about learning to automate behavior change” 
[Fogg 2009b], the Fogg Behavior Model has little to say about the automatic components of 
behaviour or routine behaviour [Oulasvirta et al. 2012]. Ferebee found ambiguities and a lack of 
guidelines in mapping existing interventions to the Behavior Grid [Ferebee 2010].  
DISCUSSION OF COMPETING MODELS 
THEORY OVERLAPS  
Health behaviour change models contain many components, some of which are shared or overlap 
[Taylor et al. 2006]. For example, intentions are a key behavioural determinant in the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour, the Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour and Social Cognitive Theory, although the 
theories differ in the elements that determine that intention. The notion of “perceived behavioural 
control” from the Theory of Planned Behaviour is similar to parts of the Theory of Interpersonal 
Behaviour’s notion of “facilitating conditions” and Social Cognitive Theory’s concept of self-efficacy. 
Common to these models is the implicit assumption that users form intentions along rational, 
conscious lines. Most health behaviour theories assume that conscious attitudes and intentions, self-
efficacy and social influences impact most on behaviour [Noar et al. 2008].   
The Transtheoretical Model, the Fogg Behaviour Model and COM-B are process models [Nilsen 2015], 
which focus more on the process of designing behaviour change interventions rather than the 
theory. Process models may have greater utility to intervention designers than framework models 
[Rogers 2004]. However, process models may not always highlight the underlying theory: although 
the COM-B model is explicitly couched in the PRIME model of motivation, the Fogg models do not 
have explicit theoretical underpinnings. 
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There are also clear overlaps between the three-part models that address interactions between 
behaviour, the environment and internal cognitive factors (Fogg, COM-B, Theory of Interpersonal 
Behaviour and Social Cognitive Theory). Indeed, Lee et al. recently combined the Fogg Behavior 
Model and COM-B into a single approach which assumed a given behaviour occurred when 
“opportunity,  ability,  motivation,  and  a  trigger all align” [Lee et al. 2017a]. 
INTENTIONS &  MOTIVATIONS  
A key common determinant of behaviour is intention. An intention is a decision to undertake a 
particular behaviour at a future point in time. It encompasses the person’s motivation to perform the 
behaviour – the direction (to perform the behaviour or not) and the intensity (how much value they 
assign to that performance) [Sheeran 2002]. The Theory of Planned Behaviour, the Theory of 
Interpersonal Behaviour and Social Cognitive Theory all assume that intentions are key determinants 
of behaviour, and those intentions arise from the likelihood and desirability of the outcomes of a 
given behaviour [Deutsch and Strack 2010; Webb and Sheeran 2006]. However, it is not clear exactly 
how intentions drive behaviour [de Bruin et al. 2012], nor how the theories see any interaction 
between habit and intentions.  
Motivation is a value attached to a particular intention. Motivation is a key construct in the Theory of 
Interpersonal Behaviour, Social Cognitive Theory, the COM-B model and the Fogg Behavior Model, 
and is central in moving people from contemplation to active stages in the Transtheoretical Model. 
We agree that DBCIs require people to be consciously motivated to change their behaviour to engage 
in interventions at the outset. However, most models (with the key exception of COM-B) focus on 
conscious, rational motivations, omitting important automatic aspects of motivation including the 
impact of contextual cues, internal physiological states (e.g. hunger) and emotions.  
THEORY GAPS  
Despite some consensus on behavioural determinants between the theories, there are gaps in their 
ability to drive the design of behaviour change interventions. Not all the models are dynamic, or 
specify how their constructs or the relationships between them change over time. This limits their 
application to DBCIs that can adapt rapidly to their users and changing inputs [Riley et al. 2011].  
Some models omit the impact of the context, habit and/or emotions in determining behaviour.  
Not all the theories explore how behaviour changes and there is little consensus on how to combine 
overlapping constructs to change behaviour [Noar et al. 2008]. For example, the Theory of Planned 
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Behaviour predicts behaviour, rather than addressing how intentions can change over time [Suh and 
Hsieh 2016].  
The practical application of theories is not always clear. Despite intentions being a core construct in 
many behaviour change theories, they do not tend to address how those intentions are formed and 
how their relationship to behaviour may change over time. The exception is the Transtheoretical 
model, which explores when intentions change, but not how [Armitage and Conner 2000].  
Many theories incorporate elements of behaviourist operant conditioning, e.g. positive 
reinforcement in the Transtheoretical Model and Social Cognitive Theory [Adams et al. 2017]. 
However, despite the crucial role the environment plays in behaviourism, many common theories 
emphasise individual/interpersonal variables rather than broader social/environmental variables 
[Davis et al. 2015b; Taylor et al. 2006]. This is a crucial omission in their application to understanding 
and changing habits given the role of contextual cues in triggering habits. 
Nonconscious behaviours including habits are key constructs omitted from many behaviour theories, 
particularly health-related theories [Nilsen et al. 2012], despite compelling empirical support for the 
role of habit as a moderator of the intention-behaviour link [Webb and Sheeran 2006; Sheeran et al. 
2017]. In general, models that assume a rational, deliberative process as a key determinant of 
behaviour (e.g. the Transtheoretical Model and the Theory of Planned Behaviour), are insufficient to 
explain the persistence of an “intention-behaviour gap” [Gardner et al. 2011; Webb et al. 2010b].   
Theories that include habit either mention it somewhat in passing (COM-B model) or restrict its 
determinants too narrowly (e.g. behaviourism’s failure to incorporate cognitive constructs that 
operate during habit formation). Even theories that explicitly incorporate habit e.g. the Theory of 
Interpersonal Behaviour and Social Cognitive Theory, fail to explain how and why habits operate, 
which limits their practical application. Further, although COM-B, the Theory of Interpersonal 
Behaviour and Social Cognitive theory all include elements of nonconscious motivation, it is not clear 
how the conscious and nonconscious elements work together to determine behaviour. 
A good candidate for filling this theoretical gap in DBCIs is Dual Process Theory. Despite Dual Process 
Theory being the “probably one of the most significant theoretical developments in the history of 
social psychology” [Gawronski and Creighton 2006], it has been little used in DBCI interventions [Orji 
and Moffatt 2016; Webb et al. 2010a; Adams et al. 2015]. The under-use of Dual Process Theory is 
important because together with contemporary habit and goal theory, it directly addresses the 
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intention-behaviour gap and allows us to address the research gap in understanding how to build 
habit-focused DBCIs.  
BRIDGING THE THEORY GAPS 
This section outlines three theories that address the formation and stopping of nonconscious 
behaviours: Dual Process Theory, modern habit theory and Goal Setting Theory. Bringing these 
theories together can bridge the research gap in understanding how to change nonconscious 
behaviours using technology and therefore move to close the intention-behaviour gap. Dual Process 
Theory allows us to see how conscious and nonconscious forces interact to determine behaviour; 
modern habit theory indicates how these might combine to determine habitual behaviour; and Goal 
Setting Theory informs effective goal-setting strategies to help drive habit and nonconscious goal 
operation through behavioural repetition.  
DUAL PROCESS THEORY  
OVERVIEW  
Dual Process Theory contends that behavioural decisions arise from two distinct sets of processes: 
Type 1 (broadly automatic, e.g. habits) and Type 2 (broadly conscious, e.g. behavioural intentions). 
Type 1 processes are nonconscious cue-driven, heuristic, impulsive, associative, contextual, 
automatic, parallel processes that operate at speed; while Type 2 processes are conscious goal-
directed, slower, rational, considered, rule-based, abstract serial processes [Evans 2011; Evans and 
Frankish 2009]. This split roughly maps onto the behaviourist/cognitivist rationalist divide, with 
habits forming part of the Type 1 set. Not all the nonconscious behaviours triggered by Type 1 
processes are habitual [Marteau et al. 2012]. People may act in line with an impulse in response to a 
cue or in line with nonconscious goals without the action becoming a stable, repeated behaviour (see 
Chapter 7).  
The crucial difference between behaviourism and Dual Process Theory is that in the latter, automatic 
behaviours rest on cognitive constructs, and thus may be altered using both cognitive and 
behavioural techniques. Dual Process Theory thus unites the behaviourist-cognitivist divide: 
behaviour is the outcome of an interplay between both Type 1 and Type 2 processes.  
We have outlined common assumptions of Dual Process Theory, but there is no one definitive 
version [Evans 2008]. Rather, it is a family of theories from multiple fields of research [Stanovich 
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2011], including the CEOS model [Borland 2013], the Reflective-Impulsive model [Strack and Deutsch 
2014] and System 1-System 2 theory [Kahneman 2011].  
RECENT IMPLEMENTATIONS &  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
Few DBCIs currently use Dual Process Theories [Adams et al. 2015]. A review of 85 DBCIs since 2000 
found zero implementations [Orji and Moffatt 2016], although pilots are emerging, for example 
Adams et al.’s studies in “mindless computing” [Adams et al. 2015]. Phelan et al. applied the theory 
in a qualitative investigation into privacy behaviour, finding that the dual process view helps to 
inform the “privacy paradox” where privacy behaviour is inconsistent with privacy concerns [Phelan 
et al. 2016]. 
Behaviour change research as a whole has recently begun to advocate the targeting of Type 1 
processes alongside Type 2 approaches [Bargh and Morsella 2010; Dolan et al. 2012; Marteau et al. 
2012; Sheeran et al. 2013]. Dual Process Theories are being used increasingly in health behaviour 
interventions [Hofmann et al. 2008], e.g. Kremers et al. used Dual Process Theory to build a 
framework exploring the impact of environmental factors on weight gain [Kremers et al. 2006].  
Neuroscientific evidence supports Dual Process Theory by showing that action-outcome behaviour 
(cognitivist goal-directed behaviour) and context-response behaviour (behaviourist habits) are 
associated with two different sets of brain processes [Gasbarri et al. 2014; Graybiel 2008; Yin and 
Knowlton 2006]. Presseau et al. measured deliberative and automatic predictors for six different 
healthcare behaviours (e.g. providing weight advice; prescribing for diabetes) using questionnaires 
and found that both predictors predicted behaviour [Presseau et al. 2014].  
THEORETICAL ISSUES  
Since Dual Process theories are still little-used in DBCIs, it is difficult to establish their efficacy. 
Implementing Dual Process Theory is not trivial: there are multiple versions, and researchers are still 
actively developing the theory as it applies to behaviour change [Wiers et al. 2013; Borland 2016]. 
Nevertheless, Dual Process Theories agree on two key predictions: behaviour is an outcome of both 
Type 1 and Type 2 processes; and Type 1 processes (including habits) will dominate when Type 2 
resources are depleted, during distraction, high cognitive load, time pressure, adverse mood and low 
self-control [Hofmann et al. 2008; Muraven and Baumeister 2000]. The relative importance of Type 1 
and Type 2 processes as a determinant of behaviour also varies with personality [Sladek et al. 2006]. 
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Thus the influence of Type 1 and Type 2 processes on an individual’s behaviour will vary both over 
time and in comparison with other people.  
Dual Process Theory does not in itself provide a practical framework of devising interventions to alter 
automatic behaviours. For this we need to examine two additional theories: modern habit theory 
and Goal Setting Theory. 
MODERN HABIT THEORY  
OVERVIEW 
Modern habit theory also integrates both stimulus-response behaviourist theories and goal-directed 
cognitive reasoned-action theories (e.g. [Wit and Dickinson 2009]). We have outlined the key points 
and some empirical evidence for the existence of habits above. This section therefore addresses 
recent implementations and some theoretical issues. 
RECENT IMPLEMENTATIONS  
Stawarz et al. investigated the formation of habits in-the-wild, focusing on the relatively simple 
behaviour of participants reporting what they had for lunch [2015]. In a 4-week study, they found 
that automaticity was hindered both by smartphone reminders and positive reinforcement. 
Automaticity developed faster for participants depending on specific if-cue then-behaviour plans 
(Implementation Intentions), compared to reminders and reinforcement, but they found no 
significant differences to a control no-cues group.    
THEORETICAL ISSUES  
Habit research is ongoing across multiple fields, with ongoing challenges in determining the exact 
mechanisms underlying habit formation [Tobias 2009; Yin and Knowlton 2006]  and in studying its 
automaticity  [Gasbarri et al. 2014]. Nilsen et al. suggest that there is a lack of empirical evidence 
supporting interventions based on habit theory [Nilsen et al. 2012].  
GOAL SETTING THEORY  
OUTLINE  
Goal Setting Theory [Locke and Latham 2002; Locke and Latham 1990] explicitly explores how best to 
form goals to drive behavioural repetition when Type 2 processes predominate. It fills the theoretical 
gap in detailing how to specify intentions. The theory proposes that goals must be accepted by users 
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to be effective, that feedback on goal progress is important, and that two key aspects of goal setting 
determines their efficacy: difficulty and specificity. Hard, specific goals are more effective than easy, 
vague ones. Contextual constraints are considered a moderator [Latham et al. 2017].  Research is 
also moving towards incorporating the operation of nonconscious goals [Latham et al. 2017], which 
we address in Chapters 3, 6 and 7.  
RECENT IMPLEMENTATIONS 
DBCIs often used Goal Setting Theory alongside other theories. For example, Ding et al. used goal 
setting theory predictions within a context-aware walking app based on the Fogg Behavior Model 
[2016]. They found some qualitative evidence that users liked short-term step goals rather than daily 
or weekly goals, but it is unclear whether the results can be generalised.   
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
Meta-analysis indicates that specific, difficult goals improved performance compared to asking 
people to “do your best”, with effect sizes from .42 to .80 [Locke and Latham 1990], cited in [Locke 
and Latham 2002]. However, there is evidence that who assigns the goal makes a difference: when 
the DBCI sets the goals, easier goals may be more effective. Lomas et al. found that when self-
selected, moderately difficult tasks were most motivating, but when externally assigned, easiest 
games were most motivating [Lomas et al. 2017]. Konrad et al. found evidence that adaptive, easy 
goals set by user’s technology were more motivating than difficult goals [2015].  
THEORETICAL ISSUES  
The two main theoretical issues with Goal Setting Theory is a lack of consensus on measuring  goal 
commitment [Hollenbeck et al. 1989] and goal difficulty, and that research into nonconscious goals is 
at an early stage. 
SUMMARY 
We have explored theoretical approaches to changing nonconscious behaviours. Three theories are 
good contenders to fill the theoretical gap in explaining nonconscious behaviour: Dual Process 
Theory, modern habit theory and Goal Setting Theory. We bring them together in a conceptual 
framework, the Behaviour Alteration Framework, in the next chapter to ease interpretation of how 
they combine to address nonconscious behaviours. 
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3. BEHAVIOUR ALTERATION FRAMEWORK 
This chapter: 
 introduces the Behaviour Alteration Framework (BAF) 
 outlines how it helps to illustrate the influence of nonconscious processes on behaviour  
 explores related strategies for NDBCIs. 
OVERVIEW 
The previous chapter identified gaps in the behaviour change research’s ability to deal with 
automatic behaviours. This chapter outlines our suggested solution: a Behaviour Alteration 
Framework (BAF) that brings together Dual Process Theory, modern habit theory and Goal Setting 
Theory to understand how behaviour emanates from both conscious and nonconscious sources. We 
use the framework to explore potential avenues for interventions to change behaviour, and frame 
current HCI research within it. 
INTRODUCTION 
The BAF is a practical, illustrative framework that synthesises Dual Process Theory, modern habit 
theory and Goal Setting Theory so they can be applied more easily to DBCIs, including NDBCIs. The 
BAF provides a conceptual, theory-driven simplification of how external and internal factors combine 
to generate both automatic and deliberative behaviour. It answers a call for a practical tool to 
describe and assess NDBCIs [Hollands et al. 2016; Aarts et al. 1997]. It allows researchers to devise 
new interventions that do not solely rely on limited deliberative cognitive resources. 
The BAF is shown in Figure 3.1. Behaviour is a function of:  
(1) the context consisting of a set of cues; 
(2) Type 1 associative processes generating behavioural impulses in response to cues;  
(3) Type 2 deliberative processes generating explicit intentions; and  
(4) individual differences (e.g. impulsivity), which determine the relative impact of Type 1 and Type 2 
processes on behaviour.  
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Figure 3.1 Behaviour Alteration 
Framework diagram 
 
Solid lines indicate processes that 
always run; dashed lines indicate 
optional processes.  
 
Context cues (F1) are filtered by both 
Type 1 (F2) and Type 2 (F3) attentional 
processes to form a set of inputs to 
subsequent memory processes of Type 1 
(P1) and Type 2 (P3).  
 
Competing drivers to act populate the 
potential response stack (P6). These may 
be consciously noticed by self-
monitoring (P5) and overridden by self-
control (P4).  
The resulting behavioural response (A1) 
and (optional) outcome (A2) feed back 
into both Type 1 and Type 2 processes. 
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The framework is dynamic: at the Filter stage, cues flow through perception and Type 1 and Type 2 
attention filters to create an input set. At the Prepare stage, Type 1 and Type 2 memory processes match 
these cues to potential responses, Type 1 impulses or Type 2 intentions. These compete to become a 
single response at the Act stage. Information from observed response and outcomes feed back into both 
Type 1 and Type 2 processes. Solid lines indicate processes that run continuously; dashed lines indicate 
processes that may run. Note that the BAF is not intended to represent the various highly complex 
physical architectures that operate in the brain. Instead, it is a virtual conceptual architecture, where 
boundaries between systems need not be rigid [Sloman 2002]. 
With sufficient repetition of simple behaviours in stable contexts, cycles around the Filter-Prepare-Act 
stages become more automatic. The corresponding context-response behaviour links become stronger 
and proceed faster, with decreasing need for conscious attention. People’s behaviour then transfers 
from slower Type 2 to faster Type 1 processes, from the conscious right-hand side of Figure 3.1 to the 
nonconscious left hand side. Behaviour disruption strategies aim to call on Type 2 deliberation to 
override automatic Type 1 processes. Although disruption can be employed to a user’s advantage, e.g. in 
error checking or reducing technology over-use [Cox et al. 2016], disruption also makes behavioural 
outcomes less stable because its success depends in part on available cognitive resources.  
Dual Process Theory predicts that behaviour is the result of the simultaneous influence of Type 1 and 
Type 2 processes [Kremers et al. 2006; Presseau et al. 2014]. Automatic impulses to respond in a 
particular way, triggered by a given context, compete with other impulses and with intentions from Type 
2 processes to determine a response [Gardner 2015]. The dominant response is determined by the 
relative strength of the items on the Potential Response stack, and is influenced by cognitive resources 
and an individual’s cognitive capacity and processing style [Sladek et al. 2006].  
Next we detail how automatic behaviours such as habits and nonconscious goal-directed behaviour are 
triggered and formed within the BAF. 
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AUTOMATIC BEHAVIOUR TRIGGER PROCESS 
F ILTER 
We start with a set of cues that make up a given context (F1). Cues include external features of the 
environment e.g. physical locations and other people, and internal features e.g.  mood or physiological 
drives such as hunger [Wood et al. 2014]. This broad set of cues is first “filtered” by perception 
processes. Then they are filtered via Type 1 implicit attention processes (F2) and, optionally, Type 2 
explicit attention processes (F3). Type 1 implicit attention filtration is influenced by mood, attitudes and 
stereotypes: some cues receive preferential implicit attention over others [Deutsch and Strack 2010]. 
Type 2 processes may use directed attention (F3) to select specific cues from the context. This directed 
attention has limited cognitive resources, so its ability to select cues is impacted by cognitive load. The 
result of the attentional filter process is a subset of cues as inputs to the potential response generation 
process, Prepare.  
PREPARE  
Cue inputs are used by both Type 1 and Type 2 memory processes to generate behavioural schemas for 
action [Strack and Deutsch 2014]. Type 1 processes (P1) generate impulses from implicit memory while 
Type 2 processes (P3) generate intentions from explicit memory. These separate schemas compete to 
become enacted behaviour, via a mechanism to integrate parallel inputs into a single behavioural 
outcome [Bargh and Morsella 2010], the Potential Behavioural stack (P6).  
Type 1 memory processes are fast, modular and parallel, so multiple impulses may be generated from 
input cues and placed on the Potential Response stack. These impulses include habits and automatic goal 
impulses. Habits are context-response impulses for behaviour that has been repeated in a stable context. 
Automatic goal impulses are goal-response links, allowing for nonconscious goal-driven behaviour when 
a goal acts as a cue [Aarts and Dijksterhuis 2000]. Impulses emerging from Type 1 memory processes 
may also be of a simple approach or avoid type [Keatley et al. 2013], for example instinctive behaviour to 
flinch from a loud sound.  
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The Potential Response stack (P6) may also contain conscious, deliberative intentions arising from Type 2 
processes (P3). These may arise from explicit goals via the mechanism of self-control (P4). Intentions that 
have been set using Goal Setting Theory are assumed to take priority on the stack. Intentions include the 
intention not to act, i.e. impulse stifling, in the case that self-monitoring (P5) indicates an unwanted 
impulse is likely to be enacted. This ability requires that the Potential Response stack is to a certain 
extent accessible to conscious thought [Bargh and Morsella 2010]. 
The order of impulses and intentions in the Potential Response stack is determined by several factors: 
match with the particular cue [Norman and Shallice 1986]; affect towards the cue and/or response [West 
2006]; and accessibility [Kahneman 2003; Danner et al. 2008]. Placing value on degree of ‘match’ means 
that behaviour enacted more often appears higher on the stack than less previously-enacted behaviour, 
since the match with a particular cue will be stronger. Thus an impulse to perform a behaviour that has 
been repeated in a stable context will appear higher in the Potential Response stack: these are automatic 
behaviours such as habits.  
ACT 
A competitive winner-takes-all process determines which single behaviour is performed from competing 
schemas on the Potential Response stack [Hofmann et al. 2009]. Any potential response (impulse or 
intention) that exceeds a certain act threshold (the red dashed line in P6 in Figure 3.1) will be enacted if 
there are no rival potential responses [Wood et al. 2014]. Where competing potential responses cross 
the act threshold, arbitration using Type 2 processes is required.  
A response may be followed by an outcome, a corresponding change in the environment or a reward. 
Information on the response and outcome feed back into implicit and explicit memory processes and 
therefore may impact on subsequent Act phases [Sun et al. 2005; Wood and Neal 2007].  
ACT ARBITRATION PROCESS 
Table 3:1 shows the different possible states of the Potential Response stack with respect to the act 
threshold (the red dotted line), and the behavioural response. Impulse A, impulse B and impulse C are 
impulses to perform behaviours A, B and C respectively; intention D is an intention to perform  
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behaviour D. The relative value of items on the Potential Response stack is indicated by position: the 
higher in the stack, the higher the relative value. 
 
 
Table 3:1 Arbitration between competing Potential Responses 
State 1 shows that where a single impulse crosses the act threshold, the impulse will be enacted 
regardless of intention: intention D is shown with a dashed outline to indicate that it may or may not be 
present. State 2 shows that where a single intention is strongly-held such that it alone crosses the act 
threshold (state 2), its target behaviour will be enacted regardless of competing, weaker impulses. State 
3 shows that where conflicts between  a Type 1 impulses and a Type 2 intention occur with similar 
implicit values so that both cross the act threshold, Type 2 processes may be alerted to arbitrate [Wood 
and Neal 2007]. State 4 shows that arbitration may also be alerted to differentiate between competing 
impulses.   
 
| P 3:38 
 
Arbitration is the implicit core of many strategies to alter default automatic behaviours, e.g. to break 
habits. These strategies try to populate the Potential Response stack with conscious Type 2 intentions to 
compete with unwanted other potential responses in order to trigger deliberative arbitration. However, 
calling on Type 2 arbitration resources imposes cognitive load, which is not always available. Where 
arbitration cannot be performed, the most likely response is the highest-value impulse in the stack. 
Arbitration is hampered by multiple load factors including other Type 2 processes, ego depletion, time 
pressure, and individual factors including working memory capacity and low trait self-control [Hofmann 
et al. 2009]. This explains why many effortful intentions to change behaviour fail: when Type 2 cognitive 
resources are low,  default Type 1 impulses predominate [Hofmann et al. 2009]. 
In case 3, if cognitively costly arbitration cannot be carried out, impulse A will predominate because 
impulses appear more quickly in the Potential Response stack in excess of the act threshold than slower 
intentions. Where impulse A represents any Type 1 automatic behaviour, generated by repeating a 
simple behaviour in response to stable contextual cues, such impulses will predominate when cognitive 
resources are low. 
AUTOMATIC BEHAVIOUR FORMATION PROCESS 
How might people form automatic behaviours, so that their default behaviour is congruent with their 
conscious intentions? Repetition is key. Habit formation requires that a given response (Act stage) is 
repeated in a stable context, i.e. with a stable set of cues arising from the Filter stage. With repetition, 
the impulse to perform the given response emerges as highest in the Potential Response stack (Prepare 
stage), triggered by the stable cues. The response (Act stage) may then proceed without conscious 
attention, i.e. the intervention of Type 2 processes. In behaviourist terms, stimulus-response links have 
been established. 
This automatic behaviour formation process can be accelerated by rewarding the required response, i.e. 
operant conditioning, providing a rewarding outcome (A2). Rewards can promote the learning of 
context-response links [Wood et al. 2014]. A reward does not have to be explicit for an automatic 
behaviour to form. For example, Conroy et al. found evidence for an habitual element in sedentary 
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behaviour despite this behaviour not being explicitly rewarded or even consciously intended [Conroy et 
al. 2013].  
The key task for DBCIs to form automatic behaviours is to foster behavioural repetition in a stable 
context. Traditional behaviour change interventions for forming new automatic behaviours is to use 
conscious Type 2 processes (the right-hand side of Figure 3.1) to drive repetition via mechanisms of 
reminders and self-control. However, as we outline below, the BAF also allows this repetition to be 
targeted via nonconscious Type 1 means.  
OPPORTUNITIES FOR DBCIS TO INTERVENE  
This section discusses the opportunites our framework identifies to intervene to change behaviour. We 
cover both the cessation of persistent unwanted behaviours, and the creation of new persistent 
automatic behaviours; some techniques are appropriate for both. For behaviour-forming techniques, the 
key question is how to move from Type 2 to Type 1 processes, from right to left in Figure 3.1. This is a 
movement from behaviour arising from slow, limited, serial, explicit systems to behaviour arising from 
faster, parallel implicit systems. For behaviour-breaking techniques, the key question is how to alter 
existing Type 1 processes without relying on cognitively effortful disruptive Type 2 resources. Points of 
intervention are denoted by numbers F1-F3, P1-P6 and A1-A2 in  Figure 3.1.  
F ILTER:  TARGET THE CONTEXT (PHASE 1) 
Removing or avoiding a cue that forms part of a cue-response link in an unwanted automatic behaviour 
will mean the undesired response is not initiated or performed. This approach is challenging because 
Type 1 associative links are not available to introspection [Neal et al. 2012; Orbell and Verplanken 2015]. 
People are unlikely to be aware of which cues are relevant to their unwanted automatic behaviours. An 
alternative strategy is to introduce cues to trigger required responses. 
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ALTER CONTEXT (F1) 
OUTLINE  
Adding or removing cues affects which impulses and intentions arise in the Potential Response stack. 
Changing cue properties such as ambience and size and/or placement, e.g. proximity and availability can 
also affect the stack [Hollands et al. 2013]. Context alteration is suggested as particularly applicable in 
the unhealthy eating domain [Wansink and Chandon 2014].   
EVIDENCE 
The primary implementations of context-altering DBCIs are ambient persuasive technologies, designed 
to change behaviour and/or attitude unobtrusively without requiring focal attention [Ham et al. 2009]. 
Examples include altering a workspace to encourage people towards the stairs [Rogers et al. 2010] and 
augmenting shopping trollies to influence consumer behaviour [Kalnikaite et al. 2011]. However, specific 
context-altering strategies lack a strong evidence base [Hollands et al. 2013]. 
Altering moods is also a context-alteration strategy. There is some evidence that mood-altering 
interventions can be successfully ported from psychology labs onto smartphones [Meinlschmidt et al. 
2016], although the technique has yet to be applied in DBCIs. 
CHALLENGES 
Determining which cues to alter is difficult. Kremers et al. identified 35 broad environmental changes to 
promote change in food and activity behaviours [2012], and the individual efficacy of these changes 
remains unclear. Detecting appropriate emotional cues for a given behaviour is particularly difficult. 
Large-scale ambient persuasive interventions can have high installation costs. This cost drawback has 
triggered research into altering “micro-environments”, contexts on a smaller scale, e.g. product labelling 
or design [Hollands et al. 2013].  
An alternative context-alerting strategy is to use pervasive technology e.g. smartphones to deliver cues, 
i.e. priming.  
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PRIMING (F1,  P1,  P6) 
Type 1 processes include associative memory links between cues and affective and behavioural 
responses [Strack and Deutsch 2014]. They can be activated using priming, the unobtrusive presentation 
of cues to activate relevant mental representations [Shalev and Bargh 2011]. Priming can increase 
accessibility of a goal concept [Kahneman 2003], making it more likely to be performed [Bargh et al. 
2001]. Positive valence towards a concept can also increase its accessibility [Kahneman 2003; West 
2006], providing opportunities for affective priming [Custers and Aarts 2007]. In the BAF, priming is 
providing a specific cue within the context (F1) that crosses the attention barrier to form an input to 
Type 1 Prepare processes (P1). These processes select a target impulse from memory. Ideally, this 
impulse is relatively high on the Potential Response stack (P6) and therefore likely be enacted. If enacted 
and repeated in a stable context, it will become a habitual behaviour [Wood and Neal 2007].  
DBCIs may implement two forms of priming behaviour: the activation of instinctive paths to achieve 
certain behaviour, or the activation of learned constructs such as goals. 
INSTINCTIVE PATHS 
OUTLINE  
Several ‘instinctive’ context-response paths already exist. Stanovich argues these fast “genetic goals” are 
more easily primed than learned goals, and are more universal [2005]. Evidence of these instinctive 
paths include the influence of auditory [Spence and Shankar 2010] or other environmental cues 
[Wansink 2010] on eating behaviour, and suggesting apparent monitoring by displaying images of eyes 
increasing compliance with honesty boxes [Bateson et al. 2006]. The latter example implies the 
possibility that DBCIs merely appearing to monitor may increase compliance to behavioural norms.  
EVIDENCE  
Several pervasive systems have implemented instinctive triggers, particularly in the fitness domain. 
Several sound-based DBCIs react to user heartrate by selecting [Nirjon et al. 2012], altering [Oliver and 
Flores-Mangas 2006] or auto-generating workout music [Bauer and Waldner 2013], while the Zombies, 
Run! [zombiesrungame 2015] app exploits a ‘flight from fear’ hard-wired instinct to cue users to run 
faster using sounds of ravening zombie hordes.  A sight-based intervention, in the healthy eating domain, 
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is the Mindless Plate. This prototype explored whether perceptions of food portion size could be altered 
using coloured plates, with somewhat encouraging short-term results [Adams et al. 2015].  
An alternative 'instinctive' path is that of social priming (e.g. [Aharony et al. 2011]): humans are 
predisposed to react to the cue of seeing another person perform a behaviour by responding with similar 
behaviour. This theory is supported by some research in neuroscience [Kessler et al. 2006], but evidence 
for efficacy is mixed [Froehlich et al. 2010]. Instinctive primes are a good candidate for research where 
deliberative strategies have repeatedly failed, e.g. in the healthy eating domain [Wansink 2010; Obrist et 
al. 2014; Pels et al. 2014].  
CHALLENGES 
The key challenge is to identify the correct prime for a given behaviour. Once identified, the prime needs 
to be delivered in a sufficiently salient manner to cross the implicit and/or explicit attention filters (F2, 
F3). If the primed behaviour is not repeated in a stable context, no habit will be formed. This is not just 
an issue of context detection, since enacting the desired behaviour is not guaranteed, given differences 
in individual responses and concurrent different states of the Potential Response stack (P6). Further 
research is required to determine how best to deliver the instinctive prime so the related impulse 
appears at the top of the Potential Response stack, and is therefore likely to be enacted. The technique is 
likely to be most successful to direct people during situations of high cognitive load (e.g. driving, 
travelling) where arbitration is not possible. 
NONCONSCIOUS GOALS 
OUTLINE  
To what extent can we prime learned associations, such as goal constructs, i.e. an association between a 
goal and the behaviour required to achieve the goal [Danner et al. 2011], to drive the formation of 
automatic behaviours? This strategy may mitigate some of the challenges in identifying and delivering 
instinctive cues. Modern goal research indicates that goals, instead of definitively forming part of 
conscious deliberation in Type 2 processes, can be both activated nonconsciously [Stajkovic et al. 2006; 
Aarts et al. 2008], and operate nonconsciously [Chartrand and Bargh 1996; Pessiglione et al. 2007; 
Förster et al. 2007]. Priming goals results in more persistent accessibility of the related concepts than 
 
| P 3:43 
 
simply priming behaviour alone, at least until the goal-related behaviour is enacted [Bargh and Morsella 
2010]. Primed impulses will therefore have more value in the Potential Response Stack (P6). 
EVIDENCE  
Chen et al. found some evidence in a single session pilot that priming intentions increased user 
engagement in an exergame [Chen et al. 2014], while Custers & Arts showed that goal priming increased 
both accessibility and affective valence and impacted on effort to pursue a goal [2007]. Priming can also 
be delivered nonconsciously, e.g. subliminally. Caraban et al. applied subliminal priming in a browser 
plug-in by decreasing the opacity of key words and found some evidence of priming on subsequent item 
selection [2017]. Evidence for the efficacy of goal priming as a behaviour change technique is mixed, 
supported by some [Sheeran et al. 2013; Sheeran et al. 2017], while other research is ambivalent [Wood 
and Neal 2007].   
CHALLENGES  
Goal priming requires work with users ahead of intervention to instil the goal along Goal Setting Theory 
lines so that it can be primed. Priming with no pre-training implicitly assumes that participants already 
associate the prime with the goal. Primes need to be designed carefully to avoid ironic effects where 
instructions such as “do not X” primes behaviour X [Earp et al. 2013]. There are some theoretical 
objections: Papies, in line with the COM-B model, argues that goal priming procedures can only be 
successful where individuals also hold sufficient motivation, capability and knowledge to pursue it 
[Papies 2016].  
Nonconscious goal priming experiments in psychology frequently use supraliminal tasks where the aim 
of the task is concealed – e.g. by tasking users with a word search where the target words relate to the 
goal of 'performing well' [Bargh et al. 2001]. However, word search or scrambled sentence tasks are 
difficult interventions for DBCIs using pervasive computing technology, particularly using small-screened 
or unobtrusive technology. Subliminal priming provides a possible alternative method of prompting 
nonconscious behaviour. Subliminal priming can help to avoid user irritation [Ham and Midden 2010], be 
less likely than conscious prompts to promote behaviour in contrast with the goal [Glaser and Kihlstrom 
2005], and ensure authenticity in response [Shalev and Bargh 2011].  
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Priming activation is distinct from habit activation. A habit is a learned context-response link, while 
priming activates multiple mental concepts in memory related to the prime [Wood et al. 2014]. To prime 
habit formation, DBCIs either need to be sufficiently context-aware to prime only within a stable context 
(to form new habits) or accept that their intervention may need to be persistent if stable-context-
priming is not possible. The latter technological dependency may not lead to long-term behaviour 
change if the technology is abandoned [Renfree et al. 2016]. 
ALTER CUE SALIENCE (F2,  F3) 
OUTLINE 
The likelihood that a given cue gets through the implicit perception filter is determined by its salience. 
Thus, a behaviour change strategy is to reduce the salience of contextual cues for unwanted responses, 
whilst increasing the salience of cues for wanted responses, using Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) 
techniques for attention biases [MacLeod et al. 2009], CBM-A. An attention bias is the tendency for a 
given cue to receive disproportionate implicit and/or explicit attention, points F2 and F3 in Figure 3.1 
respectively. Reducing attention for unwanted cues reduces the resulting unwanted response because 
the cue is less likely to become an input to Type 1 and Type 2 memory processes, and likewise the 
reverse with wanted cues.  
EVIDENCE 
Biases affecting attention can be altered by appropriate training [Hertel and Mathews 2011]. Evidence 
from psychology labs is encouraging, e.g. in the healthy eating domain [Kakoschke et al. 2014]. However, 
there are relatively few DBCI implementations, with most at pilot stages. One randomised controlled trial 
porting CBM-A techniques onto smartphones found inconsistent results with only small effects on 
attention bias scores [Enock et al. 2014].  
CHALLENGES  
CBM techniques face challenges in identifying relevant cues that need increasing/decreasing in salience, 
and in ensuring longevity of newly-learned responses [Hertel and Mathews 2011]. Mixed empirical 
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evidence indicates that additional research is required to determine how best to apply this strategy in 
DBCIs. We address this in Chapter 5.  
PREPARE:  TARGET THE CONTEXT-RESPONSE LINK (PHASE 2) 
TRAIN CONTEXT-RESPONSE (P1,  P6) 
OUTLINE 
Cognitive Bias Modification for approach biases, CBM-Ap, trains context-response links. An approach 
bias exists when an individual has a default impulse towards an unwanted cue, i.e. a Type 1 Prepare 
processes, P1 in Figure 3.1. For example, a smoker may have an approach impulse towards a cigarette. 
CBM-Ap techniques train individuals to inhibit responses or reject these unwanted items, and to accept 
alternative wanted items. For example, the smoker might be trained to reject cigarettes and accept 
chewing gum. 
EVIDENCE 
Two CBM-Ap studies found small statistically significant results following brief training with challenging 
participants and long follow-up periods. Wiers et al. trained alcoholics with 4x15 minutes lab training 
sessions [2011]. Participants used a joystick to push away images of alcoholic drinks, and pulled towards 
them images of non-alcoholic drinks. The training altered the intervention group’s small approach bias 
for alcohol to a strong avoidance bias, reflected in marginally statistically significant differences in 
relapse rates. Wittekind et al. trained psychiatric inpatients with a similar anti-smoking CBM-Ap over 4 
sessions and found small statistically significant differences in self-reported nicotine consumption at 3-
month follow-up [2015].  
CHALLENGES 
As with CBM-A, it is not clear how best to translate CBM-Ap to DBCIs. Cue identification may also be an 
issue, although it is easier for people to identify unwanted approach biases than unwanted attention 
biases. The behavioural impact of the two CBM-Ap studies was small, and intervention groups also 
received standardised Type 2 interventions (e.g. motivational interviewing). Nevertheless, evidence of 
impact of the minimal Type 1 training indicates potential in using more pervasive technology to deliver 
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larger numbers of training sessions in situ. CBM-Ap has parallels with automating self-control, which 
focuses on response inhibition, as discussed below. 
IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS (P1,  P2,  P3) 
OUTLINE 
This approach tries to bridge the gap between explicit Type 2 intentions and implicit Type 1 impulses. 
Implementation intentions are specific, concrete if-then plans that link particular if contexts (i.e. sets of 
cues) to a desired then response. They aim to automate then behaviour by delegating its control to the 
selected contextual if [Gollwitzer et al. 2005]. Implementation intentions are a special form of 
automated goals that can bridge the intention-behaviour gap [Webb and Sheeran 2006; Wood and 
Rünger 2016], and are argued to be a good strategy for habit formation apps [Stawarz et al. 2015].  
The mechanisms through which Implementation Intentions work are increased accessibility [Webb and 
Sheeran 2008], so the resulting behavioural intention to perform the then response is highest in the 
Potential Response stack. Through rehearsal, sufficiently concrete and relevant Implementation 
Intentions become impulses, moving from Type 2 deliberative processes into Type 1 automatic processes 
[Einstein and McDaniel 2005].  
EVIDENCE  
A meta-analysis found Implementation Intentions had a medium-to-large magnitude (d = .65) on goal 
attainment [Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2006]. However, the meta-analysis did not consider whether the 
behavioural goals related to habitual behaviour or not, and other reviews note a heterogeneity in effect 
sizes [Hagger and Luszczynska 2014]. Prestwich et al. found some evidence that self-selected SMS 
reminders (not just-in-time reminders) can boost the effectiveness of Implementation Intentions for 
daily brisk walking, although the study was based on self-report [Prestwich et al. 2010].  
CHALLENGES  
Again, difficulties of accurately monitoring context cues and behaviour are challenges for 
Implementation Intention-based DBCIs. Further, evidence for habit breaking using Implementation 
Intentions is mixed: some research suggests they are not good at controlling strong habits [Wood and 
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Rünger 2016], while Sheeran et al. suggest that they have been successful with smoking interventions 
[Sheeran et al. 2017]. We explore technology-mediated Implementation Intentions in Chapters 5 and 7. 
PROVIDE INFORMATION  (P3) 
OUTLINE  
The provision of information is common in DBCIs [Pejovic and Musolesi 2014; Webb et al. 2010a] and 
behaviour change interventions in general, e.g. in healthcare [Nilsen et al. 2012]. The underlying 
“information gap hypothesis” [Cowan et al. 2013] implicitly assumes a rational choice model, where 
people alter conscious behavioural intentions (P3) to counter a given behaviour in response to 
information provided.  
EVIDENCE  
Providing information can in some circumstances change behaviour, albeit with a small impact: a meta-
analysis of public information campaigns showed an average effect size of .05  [Anker et al. 2016]. 
Evidence is mixed for information-based DBCIs, partly because it is rarely used as a single approach. 
Comber & Thieme used information provision to counter habitual recycling behaviours with a just-in-
time recycling-monitoring system [Comber and Thieme 2013]. They found no impact of their awareness-
raising on attitudes or on behaviour over 5 weeks.  
Crucially, the long-term effects of providing information on behavioural intentions are not stable. A 
randomised control trial with longitudinal research (12 months) showed that advising people to do more 
exercise is ineffective in the long term [Hillsdon et al. 2002]. The eating domain shows evidence of a 
persistent “mindless eating” gap of 15-20% of consumption, regardless of an individual’s knowledge of 
nutritional information [Wansink and Chandon 2014; Bellisle et al. 2004]. 
CHALLENGES 
Deliberative cognitive resources may not be available for Type 2 processes to attend to, analyse and 
deliberate the information. People also may not change their attitudes and/or behaviours in line with the 
information. Further, Type 1 processes may bias the information itself as an input to Type 2 processes, 
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e.g. framing effects, where presenting the same information in either positive or negative ways impacts 
differently on subsequent Type 2 judgements [Kahneman and Tversky 2000].  
DBCIs often use disruption to alert Type 2 resources to process information [Verplanken and Wood 
2006]. However, this is not a panacea: Combor & Thieme found that a disruptive audio signal did alert 
participants, but that their intervention did not provide the right information to change behaviour 
[Comber and Thieme 2013].  
Cognitive biases in decision making also present an opportunity. Lee et al. argue that varying the way in 
which information is delivered, e.g. in providing the required behaviour as the default, can be successful 
[Lee et al. 2011]. This is a key tenet of choice architecture or ‘nudge theory’ [Thaler and Sunstein 2008].  
JUST IN TIME REMINDERS (P3,  F3) 
OUTLINE & EVIDENCE 
The strategy leverages context-aware technology to provide just-in-time reminders to behave in a 
particular way [Moller et al. 2017]. Reminders can support the development of habits, but can have 
diminishing effects [Tobias 2009]. They can also prompt reactance, where people act to restore their 
behavioural autonomy in response to perceived threats [Brehm 2009], particularly where users are 
instructed to suppress thoughts of an unwanted behaviour [Palfai et al. 1997].  As with priming, there is 
a risk of ironic effects [Earp et al. 2013].  
Even if the ‘correct’ response is performed, the response may depend on the presence of the DBCI as a 
cue. This makes the new behaviour fragile and susceptible to disruption [Renfree et al. 2016]. Stawarz et 
al. found evidence in a 4-week trial that reminders increased behavioural repetition but impeded 
automaticity [2015]. Without automaticity, once the DBCI is removed, the behaviour is unlikely to 
persist.  
Several researchers reduce the complexity of reminders to reduce their cognitive load. Ding et al. tried to 
identify low-disruption opportunistic points to deliver walking prompts using context-aware technology 
[Ding et al. 2016], but found embarrassment persisted at inappropriate suggestions. 
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CHALLENGES  
Behavioural repetition in a stable context is crucial to forming automatic behaviours. Just-in-time habit-
forming reminders therefore must be context-aware. However, technological issues persist in both 
context and behaviour detection. Few approaches to capturing behaviour also capture causal 
relationships between context and response [Banovic et al. 2016], limiting their ability to remind in a 
habit-forming way.   
TRAINING SELF-CONTROL (P4) 
OUTLINE  
Self-control is the ability to “alter [your] own behavioural patterns so as to prevent or inhibit [the] 
dominant response” [Muraven and Baumeister 2000]. Dual Process Theory considers self-control as a 
Type 2 process [Metcalfe and Mischel 1999], although it can become automated into Type 1 processes 
[Verbruggen and Logan 2009]. Self-control could therefore provide a mechanism for people to resist 
unwanted Type 1 impulses. Taylor et al. suggest that computer-based training to enhance self-control 
could take advantage of neuroplasticity to support treatment for drug addiction alongside 
pharmaceuticals [2013]. Webb, Sniehotta et al. express surprise that few interventions against addictive 
behaviour have used self-control strategies [Webb et al. 2010b]. 
EVIDENCE  
De Ridder et al. found a relatively large relationship between self-control traits and habits, and suggest 
self-control is important in changing habitual behaviours [de Ridder et al. 2012]. Muraven argues that 
self-control training is generalizable: small acts of conscious behavioural inhibition improves self-control, 
regardless of domain or whether participants believed it would help [Muraven 2010].  
Cranwell et al. found that a 3-daily, 4-week training task showed a statistically significant increase in self-
control scores compared to a control group [Cranwell et al. 2014]. Research has found some impact of 
internet-delivered go/no-go food image tasks on weight loss [Lawrence et al. 2015; Veling et al. 2014]. 
Lawrence et al. trained participants to inhibit responses to unwanted foods with 4 sessions over 1 week 
and found a statistically significant, medium-sized drop in self-reported energy intake [Lawrence et al. 
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2015]. In terms of automating self-control [Fishbach and Shah 2006], Verbruggen & Logan showed that 
practising inhibition can automatically inhibit responses to unwanted items [Verbruggen and Logan 
2009].   
CHALLENGES  
Effortful (Type 2) self-control is restricted by limits on deliberative cognitive resources [Baumeister 2002; 
Wood and Neal 2007]. When it fails, old automatic behaviours will re-emerge. The inability to introspect 
habits may restrict attempts to limit unwanted behaviour through self-control where people are 
unaware of habit cues. A strong association between affective state and self-control capacity 
[Economides et al. 2015; Tice et al. 2001] may also hamper behavioural persistence. Nevertheless, it is 
not clear precisely how the self-control mechanism works. Evidence for its efficacy is inconsistent: Miles 
et al. found no effects on either Type 1 or Type 2 self-control following a 6-week self-control training 
programme [Miles et al. 2016].  
ACT:  TARGET THE RESPONSE (PHASE 3) 
Targeting the response aspect of the context-response link may involve the use of self-monitoring to 
reveal previously unknown response patterns, or operant conditioning on the response outcome (A2). 
SELF-MONITORING (P5,  A1) 
OUTLINE & EVIDENCE 
Self-monitoring involves using information from self-tracking to form alternative intentions to act 
[Snyder 1974]. Self-tracking, the capture and presentation of information about an individual’s 
behaviour, can reveal information previously unknown to the user [Thaler and Sunstein 2008], such as 
the number of steps taken each day. The “self-monitoring and feedback” approach is highly prevalent in 
DBCIs [Orji et al. 2017], with domains including energy usage, water usage and activity tracking 
[Brynjarsdottir et al. 2012; Laschke et al. 2011; Nike+ 2013; Fitbit 2017]. Activity trackers also implement 
data analysis and reminder engines in addition to simple data presentation [Jawbone 2015].  
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A meta-analysis of 138 interventions found that self-monitoring led to small-to-medium changes in 
health goal attainment [Harkin et al. 2016]. Self-monitoring of weight, i.e. tracking the consequences of 
undesired eating behaviour, can be an effective long-term strategy in maintaining weight loss [Butryn et 
al. 2007; Wing et al. 2006]. Kelley et al. provide qualitative evidence that self-monitoring has a role in 
revealing unhealthy or unexpected behaviour [Kelley et al. 2017] and provides motivation for change.   
However, self-monitoring is not a panacea for behaviour change [Epstein et al. 2016], and the evidence 
for technology-mediated self-tracking is not equivocal: a large-scale RCT found that using a tracking 
device alongside self-monitoring of diet and activity resulted in less weight loss compared to a self-
monitoring group alone [Jakicic et al. 2016]. Use of activity trackers tends to tail off in the longer term: 
more than 50% of US tracker owners abandon their device, 1/3 abandoning it within 6 months [Ledger 
and McCaffrey 2014], with abandonders reporting issues with accuracy [Goodyear et al. 2017; Yang et al. 
2015]. We explore this issue further in Chapter 7. 
CHALLENGES 
Self-monitoring and tracking is rarely implemented as a stand-alone strategy, making evaluating its 
efficacy difficult. Instead, it is often combined with goal setting, goal tracking and goal feedback 
mechanisms [Consolvo et al. 2008; Fitbit 2015]. Dual Process Theory and habit theory suggests that self-
report of behaviour is unlikely to be accurate; empirical data shows substantial differences between self-
report and actual sedentary behaviour [Clark et al. 2009; Colbert and Schoeller 2011].  
The mechanism linking self-monitoring with behaviour change is unclear. For example, self-weighing may 
function as an explicit input to Type 2 processes, affecting deliberative food choices. Alternatively, self-
weighing may prime Type 1 processes, triggering nonconscious restraint [Pacanowski et al. 2015; 
Brunner and Siegrist 2012]. The design of self-monitoring systems is important since cognitive resources 
to process the results of self-tracking may not always be available. This consideration has resulted in 
‘glanceable’ feedback [Consolvo et al. 2008], and use of aggregated wellbeing scores [Lin et al. 2012; 
Meyer et al. 2014].  
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REVALUE OUTCOME (A2) 
OUTLINE & EVIDENCE 
A key strategy to revalue outcomes is providing rewards for ‘correct’ behaviour [Gouveia et al. 2015] or 
punishments for ‘incorrect’ behaviour [Kirman et al. 2010].  Rewards are not a necessary part of habit 
formation, but they may accelerate its development into automaticity.  In the BAF, rewards boost the 
position of the matching impulse (nonconscious Type 1) or intention (conscious type 2) on the Potential 
Response stack. Virtual rewards are common in DBCIs [Hamari et al. 2014; Orji and Moffatt 2016], but 
punishment strategies are much rarer [Kirman et al. 2010]. Evidence is mixed for efficacy of virtual 
rewards in DBCIs, perhaps because they target Type 2 scarce resources for conscious processing of 
rewards. One short-term (10-day) study found no effect [Zuckerman and Gal-Oz 2014]; qualitative 
research both supports [Fritz et al. 2014] and does not support [Munson and Consolvo 2012] the 
strategy.  Stawarz et al. identified a key challenge in delivering rewards to drive the generation of 
automatic behaviour: positive reinforcement over 4 weeks hindered automaticity, possibly due to 
reactance [Stawarz et al. 2015].  
CHALLENGES  
Accurately monitoring context and behaviour deliver rewards smoothly (so that the user assigns credit 
from the reward to the correct action [Maia 2009])  is not easy.  The desired behaviour may be 
extinguished by inaccuracy: both when a given action no longer attracts the previous reward, or when a 
reward is received despite the appropriate action not occurring [Yin and Knowlton 2006]. It is also not 
clear how to apply results from psychology labs to designing rewards and reward schedules for DBCIs. 
Continuous or very frequent rewards can support the acquisition of new behaviours that are easily 
extinguished [Villamarín-Salomón and Brustoloni 2010].   
Finally, punishment or removal of rewards may not alter underlying associations. Instead, people may 
simply learn to inhibit the unwanted behaviour in particular contexts [Bouton 2014; Redish et al. 2007], 
so the old unwanted behaviour may re-emerge later. 
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 BAF phase and target Challenges  




















2 Recent implementations 
Alter context       • •   
[Kalnikaite et al. 2011; Rogers et al. 
2010] 
Instinctive primes       • •   
[Bateson et al. 2006; zombiesrungame 
2015] 
Goal priming       • •   
[Chen et al. 2014; Magaraggia et al. 
2014; Loizou and Karageorghis 2015] 
Alter cue salience       • • •  




     • • •  
[Wittekind et al. 2015; Rabinovitz and 
Nagar 2015; Heitmann et al. 2017] 
Implementation 
intentions     
  •    
[Veling et al. 2014; Brevers et al. 2017; 
Thompson et al. 2012] 
Provide 
information 
       •  • [Comber and Thieme 2013] 
JIT reminders       • •  • [Klasnja et al. 2015; Ding et al. 2016] 
Self-control       • • • •
4 
[Lawrence et al. 2015; Miles et al. 
2016; Blackburne et al. 2016] 
Self-monitoring       • •  • [Kelley et al. 2017; Hollis et al. 2015] 
Revalue outcome       • • •  [Adams et al. 2017; Fitbit 2015] 
 
Table 3:2 Strategies, BAF phase and Type 1/Type 2 targets
                                                            
4 Note that self-control also has a Type 1 component that is less affected by cognitive limits than its Type 2 counterpart 
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SUMMARY  
Which strategies hold most promise as approaches for further research? Table 3:2 shows an 
overview of the identified strategies, together with the processes they target, which component of 
habits they relate to (illustrated with reference to the BAF Figure 3.1), a summary of the challenges 
and recent implementations.  
The main challenges are: correct context detection; mixed or missing evidence for a strategy’s 
efficacy in relation to behaviour changes; difficulties in ecological validity, i.e. in translating strategies 
from psychology labs to in-the-wild DBCIs; and interventions that rely on limited deliberative 
cognitive resources. Context detection issues affect most strategies. This may explain why 
information-providing DBCIs are common, while few DBCIs use context analysis [Stawarz et al. 2015; 
Honka et al. 2011]. The empirical gaps indicate opportunities for research. 
The techniques we selected for further investigation were those that target Type 1 processes, have 
shown promise in psychology labs, are transferable to digital interventions, but have yet to be 
explored in-depth in DBCIs: Implementation Intentions, cognitive bias modification (both Attention 
and Approach varieties) and subliminal priming. We outline our reasons below. 
IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS (CHAPTER 4) 
Implementation intentions are a good candidate strategy because they effectively model habitual 
behaviours and are predicated on stable environments. They focus on shifting conscious Type 2 goals 
into automatic Type 1 processes (moving from P3 to P1 in Figure 3.1). There is also good evidence of 
a moderate-to-large impact of the strategy on behaviour from a meta review [Gollwitzer and Sheeran 
2006]. Although some studies have ported the strategy out of psychology labs onto SMS-based 
systems, e.g. Pirolli et al. [2017], there is still a research opportunity in exploring how it might be 
enhanced by using more pervasive context-aware technology. Stawarz et al. argue that 
Implementation Intentions should be used to help support habit formation in apps, and suggest 
further research is required into its use on mobile technologies [2015].   
A caveat to employing Implementation Intentions is the ongoing challenge in solving problems of 
accurate behaviour and context-detection [Bettini et al. 2010; Rogers 2006].  However, Tobias argues 
that in-situ reminders  can support the accessibility of Implementation Intentions [Tobias 2009], 
while evidence shows that even inexperienced users can quickly learn if-then plans with multiple 
triggers or actions [Ur et al. 2014]. Therefore, we identified an opportunity to explore the use of 
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context-aware technology triggers to support Implementation Intentions. Exploring Implementation 
Intentions with context-aware technology was therefore our starting point in exploring NDBCIs, and 
is the focus of the next chapter. 
COGNITIVE BIAS MODIFICATION (ALTER CUE SALIENCE ,  TRAIN CONTEXT-RESPONSE ;  CHAPTER 5) 
CBM techniques to alter cue salience and train context-response actions (CBM-Attention and CBM-
Approach respectively) are good candidate strategies because they have shown promise in 
psychology labs, but have been little-used in DBCIs. Further research is therefore warranted to 
establish how the techniques might translate to DBCIs. To avoid context-detection issues, we 
selected two domains where the unwanted cues are relatively easy to identify (healthy eating 
domain – unhealthy food cues; smartphone problematic use domain – smartphone cue).  The use of 
the technique may also confer particular advantages  in the healthy eating domain compared to a 
self-tracking approach since people have a generally poor ability to monitor their food consumption 
[Wansink and Chandon 2014]. CBM tends to use rehearsal or training of the desired different 
attention or approach actions, rather than using explicit behavioural directions. They are therefore 
less likely to provoke user irritation and reactance than disruptive just-in-time behavioural prompts.  
SUBLIMINAL PRIMING (CHAPTER 6) 
Subliminal priming is a good candidate strategy because  as noted above, using priming may result in 
increasing the value of related impulses on the Potential Response Stack (P6).  As with CBM, 
subliminal priming techniques do not tax deliberative cognitive resources, and are therefore less 
likely to trigger reactance. They can also support habit formation where the automated behaviour 
occurs in a stable context. We propose examining the use of subliminal goal priming to increase the 
accessibility of related behaviour, and thus increase the likelihood of the goal-related behaviour 
being enacted (see Chapter 6 and [Custers and Aarts 2007]). This avoids the context-detection issues 
since the priming can occur regardless of context; since it is delivered below the threshold of 
conscious awareness, it gives us an opportunity to avoid possible reactance and user irritation by 
getting the time-of-delivery wrong. Further, there is a research gap in determining the most effective 
method of subliminal priming, since there are a wide range of priming design choices including 
design of the prompt, duration, repetitions required and delivery mechanism.    
The next chapter outlines our research into the use of context-aware technology to support 
Implementation Intentions.  
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4. EXPLORING CONTEXT-AWARE IMPLEMENTATION 
INTENTIONS ON SMARTPHONES 
This chapter: 
 presents the results of a smartphone-based context-aware Implementation Intentions pilot 
carried out in-the-wild over one week (4.1);  
 analyses responses to a qualitative survey to identify good candidate locations for behaviour 
change proximity triggers in the workplace and at home (4.2); and 
 derives a set of key design recommendations and pointers for future research. 
The pilot study 4.1 was built and tested as part of a student project I supervised by Adhi Wicaksono. 
The related work, data analysis, discussion and rest of the chapter was solely my own work. 
MOTIVATION 
Implementation Intentions are special if-then plans where ifs are contextual cues and thens are 
specific goal-related behaviours. We outlined in Chapter 3 why they hold promise as an effective 
strategy to support the formation of automatic behaviours: their evidence base from psychology is 
good, and they model habitual behaviours. Yet they still face the problem of accurate context-
detection. Therefore, to investigate RQ2, “how can technology best exploit nonconscious 
opportunities to intervene in a user-friendly way”, given that context-aware technology might help 
us to overcome context-detection problems in NDBCIs, we undertook both pilot 4.1 to explore how 
people might use context-aware support on smartphones in Implementation Intentions, and a survey 
4.2 to better understand the potential role of context triggers in this sort of NDBCI.  
INTRODUCTION 
Implementation Intentions are specialised goal intentions that explicitly set up contextual cues as 
triggers (e.g. time of day or a particular location) for a desired goal-related behaviour (e.g. to take the 
stairs) [Gollwitzer 1999].  
Implementation Intentions aim to automate behaviour, i.e. to convert intentional behaviour into a 
nonconscious habit, by rehearsing cue-behaviour associations in memory such that the link achieves 
a “heightened accessibility” and becomes a candidate for automatic activation [Gollwitzer 1993]. 
Sheeran et al. suggest Implementation Intentions may also protect people against adverse goal 
primes in the environment (e.g. advertising) [2005a]. Gollwitzer & Sheeran’s meta-analysis found 
 
| P 4:57 
 
Implementation Intentions had a medium-to-large effect on goal achievement, with evidence that 
Implementation Intentions increased accessibility of goal plans and goal automation [2006].  
DESIGN ISSUES  
Implementation Intentions require the identification of appropriate contextual triggers and the 
ability to combine these ifs into if-then plans [Verhoeven et al. 2014]. Appropriate triggers are those 
that are “sufficiently salient in daily life … encountered and detected frequently and consistently” 
[Gardner et al. 2012b] Ur et al. demonstrated that novice users can learn to generate plans with . 
multiple ifs and thens [Ur et al. 2014]. If-then “recipes” have been implemented in the web & app 
service If This Then That (IFTTT) [2015] and in other smartphone-automation apps e.g. [Tasker 2016]. 
IFTTT allows users to link devices and social media services to automate tasks, with more than one 
million if-thens created [If This Then That 2012] and 100,000 users [Ur et al. 2016]. Although these 
services do not focus on behaviour change, they indicate that if-then programming may be easily 
grasped. 
STUDY 4.1  IMPLEMENTATION INTENTION PILOT 
This study was carried out as part of a student project by Adhi Wicaksono. 
MOTIVATION 
Therefore, we wished to explore how context-aware smartphones might convey some advantages to 
support the if (i.e. context trigger) component in Implementation Intention if-then plans. 
Implementation Intention studies on smartphones e.g. [Prestwich et al. 2010] tend to use SMS text 
messages to support interventions, and do not use smartphone context detection as a possible 
trigger. DBCIs using Implementation Intentions are starting to emerge, e.g. [Thompson et al. 2012] 
who focused on using video games as a delivery vehicle, but to our knowledge this was the first 
research into Implementation Intentions using the context-aware capabilities of smartphones.  
METHOD  
We built a pilot on Android smartphones to explore how users interact with a context-aware 
Implementation Intentions app. The app enabled users to combine if context triggers with then goal-
related behaviours to generate Implementation Intentions. When the relevant ifs were detected for 
each II, the app notified users with an alert and text to remind them of their related then goal-related 
behaviour. 
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DESIGN  
The pilot used a simple pre-test/post-test single group quasi-experimental design as a design probe 
to gain more insights into how people might use their context-aware smartphones to support 
Implementation Intentions.  
HYPOTHESES  
Our hypothesis was that there would be a statistically significant effect of session on  goal 
automaticity scores. We predict that the score would increase between pre- and post-tests.  
PARTICIPANTS  
10 Android users were recruited from the student population of the University of Birmingham. We 
did not record additional demographics information.    
MATERIALS  
Participants used their own Android smartphones to install our experiment app and specify 
Implementation Intentions. If context triggers available in the app were: location, movement, time, 
calendar, device battery and orientation.  
Figure 4.1 shows an example Implementation Intention with two combined cues, while Figure 4.2 
shows an example list of goal-related behaviours that have been added to cues to generate 
Implementation Intentions. 
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Figure 4.1 Example Implementation Intentions showing goal and related 
trigger cues 
Figure 4.2 Example Implementation 
Intentions list 
MEASURES  
Our dependent variable, goal automaticity, was a sub-scale of the Self-Report Habit Index 
(SRHI,[Verplanken and Orbell 2003]) to measure the automaticity of their selected goal-related 
behaviours (Table 4:1), with a 7-point Likert scale. We omitted self-identity items since it has been 
found to not measure habit [Gardner et al. 2012a] and longevity of behaviour due to our short 
intervention. Our independent variable was session, pre- and post-intervention (within-subjects). At 
post-intervention, participants also completed a System Usability Scale (SUS, [Bangor et al. 2008]) 
questionnaire as a quick, high-level subjective participant view of system usability. 
I do that behaviour automatically 
That behaviour makes me feel weird if I do not do it  
That behaviour would require effort not to do it  
I would find hard not to do that behaviour  
I do that behaviour without having to consciously remember 
I do that behaviour without thinking  
I start doing that behaviour before I realise I am doing it 
I have no need to think about doing that behaviour 
Table 4:1 SRHI subscale items 
PROCEDURE  
Participants first completed the SRHI sub-scale. Participants then installed the app and received 
instructions in person on generating Implementation Intentions from if context triggers and then 
goal-related behaviours. After one week, participants filled in a post-test SRHI and the SUS. 
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RESULTS  
SRHI   
We examined SRHI values to test our hypothesis that the scores would be higher at post-intervention 
compared to pre-intervention. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4:2, and Figure 4.3 shows a 
barplot with one-standard-error error bars.  
The differences were tested for normality (Shapiro-Wilk W=0.88, p=.12). A paired t-test showed no 
evidence of a statistically significant difference between the means t(9) = 1.21, p =.26), with a mean 
difference of 0.63, 95%CI[-1.80, 0.55], Cohen’s d=0.38. 
 
Session SRHI Mean 95%CI SRHI SD  
Pre 4.58 [3.30, 5.85] 1.78 
 Post 5.20 [4.41, 5.99] 1.10 
Table 4:2 SRHI descriptive statistics by Session 
 
Figure 4.3 Barplot of SRHI means with 1SE bars 
SUS   
The mean SUS score was 71.75, indicating that from a subjective participant viewpoint there was no 
self-reported evidence of major usability problems [Bangor et al. 2008; Brooke 2013]. 
QUALITATIVE RESULTS  
Table 4:3 shows the Implementation Intentions created by participants. All participants only created 
one II, and the context cues used were broadly similar.  
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If … Then … 
Movement Walking 30 minutes a day 
Movement Thin 
Location Sleep tight 
Time Jogging after dinner 
Time Exercise for 10 minutes 
Movement Walking 
Time Drink water 
Time Jogging 
Location, Time Having a dinner 
Table 4:3 1 Implementation Intentions created 
No participants used the calendar, device battery or orientation cues as Implementation Intention 
cues. Then goal-related behaviours all focused on health, with 7/10 related to exercise and 
movement, 2/10 relating to food and water intake and the remaining goal going to sleep. If context 
triggers included movement (4 Implementation Intentions), time (4 Implementation Intentions), 
location (1 II) and location + time (1 II).  Most of the goals (e.g. “Thin” and “Walking”) were 
somewhat abstract; only two are more specific – “exercise for 10 minutes” and “jogging after dinner” 
- and these still could do with more detail (e.g. what type of exercise?; how long to jog for and where 
to?) in order that they are salient to participants.  
D ISCUSSION  
There was no evidence for our hypothesis that the intervention would result in a statistically 
significant increase in our measure of goal activation (SRHI). Given that 95%CIs for normal data are 
approximately 2 standard errors from the mean5, we can see from figure 4.3 that this experiment 
would only be able to detect differences of approximately 2 units on the SRHI scale (0-7). The 
experiment is therefore underpowered, so there is a risk that our non-statistically-significant result 
may be a false negative. The experiment also has a small-to-medium effect size of 0.38, so the 
difference is non-trivial, albeit not statistically significant. 
One method to reduce standard error is to increase n. To halve the standard error, the sample size 
must quadruple since the standard error is equal to the sample standard deviation over the square 
root of the sample size. Therefore, to achieve confidence intervals approximately the same as the 
standard errors shown in figure 4.2, to detect changes of around one unit on the SRHI, we could 
                                                            
5 the critical t value for d.f. = 9 at 95% confidence is 2.26, so 95%CIs are mean +- 2.26 * standard error. 
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repeat the experiment with an n of 40. Alternatively, or in addition to increasing sample size, we 
could take other measures to gain power [Dix 2017], for example to run a more controlled 
experiment. 
Given the positive results from meta reviews of Implementation Intentions, we still consider this a 
NBCI with potential. We use possible reasons for goal failures from this experiment to feed into a 
Goal Failure Framework in Chapter 7. That chapter reconsiders adopting Implementation Intentions 
by proposing a more structured intervention with more support for forming, rehearsing and chaining 
Implementation Intentions that has the potential to have a greater impact with lower variability. 
In terms of RQ2, “how can technology best exploit nonconscious opportunities to intervene in a user-
friendly way”, we found little evidence to suggest that context-aware smartphones can overcome 
context-detection problems. Indeed, this study indicated that users require additional support during 
the Implementation Intention creation phase: the goals created were somewhat abstract and the 
salience of the selected cues may not be strong, given that most participants only used one cue e.g. 
time.   
Although the SUS score indicated no self-reported usability issues, most users (9/10) only specified 
one goal using one cue, and their then plans were not all concrete activities. This indicates possible 
intelligibility issues in forming context-aware Implementation Intentions. Future research is needed 
to clarify whether users prefer to only set single if-then plans, and what the upper limit is for multiple 
plans.  
LIMITATIONS   
This quick-and-dirty pilot was limited by a small number of participants and no control group, 
therefore the power was low and it is difficult to draw conclusions about a lack of evidence for 
changes in SRHI. Our focus was in exploring what Implementation Intentions participants form using 
a context-aware system. We did not measure how often the if-then plans were triggered which 
would have provided further information on their suitability, and may also have altered our measure 
of goal automaticity. The intervention was short; only running over one week, which is unlikely to be 
sufficient time for automatic behaviour to emerge given evidence that they can take 18-254 days to 
form [Lally et al. 2010]. We enabled smartphone-specific context cues such as device orientation and 
battery level which may not fit the criteria for trigger cues to be salient and detected [Gardner et al. 
2012b]; we found no evidence that participants found these cues helpful since none used them.  We 
did not record or score any of the interactions with participants during the setup phase, which may 
 
| P 4:63 
 
also reveal other intelligibility issues. The participant information material may have primed them to 
set only one II.  
Therefore it is not clear how good people are at identifying appropriate cues and/or if the tech-
supported cues were suitable to form Implementation Intention anchors. It is perhaps not surprising 
that our participants did not base their intentions on non-obvious technology context options such as 
device battery or orientation, and the intervention may have had too short a life to make the 
calendar a useful cue option. To disambiguate this issue, we ran a qualitative survey as outlined in 
the next section.  
STUDY 4.2:  ELICITATION SURVEY 
MOTIVATION  
We wished to broaden our understanding of how context-aware technology can best support 
Implementation Intentions beyond smartphones. We therefore used a survey to ask potential users 
about potential application domains. We also explained the concept of proximity triggers, without 
mentioning a specific technology, and then gathered information about specific locations that 
potential users would wish to place such triggers in, based on locations at work and in the home 
whether they perform unwanted habitual behaviours.     
METHOD  
PARTICIPANTS  
137 people (mean age 30.7 years, SD 11.97, 100 female) took part. The majority (56%) were 
students. 
PROCEDURE  
Participants were recruited via social media and completed the survey online. They gave informed 
consent, provided demographics information and could optionally enter a prize draw on survey 
completion. We asked them to report any repetitive behaviours they wanted to change (creating 
new habits or breaking old ones) and where they performed them (at home and at work). Then we 
asked where they would place technology to detect when they were close to a particular place or 
object to support them to change their behaviour (proximity triggers), and why. We gave examples 
of a trigger on a water cooler to remind them to drink more water, and one by the lift to remind 
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them to take the stairs. We asked how triggers should alert people, and what they should say to 
persuade them to comply. Full questions are given in the Appendix. 
RESULTS  
DATA ANALYSIS 
Responses were analysed using content and thematic analysis [Braun and Clarke 2006]. They were 
iteratively coded, and grouped into object categories or behaviour themes. Following Kennedy et al. 
[2013], each response could contribute a maximum score of 1 to any particular category, and any 
response could contribute to multiple categories. We discuss the categories below. 
LOCATION AND OBJECT CUES  
For both home and work, responses were of two types: specific locations and particular objects in 
those locations. Table 4:4 shows categorised mentions for home-specific locations and objects; Table 
4:5 shows the same for workplaces. Food issues feature strongly in both: the kitchen is the top home 
location, and food outlets topped the work location list. Top objects at home are fridge and food 
storage (e.g. biscuit tin), while food storage, vending machines and workplace fridges all feature in 
work objects. 
Home  
location Mentions %  Object Mentions % 
kitchen 38 28 fridge 30 22 
entrance/exit 12 9  food storage 23 17 
lounge 12 9  TV 21 15 
bedroom 9 7  desk 10 7 
bathroom 5 4  sofa 9 7 
study 3 2  bed 9 7 
stairs 2 1  computer 8 6 
lift 1 1  phone 7 5 
drive 1 1  car 5 4 
    exercise equipment 4 3 
    freezer 4 3 
    kettle 4 3 





Office location Mentions %  Object Mentions % 
food outlet 19 14 water cooler 20 15 
lift 13 9  computer 15 11 
kitchen 11 8  desk 14 10 
entrance/exit 7 5  fridge 11 8 
office 4 3  food storage 8 6 
bathroom 3 2  vending 
machine 
5 4 
bus stop 3 2  phone 5 4 
stairs 2 1  mirror 2 1 
car park 2 1  light switches 2 1 
pub/bar 2 1  chair 2 1 





TARGET BEHAVIOURS  
Target behaviours were categorised as positive where the goal was to perform the behaviour; and 
negative where the goal was to stop performing it. Target behaviours for home and work are shown 
in Table 4:6 and Table 4:7 respectively.  
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Positive behaviour Mentions %  Negative behaviour Mentions % 
exercise/ breaks 21 15  stop snacks 18 13 
eat healthily 15 11  procrastination/ 
distraction 
7 5 
drink water 10 7  stop being sedentary 3 2 
floss / clean teeth 3 2  Stop smoking 1 1 
read more 3 2  
  
 
tidy/wash up 3 2  
  
 
lock up / remember keys 3 2  
  
 
Table 4:6 Home target behaviour theme mentions 
The top four positive home behaviours, 3 of the 4 negative home behaviours, the top 4 positive 
workplace behaviours and half of the four negative workplace behaviours are all related to health. 
Positive behaviour Mentions %  Negative behaviour Mentions % 
exercise/ breaks 17 12  procrastination/ distraction 6 4 
eat healthily 17 12  stop snacks 3 2 
drink water 17 12  drink less coffee 2 1 
take stairs 5 4  don't smoke 1 1 
energy saving 3 2  drink too much 1 1 
  
  spend too much 1 1 
Table 4:7 Workplace target behaviour theme mentions 
NOTIFICATIONS :  WHEN AND HOW  
There was a wide variety of suggested modes of interruption, from specifically unobtrusive vibration 
(“vibrate to be discreet”, “silent vibrate”) to deliberately annoying (“In the most annoying way 
possible so that it can't be ignored”), via loud noises and alarms. One user suggested a solution: “You 
should be able to choose the alert sound or vibrate that suits you. The alert should self-destruct if not 
responded to within a particular time frame”. 
NOTIFICATION CONTENT  
Results are shown in Table 4:8, with simple goal reminders only a minority of suggestions (40%).  
They suggest users prize configurability, both in notification mode (vibration, noise, lights etc.) and 
content. The results also indicate users expect context-aware apps to be able to predict behaviour. 
Several people specifically requested negative reminders, e.g. “near coffee shops, to not go in” (P23), 
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Type % Examples 
simple goal reminder 40%   
outcomes reminder 13%  “show me an image of rotten teeth” 
context-aware reminder 9% “linked to the pedometer” 
generic reminder 9% “stop!”, “think” 
tailored reminder 9% users can “set [their] own phrases” 
sound or vibration only 8%   
Table 4:8 Reminder type themes mentioned by % of users 
 
ISSUES WITH JIT  INTERRUPTIONS  
Table 4:9 summarises reported issues.  
Issue Mentions % 
Annoying alerts 16 12 
Reactance 16 12 
Ignore alerts 10 7 
Context-aware issues 10 7 
Longer term failure 6 4 
Miss alerts 5 4 
Cognitive load 1 1 
Table 4:9 Reasons for failure 
Although we implied reminders would always appear in the presence of a given trigger, 6 participants 
(4%) suggested such reminders might lose impact in the longer term, e.g. “I tend to start ignoring 
them after a bit” (P131). 10 participants (7%) identified the importance of reminding in the right 
context. If cues appear at the wrong time, and the required behaviour is not enacted, over time 
people may form an automatic response to ignore the cue: “if you have something reminding you at 
set times of day then you'll just get used to it” (P4). Participant P41 asked for an “alert [only] when it 
is appropriate”, wanting the app to be aware of their other activities and/or calendar. Reactance was 
identified as a potential issue by 16 participants (12%) if the app is triggered at an inconvenient time: 
“If I got too many notifications when I'm not able to go through with the task I'd probably get a bit 
annoyed and turn them off entirely or delete the app” (P44), “if it isn't 'smart' it could become 
frustrating and may make you turn the app off” (P5). 16 participants (12%) speculated that context-
aware alerts would be annoying, while 10 participants (7%) suggested that they might ignore 
predictable reminders.  
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Finally, this approach would not appeal to everyone: 11 people (8%) rejected the idea of proximity 
triggers at work, one because they are retired, while 10% (14%) rejected the idea of proximity 
triggers in the home. One person commented, “I would HATE this and avoid these places” (P36).  
D ISCUSSION   
In terms of RQ2, we have established some evidence of what sorts of intervention would be valued. 
Health-related behaviours dominate user concerns both at home and at work: the top 3 positive 
behaviours in both locations are exercise, eating healthily and drinking water. Other overlaps include 
requirements to guard against procrastination and distraction.  
We also found evidence of a wide variety of suggested notification modes alongside evidence of 
issues with Just-in-Time interventions including irritation and possible reactance. Therefore, highly 
tailorable interventions are likely to be the least disruptive; we revisit this point in Chapters 7 and 8. 
LIMITATIONS  
Note that our survey questions included examples of watercooler/drink more, and lift/take stairs 
interventions. Their popularity should be validated by a study that does not cue these examples.  Our 
study analysis was limited by the content and thematic analysis only being undertaken by one 
researcher.  
SUMMARY 
Overall, we found qualitative evidence that some users dislike just-in-time interventions as currently 
implemented, with annoyance, reactance and ignoring as key reasons for disliking them. There is a 
clear requirement for more training at formation of Implementation Intentions than we applied in 
our pilot: we found many examples of negative behaviours, which risk ironic effects in 
Implementation Intentions [Adriaanse et al. 2011]. We therefore re-visit the training option, 
alongside other possible avenues for further research with Implementation Intention NDBCIs to 
enhance their efficacy, in Chapter 7, where we examine how such interventions can address 
potential sources of goal failure. 
The research in this chapter provides insights into the augmentation of Implementation Intentions 
using context-aware smartphones, as part of addressing RQ2, “how can technology best exploit 
nonconscious opportunities to intervene in a user-friendly way”.  
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To provide a user-centred design, future Implementation Intention apps should: 
1. Support strong configurability for ‘if’ proximity triggers to include room-level locations and 
specific objects (4.2); 
2. Guide users during the Implementation Intentions formation phase to avoid negative behaviours 
and form goals with appropriate specificity (4.1, 4.2); 
3. Support user tailoring for notification timings, mode and content, integrating with user calendars 
where possible, since our survey 4.2 showed support for configurable notifications; 
4. Manage context-aware expectations (4.2); 
5. Expect some users to be resistant to the app, and test for reactance (4.2). 
The use of Implementation Intentions remains a good candidate strategy for NDBCIs because of the 
strength of evidence for their efficacy in metareviews, and the way they effectively model habitual 
behaviours. Our survey 4.2 also showed user interest in the approach. Although our study 4.1 found 
no evidence of efficacy, we note that it was underpowered. We therefore return to considering how 
they may be incorporated into NDBCIs further in Chapters 7 and 8.  
We also identified several potential limitations of the specific just-in-time context-aware interruption 
approach that we took. Our survey 4.2 showed issues of reactance and annoyance with the sort of 
interruptions we used in our pilot. Reminding users of then goals in the presence of ifs also risks user 
distrust if the app cannot reliably detect whether the user has just performed, or is anyway about to 
perform, the required behaviour. Yet even if this context- and behaviour-detection problem were 
solved, reliable ‘correct’ reminders might also be habitually ignored by users.  
In Chapter 7 we consider how Implementation Intention NDBCIs may address several potential 
sources of goal failure through defensive design, using strategies of rehearsal, chaining and warning 
of possible conflicts between triggers and cues. Chapter 8 outlines other future research questions 
for the technique.  
In the shorter term, we shifted research focus to explore an alternative, less disruptive strategy: 
cognitive bias modification. This emerged as another candidate strategy from the BAF in Chapter 3. 
This is the subject of the next chapter. The approach moves down the cognitive load continuum to a 
more lightweight interaction less likely to induce reactance because it does not involve direct 
behavioural commands. It also avoids the requirement of just-in-time context detection by focusing 
on a time-shifted training element for the required behaviour ahead of behavioural enactment time.  
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5. COGNITIVE BIAS MODIFICATION  
This chapter discusses two experiments and a qualitative survey exploring the use of cognitive bias 
modification (CBM) as a nonconscious intervention strategy. It covers: 
 Experiment 5.1, in the healthy eating domain, using an elicitation study and a pilot 
longitudinal intervention to explore opportunistic incidental CBM on smartphones to retrain 
attitudes to healthy and unhealthy foods. 
 A follow-up qualitative survey, study 5.2, exploring how users might like to use CBM training, 
and their domains of concern. 
 Experiment 5.3, which builds on reported user concerns about problematic smartphone 
usage, uses a single-session intervention to explore the use of a Tabletop to retrain approach 
and avoid biases towards smartphones. 
Experiments 5.1 and 5.3 were carried out as part of student projects I supervised, by Rosa Lilia 
Segundo Díaz, and Jose Ignacio Rocca respectively. Related work, data analysis, discussion and survey 
5.2 were all my own work. 
MOTIVATION 
Chapter 3 identified a research gap in exploring how DBCIs can use CBM outside psychology labs, and 
Chapter 4 indicated user issues in intelligibility and with just-in-time behavioural prompts. This 
chapter explores an alternative in using simple training strategies to alter nonconscious processes. 
Our motivation was to explore the application of CBM-Attention (CBM-A) and CBM-Approach (CBM-
Ap) in-the-wild and in semi-controlled conditions to assess their suitability for further research. 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 outlined how CBM-A and CBM-Ap techniques can target the nonconscious Filter and 
Prepare BAF stages. CBM-A aims to alter an attention bias (a Type 1 attention process) towards a 
particular cue and/or away from a particular cue e.g. [Dandeneau et al. 2007; Kakoschke et al. 2014].  
CBM-Ap targets automatic approach/avoid cue-triggered behavioural impulses within Type 1 
memory processes, e.g. [Scott-Brown et al. 2012; Wiers et al. 2011; Wittekind et al. 2015]. Chapter 3 
noted a key piece of CBM-Ap research was Wiers et al.’s approach-avoid task (AAT). Just four 
sessions of a CBM-Ap AAT training using a joystick (push away images of alcoholic drinks, pull 
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towards you images of soft drinks) had short-term effects on Implicit Association Test scores and a 
marginally statistically significant impact on relapse rates after 1 year [2011].  
Few CBM interventions have targeted smartphones or tablets to deliver training. A pilot healthy-
eating CBM-Ap tablet game replicated the push/pull paradigm with swipe up/down touchscreen 
gestures but is yet to show results [Scott-Brown et al. 2012]. Enock et al. found mixed statistically 
significant effects for a social anxiety CBM-Ap app, but concluded smartphones are a viable tool to 
deliver reaction-time based assessments [2014]. Several commercial CBM apps claim to help with 
social anxiety, problematic eating and smoking [Bias Modification Therapy 2015; Mental Mint 2015a; 
Mental Mint 2015b], but evidence for their efficacy is unclear. 
EXPERIMENT 5.1:  “ACCEPT THE BANANA” 
This study was carried out as part of a student project by Rosa Lilia Segundo Díaz. 
MOTIVATION  
We wished to explore the application of CBM techniques to smartphones in the healthy eating 
domain. We selected the healthy eating domain because of evidence from our surveys that people 
are interested in using technology in this domain, and evidence it is a pressing problem: some OECD 
countries may have 2/3 of their population obese by 2020 [Sassi 2010]. Kakoschke et al. found that 
CBM can impact eating behaviour, with a single-session of CBM-A training increasing both attentional 
bias for and consumption of healthy foods [2014]. 
ather than assuming that Our approach differs from existing CBM research in several ways. Firstly, r
push/pull map to reject/accept gestures [Scott-Brown et al. 2012],  we used an elicitation study to 
determine how users accept/reject items on smartphones. Secondly, CBM training was incorporated 
as part of an opportunistic incidental interaction [Dix 2002; Ding et al. 2016], piggy-backing existing 
smartphone actions (unlock activity) rather than as a standalone. To our knowledge, this is the first 
intervention to apply CBM in an incidental way on smartphones. Finally, the intervention prioritised 
showing healthy foods over unhealthy foods at a ratio of 9:1 to counter possible ironic effects where 
unhealthy food images cue users to eat those foods [Earp et al. 2013; Adriaanse et al. 2011], and to 
increase liking via the mere exposure effect [Zajonc 1968a]. Our approach therefore combines CBM-
A and CBM-Ap since participants were shown more healthy than unhealthy foods. 
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Measuring eating behaviour is difficult, even with self-report. Instead we used specific and general 
food attitudes as a proximal outcome [Klasnja et al. 2011]. Our research question was whether this 
blend of CBM-A and CBM-Ap would change both specific and general participant attitudes towards 
healthy foods and their ratings of them.  
We first established which gestures people tend to use for ‘accept’ and ‘reject’ on smartphones via 
an elicitation study. We applied the resulting gestures in an opportunistic intervention within a 
smartphone unlock screen, and ran a pilot pre-post-control group study in-the-wild to explore its 
impact on specific and general attitudes to healthy and unhealthy foods. 
ELICITATION STUDY  
This study was run to determine which gestures participants use to indicate ‘accept’ and ‘reject’. 
METHOD  
PARTICIPANTS  
9 masters students were recruited from the University (3 women, 6 men; 8 right-handed; no age data 
gathered). All participants owned a smartphone (6 Android users; 3 Apple users). 
PROCEDURE 
Participants completed a consent form. They were given a smartphone running an app that showed 
eight different screens in succession: either a triangle or a rectangle in one of two colours (red and 
green). They were instructed to perform any gesture to reject or accept the shapes, three gestures 
for each shape. After three gestures were recorded, the image changed to the next one. Full 
instructions are given in the Appendix. 
RESULTS &  DISCUSSION  
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show aggregated results from the Accept and Reject conditions 
respectively.  
 








Figure 5.1 "Accept" gestures Figure 5.2 "Reject" gestures 
We disregarded double tap gestures due to possible priming effects because this gesture was used to 
start the experiment. The results show no clear overall agreement on accept or reject gestures. Both 
“slide up” and “slide down” – the most directly mapped gesture from the CBM-Ap push-pull 
paradigm – appear on both lists, making these gestures unsuitable. The top gestures in each 
condition, tick mark and cross mark, formed a logical pair, so these were selected for the pilot app.  
P ILOT INTERVENTION  
We applied the findings from the elicitation study to an app to deliver opportunistic incidental CBM-
Ap and CBM-A training at smartphone unlock time.  
 




The pilot used a pre-test/post-test control group design. Our independent variables were 
intervention group (control and intervention, between-subjects) and session (pre and post, within-
subjects). There were two sets of dependent variables: specific and general measures of food 
attitudes.  
HYPOTHESES 
We hypothesised that there would be a statistically significant interaction between intervention 
group and session. We predicted that, when compared to the control group, participants in the 
intervention group would show increased positive attitudes towards healthy foods and decreased 
positive attitudes towards unhealthy foods at post-test compared to pre-test measures.  
PARTICIPANTS  
22 participants (who had not participated in the elicitation study) were recruited from the University 
and the researchers’ social networks (age: mean=29.1 years, SD=9.7 years; 10 women). 12 were 
Android users who were assigned to the intervention group, the other 10 participants acted as the 
control. 
APPARATUS 
Intervention participants installed an app on their own Android smartphones that on unlock showed 
an image of either a healthy or unhealthy food as a full-screen overlay. A stylised version of the 
intervention is shown in Figure 5.3. To unlock their phone, participants had to perform a tick (check) 
gesture to accept healthy items, or a cross gesture to reject unhealthy items. If the participant 
performed the wrong, or an unknown gesture, 3 times, the phone was unlocked and a reminder 
message was shown to indicate the correct expected gesture. This overlay appeared in addition to 
any other unlock screen because of security concerns.  
The prime picture shown on the overlay was randomly selected from a group of 10 healthy food 
images and 10 unhealthy food images in a ratio of 9:1.  
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Figure 5.3 Healthy food unlock 
procedure 
MEASURES 
Our dependent variables were in two categories: specific measures of the items used in the 
experiment (healthy and unhealthy food images) and general measures of attitudes to healthy and 
unhealthy foods in general.  
SPECIFIC MEASURES 
There is some debate over the appropriateness of implicit measures such as the emotional Stroop 
test for eating-related studies [Phaf and Kan 2007]. Instead, we chose a lightweight measure of 
specific food liking by using a pleasantness rating on a 7-point scale from “extremely unpleasant” to 
“extremely pleasant” for the experiment set of (a) healthy (HFIR) and (b) unhealthy (UHFIR) food 
images.  
GENERAL MEASURES 
We used four general measures of food and food-related attitudes. These included two Health and 
Taste Attitude Scale (HTAS) [Roininen et al. 1999] subscales, (a) General Health Interest (GHI) items, 
and (b) Taste items. The scales have been validated in multiple experiments across countries 
[Roininen et al. 2001]. Full HTAS components are given in the Appendix. The third and fourth general 
measures were 7-point Likert attitude ratings using 6 semantic differentials [Osgood 1952] as shown 
in Figure 5.4 , one for “healthy food” (HFA) and one for “unhealthy food” (UHFA), as a relatively 
lightweight measure of affect.  Semantic differentials are a common technique to measure users’ 
perception and evaluation of concepts and objects [Hassenzahl et al. 2001]. They are used in HCI 
broadly to measure affect e.g.  [Creed et al. 2015] and have been used in previous food interventions 




Wrong! The expected 
gesture was a check mark  
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Semantic differentials for healthy and unhealthy food 
Important | Unimportant 
Harmful | Beneficial* 
Healthy | Unhealthy 
Enjoyable | Unenjoyable 
Pleasurable | Unpleasurable 
Satisfying | Unsatisfying 
*reverse scored 
Figure 5.4 Semantic Differential scales 
 
PROCEDURE 
Participants completed a consent form, demographics, and an online questionnaire to measure pre-
intervention specific and general attitudes using Lime Survey. Intervention participants installed the 
app and it ran for 2 weeks or 256 trials (replicated from Kakoschke et al. [2014]), whichever 
happened first. Control participants received no intervention. After 2 weeks, participants completed 
a post-test questionnaire identical to the pre-test. All intervention participants were invited to a 
post-intervention email interview; 6 accepted. 
RESULTS 
QUANTITATIVE-USAGE 
Intervention participants completed 256 trials. On average, participants completed 232 healthy food-
tick trials (SD=6.27) and 24 unhealthy food-cross trials (SD=6.27). Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 show the 
number of tries required to complete the required gesture, showing participants found it more 
difficult to perform the cross gesture correctly first time than the tick gesture. The mean error rate 
(where participants failed to perform the correct gesture 3 times in a row) was 1.31% (SD 1.04). On 
average, participants completed the 256 trials in 5 days (max=11, min=2), with an average number of 
trials per day of 51.  
 




Figure 5.5 Accept (tick) gesture tries Figure 5.6  Reject (cross) gesture tries 
 
QUANTITATIVE-ATTITUDES 
Our hypothesis was that the intervention would change specific and general attitudes towards 
healthy and unhealthy foods. Descriptive statistics for each measure (HTAS GHI, HTAS taste, HFA, 
UHFA, HFIR and UHFIR) are shown in Table 5:1. Table 5:2 shows 1 standard-error barplots for the 
measures. Table 5:3 summarises the outcome of mixed ANOVAs run on our 6 measures. Note that no 
family-wise Bonferroni error correction has been made to correct for our multiple hypothesis tests. 
This means that the two statistically significant results (p=.02 in both cases) may be false positives / 
Type 1 errors. The Bonferroni-corrected significance level for 18 comparisons at the 95% confidence 



















Tries required to complete 




















Tries required to complete 
Reject (cross) gesture 
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  Measure Group Mean SD 
HTAS GHI  
 
Control Pre 4.52 1.06 
Control Post 4.45 1.07 
Intervention Pre 4.23 0.76 
Intervention Post 4.81 0.75 
HTAS taste  Control Pre 4.75 0.63 
 Control Post 4.52 0.85 
 Intervention Pre 4.59 0.68 
 Intervention Post 4.34 0.55 
HFIR Control Pre 5.96 0.69 
 Control Post 5.64 0.81 
 Intervention Pre 5.73 0.42 
 Intervention Post 5.64 0.85 
UHFIR Control Pre 5.24 1.09 
 Control Post 5.22 0.73 
 Intervention Pre 4.99 0.81 
 Intervention Post 4.23 1.20 
Attitude to healthy foods (HFA) Control Pre 6.17 0.77 
 Control Post 5.72 0.95 
 Intervention Pre 6.21 0.45 
 Intervention Post 6.18 0.59 
Attitude to unhealthy foods (UHFA) Control Pre 3.83 1.42 
 Control Post 4.1 1.22 
 Intervention Pre 3.86 1.09 
 Intervention Post 3.49 1.00 
Table 5:1  Descriptive statistics for food attitudes 
 








Table 5:2 Barplots with 1SE for food attitude measures 
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SPECIFIC MEASURES 
Our two specific dependent variables were healthy food image ratings (HFIR) and unhealthy food 
image ratings (UHFIR). To test the hypothesis that our intervention would alter these measures, we 
ran a 2x2 (intervention group x session) mixed ANOVA on each variable (HFIR or UHFIR) with 
intervention group (control or intervention) as a between-subjects factor, and session (pre or post) 
as a within-subjects factor. There was no evidence for any main or interaction effects of intervention 
group and session on either HFIR or UHFIR, all p>.05, as shown in Table 5:3.  
Dependent 
variable 
Levene’s test Shapiro-Wilk 2x2 Mixed ANOVA 
Specific measures 
HFIR F(3,40) =  0.92 p=.44 All p > .05 
Session  F(1,20) =  1.32, p=.26 
Intervention F(1,20) = 0.21, p=.65 
Session x intervention F(1,20) = 0.40, p=.53 
UHFIR 
F(3,40) =  0.62, 
p=.61 
All p > .05 
Session  F(1,20) = 3.10, p=.09 
Intervention F(1,20) = 3.00, p=.10 




F(3,40) =  1.75, p 
=.17 
All p > .05 
Session  F(1,20) = 3.70, p=.07 
Intervention F(1,20) = 0.01, p=.93 
Session x Intervention F(1, 20) = 6.21, p=.02, η2P =.24 
HTAS Taste 
F(3,40) =  1.11, p= 
.36 
All p > .05 
Session  F(1,20) = 6.37, p=.02, η2P =.24 
Intervention F(1,20) = 0.40, p=.53 
Session x Intervention F(1,20) = 0.03, p=.87 
Attitude to healthy 
foods (HFA)  
F(3,40) =  2.11, 
p=.11 
All p > .05 
Session  F(1,20) = 1.98, p=.18 
Intervention F(1,20) = 1.06,  p=.31 




F(3,36) = 0.42, p = 
.74* 
 
All p > .05* 
Session*  F(1,18) = 0.02, p=.89 
Intervention* F(1,18) = 1.67, p=.21 
Session x 
intervention* 
F(1,18) = 3.04, p=.10 
* run on truncated data due to initial non-normal data  
Table 5:3 Analysis of attitude measures 
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GENERAL MEASURES 
ATTITUDE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIALS 
We examined internal consistency for our two attitude measures; attitude to healthy foods (HFA) 
and attitude to unhealthy foods (UHFA). Internal consistency was good for HFA-Post (α = .78), UHFA-
Pre (α=.74) and UHFA-Post (α=.79) semantic differentials, and acceptable for the HFA-Pre semantic 
differential (α = .60).  
To test the hypotheses that our intervention altered HFA measures, we ran a 2x2 mixed-ANOVA on 
HFA with intervention group (control or intervention) as a between-subjects factor, and session (pre 
or post) as a within-subjects factor. The HFA analysis showed no evidence of any main or interaction 
effects (p >.05) as shown in Table 5:3, and therefore no evidence of an impact of the intervention. 
Attitude towards unhealthy food was not normal for one cell of the 2x2 intervention x session matrix 
(control Pre measure W=0.77, p = .01 for unhealthy attitude). We removed 2 outlying users to obtain 
non-significant Shapiro-Wilk tests (p > .05) and ran a 2x2 mixed ANOVA on UHFA with intervention 
group (control or intervention) as a between-subjects factor, and session (pre or post) as a within-
subjects factor. The results showed no evidence of statistically significant effects (p>.05) as shown in 
Table 5:3 and therefore again no evidence of changes due to the intervention. 
HTAS SCORES 
To test the hypothesis that our intervention would alter the two HTAS scores (GHI and Taste), we ran 
a 2x2 mixed-ANOVA for each measure with intervention group (control or intervention) as a 
between-subjects factor, and session (pre or post) as a within-subjects factor.  
HTAS GHI 
There was a small statistically significant effect of the group and session interaction on the HTAS 
general health index (GHI) score, F(1, 20) = 6.21, p=.02, η2P=.24. Post-hoc Tukey-adjusted pairwise 
comparisons showed a statistically significant difference between intervention scores pre- (mean = 
4.23) and post- (mean= 4.81) t(20)=3.28, p=.02, but no statistically significant difference between 
control scores pre (mean= 4.53) and post (mean=4.45), t(20) = 0.38, p=.98. This effect is also shown 
in the plot of the model’s estimated marginal means using the lsmeans package [Lenth 2016] shown 
in Figure 5.7. The figure indicates that the model predicts increased GHI scores for the intervention 
group, although the estimated marginal mean 95%CIs cross; note that estimated marginal means 
only model the fixed, not random, parts of the model. 
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Figure 5.7 Estimated marginal means plot with 95%CIs for GHI by group and session 
HTAS TASTE 
As shown in Table 5:3, there was a statistically significant main effect of session on the HTAS Taste 
score F(1,20) = 6.37, p=.02, η2P = .24, but no main effect of group or group - session interaction (all 
p>.05). This effect was an overall decrease in HTAS taste scores of 0.24 between pre- and post-, 
regardless of group. This provides evidence of a general experiment effect, i.e. that mere 
participation reduced taste scores, rather than any evidence of an impact of the intervention as we 
hypothesised.  
QUALITATIVE-INTERVIEWS 
6 of the 12 intervention participants completed a brief semi-structured post-intervention interview 
via email. Responses indicated most felt the app had an impact on a conscious level: 5/6 felt the app 
supported them to make conscious healthy food choices e.g. “[it] … help you to recognise the food 
that is bad for your health” (P6).  P3 felt the app was helpful because it provided reminders, while P1 
felt the app could help to indicate which foods are healthy in the case of ambiguity e.g. yogurt. 
Others were more sceptical: “I don't think that if you cross or check pictures you will change the food 
that you eat” (P4); another thought that the intervention period was too short “very little time using 
it” (P3). 
Requests for feature improvements included personalisation of healthy/unhealthy food (3 
participants), with one participant not recognising avocados (P4), and another reporting frustration 
that the application didn’t let them eat pizza” (P5).  Two participants reported frustration with 
gesture recognition, particularly when in a hurry: “when it is a rush, sometimes had to try it 2-3 
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times” (P2). P2 was also frustrated by a double-unlock: first to perform the training, and second to 
enter their PIN. 
DISCUSSION 
Our hypothesis was that the intervention would alter specific and general food attitudes. The results 
only show some evidence that one measure of general attitude changed as a result of the 
intervention: there was a statistically significant interaction between session and intervention for the 
HTAS GHI score. There was also evidence of a statistically significant general drop in HTAS taste 
scores from pre- to post, regardless of intervention group, indicating that for all participants, their 
craving and focus on unhealthy foods dropped between sessions. No other evidence for changes was 
found, despite the larger proportion of healthy ‘accept’ trials completed, which we expected to 
impact on our specific measure of food attitudes, food image ratings, via the mere exposure effect 
[Zajonc 1968a]. Nevertheless, the HTAS GHI score questions are general rather than specific (e.g. “I 
always follow a healthy and balanced diet”), indicating that the intervention may have some 
generalised effects. However, caution is required to interpret these results since family-wise 
Bonferroni error corrections were not applied, increasing the likelihood of false positives. 
LIMITATIONS 
The results are limited by small sample size, small numbers of unhealthy trials, and the non-
randomised allocation of intervention group. The allocation was not randomised due to small 
numbers of participants: all those with Android smartphones were invited to the intervention group. 
The control group did not install anything on their phone, so it is not possible to determine from this 
experiment whether it was the CBM training, rather than the presence of the unlock training screen 
providing simple reminders, that had an impact on GHI scores.  
Contrary to expectations, we found no evidence of improvements of liking of the specific healthy 
foods used in the experiment, or a reduction in liking of unhealthy foods, as measured by users rating 
the food images used in the experiment. The measures were conducted in-the-wild, and we did not 
gather additional possible confound data such as user hunger or current levels of self-control 
resources. A measure of implicit food attitude may have yielded different results.  With the general 
measures, the semantic differentials were a relatively small set, and could have included measures of 
more rigorous underlying concepts instead of including the somewhat tautologous “health-
unhealthy” dimension.  
 
| P 5:83 
 
Looking at Table 5:2, if we consider 95% confidence intervals of approximately 2 times the standard 
error, it’s clear that some of the procedures we used could not easily detect a change in attitudes. 
For example, for ratings of healthy food (attitude to healthy food, rating for healthy food images), at 
the outset mean ratings exceeded 5.5 (out of 7). Given the unlikelihood of participants scoring the 
maximum for any given measure, the standard error and thus confidence intervals would need to be 
much reduced (e.g. by increasing n as discussed on page 4:61) in order to detect the expected small 
increases in these measures. Again, given the evidence from psychology that CBM techniques can be 
successful, we consider that CBM is still a potential strategy for further investigation. However, we 
suggest that future interventions restrict measurement to the validated GHI scales, alongside other 
strategies to increase power. 
The data shows a variation in the number of days taken to complete the 256 trials –maximum 11 
days, minimum 2 days. Our follow-up measures were all taken 14 days after the start of the 
intervention. It may be that the CBM training should be undertaken in a more concentrated period of 
time in order to be effective. Further, the physical push/pull effort in the CBM-Ap paradigm may be 
important: future work could explore the use of motion gestures to accept/reject stimuli. Task-based 
training of larger physical push/pull gestures is the focus of Study 6.3. 
STUDY 5.2:  FOLLOW-UP QUALITATIVE SURVEY  
OVERVIEW  
To broaden our understanding of the domains in which end-users might want to use cognitive bias 
modification technology, we conducted an online survey. These questions ran alongside those in 
survey 4.2. 145 participants completed the survey (age mean 30.3, SD 11.86, 106 women). 56% were 
students. 137 of these also completed survey 4.2.  After answering the 4.2 questions, participants 
were briefly informed about CBM-Ap training, i.e. the repeated acceptance or rejection of particular 
trigger items, and asked to nominate their own accept/reject pairs. Examples of rejecting cigarettes 
and accepting chewing gum, and choosing celery and ignoring chocolate biscuits were given.  
RESULTS  
Responses were analysed using iterative content analysis. Table 5:4 shows themes, specific items and 
accept/reject pairs reported.  
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Theme Mentions  %  Item Mentions %  Pairs Mentions % 
Food 81 56  Fruit 51+ 35  Chocolate-fruit 28 19 
Exercise 69 48  Chocolate 41* 28  Soft drink-water 21 14 
Technology^ 56 39  Water 39+ 27  
Junk food-healthy 
food 13 9 
Drink 52 36  Book 32+ 22  Smartphone-book 11 8 
Reading 35 24  TV 25 17  TV-exercise 10 7 
Sedentary 
behaviour 33 23  Phone 19* 13  TV-book 8 6 
Study/work 15 10  Sofa 17* 12  Sweets-fruit 8 6 
Sleep 13 9  Trainers 13+ 9  Technology-
outdoors 
8 6 
Smoking 4 3  Computer 8+* 6  Biscuits-fruit 6 4 
Posture 4 3  Wine 8* 6  Alcohol-water 6 4 
* Reject item 
+Accept item 
^Technology includes TV, mobile phones, tablets and computers. 1 mention was Accept technology; the rest were Reject. 
# 2 mentions were Accept sleep, the rest were Reject 
  
Table 5:4 Top Theme, Item and Pairs mention d for Accept/Reject CBM behaviour change 
 
KEY SURVEY THEMES  
DOMAINS 
The top 3 domains of interest were food, exercise and technology. Users wish to alter food and drink 
intake, levels of activity and usage of technology. Items results show chocolate and TV as the highest-
mentioned reject items; fruits and water were the highest-mentioned accept items. Reflecting the 
theme results, people suggested healthy-unhealthy food and drink items most frequently, and 
alternatives to technology (TV, phones, desktops, laptops, tablets), which included books, exercise 
and the outdoors. 
Since we investigated food issues in Study 5.1, and address exercise further in Chapters 6 and 7, here 
we focus on the emerging issue of problematic technology use. 
PROBLEMATIC TECHNOLOGY USE 
This theme encapsulates concern over overuse of technology. 18 participants (12%) wanted to swap 
their TV for either exercise or reading. Of 19 mentions of problematic phone use, the majority (58%) 
wanted to substitute their phone for books. In terms of motivation to reduce use of technology, 
participants identified a link between phone usage and sleep: “my sleep could also be improved so 
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maybe cutting back on using my phone … could help” (P48); and between phone usage and lack of 
productivity: “I often get distracted from studying by my phone” (P65). 5% of respondents were 
sceptical about using a phone as anti-phone training; “want to get away from technology” (P7);  
“playing with my phone is a habit I haven't really got into yet so don't want my retraining to come via 
phone” (P98). We explore this theme further in study 5.3. 
PROBLEMATIC AUTOMATICITY  
89% of participants reported awareness of making unhealthy choices, e.g. “I should be doing more of 
the good things and at present I'm too prone to doing the bad ones” (P34), with 15% reported issues 
with controlling themselves, e.g. “I feel like I go to [Facebook] almost instinctively when I don't know 
what I want to do” (P44); “They are choices I frequently regret after I've made them, and always 
resolve to do differently the next day” (P9). 3% reported issues with low motivation, and the same 
number with being unable to resist temptations.  
REACTANCE 
Several participants (10%) identified potential reactance in engaging with opportunistic CBM 
systems, e.g. “the risk is it becomes annoying … they only work short term and only when you are not 
busy” (P13). 5% of participants also identified ironic effects: “pictures of food will only remind me of 
food and make me feel hungry” (P139). 
D ISCUSSION &  L IMITATIONS  
The survey showed people are concerned about healthy eating, exercise and technology overuse, 
although we note that to aid user understanding of our questions, we also gave some concrete 
examples (smoking; eating) which may have biased responses.  
There is evidence that people are aware of unhealthy choices, with some identifying automaticity as 
a possible cause. Some respondents were sceptical about the long-term impact of incidental CBM 
interactions. People reported possible ironic effects, reactance, and a dislike of using their 
smartphones for such training. This led us to shift research focus away from potentially irritating at-
unlock opportunistic CBM training to focus instead on a training task-based CBM delivered at a larger 
scale on a Tabletop Surface, the subject of Experiment 5.3.  
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EXPERIMENT 5.3:  “PUSH AWAY THE SMARTPHONE” 
This study was carried out as part of a student project by Jose Ignacio Rocca.  
MOTIVATION  
Within our RQ2, “how can technology best exploit opportunities to intervene in a user-friendly way”, 
we wanted to explore how CBM-Ap might be used to counter problematic smartphone usage. 
Problematic technology use was in the top 3 user domains of concern in Survey 5.2, is a domain in 
which the problematic cue is clearly identifiable, and one in which participants reported problematic 
automaticity. We therefore explored whether training on a Tabletop with push and pull Cognitive 
Bias Modification training might enable our participants to overcome this. We anticipate a growing 
demand for counter-smartphone measures given evidence of ever-increasing smartphone sales 
[Gartner 2018] and evidence that problematic use interferes with everyday life [van Deursen et al. 
2015; Wolniewicz et al. 2017; World Health Organization 2014]. 
Survey 5.2 indicated that 39% of users were concerned about overuse of their technology. 13% 
specifically mentioned rejecting their smartphones, and 8% suggested a smartphone-book push/pull 
pairing. Our intervention platform was a Tabletop, building on the possibility that the physical 
push/pull gesture is important in CBM-Ap, and survey 5.2 evidence that people did not want to 
perform anti-smartphone training on their smartphones. We used reaction time as a dependent 
variable, rather than a measure of self-reported attitude as in Experiment 5.1. Using a Tabletop also 
gave us more control than the in-the-wild experiment 5.1.  
INTRODUCTION  
TABLETOP INTERVENTIONS 
The Tabletop allows people to make more expansive accept/reject push/pull gestures than on 
smartphones. It also allows the emulation of more realistic situations in which a person might wish to 
“push away” a smartphone, and avoids delivering an anti-smartphone training on a smartphone. 
Tabletops have been used to support individual and collaborative activities in multiple domains, 
including design [Rick et al. 2009], tourism [Marshall et al. 2011] and games [Piper et al. 2006]. 
However, it is still not clear which applications Tabletops are best suited for [Wallace et al. 2017]. 
This study explores whether CBM-Ap applications, yet to be explored on Tabletops, are a good fit.   
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SMARTPHONE ADDICTION 
Smartphone usage is pervasive, with ownership at 69% in the UK in 2015 [Ipsos 2015]. Worldwide 
mobile phone shipments reached 1.86 billion in 2017, and are predicted to rise into 2018-9 [Gartner 
2018]. Meanwhile, concern over problematic usage of smartphones is growing. Research into the 
effects of problematic usage of smartphones is still at an early stage [Wilmer et al. 2017], since 
platform innovation tends to outpace research, but indicates possible impacts on psychological 
wellbeing [Samaha and Hawi 2016] and depression [Elhai et al. 2017a]. Night-time use disrupting 
sleep is a particular issue [Vernon et al. 2018]; the World Health Organization suggests that 
“excessive use of smartphones and electronic screen products relates to sleep deprivation” [World 
Health Organization 2014].  
Problematic usage may emerge where smartphone use develops into a habit, because habitual 
behaviours are automatic and beyond conscious control [Oulasvirta et al. 2012]. Initial drivers that 
prompt usage that evolves into problematic behaviour may initially be social (e.g. to keep in contact 
with friends) or process (e.g. to read news or listen to music) [van Deursen et al. 2015; Elhai et al. 
2017b]. Habitual usage can lead to excessive phone checking, which can interfere with everyday life 
when people experience unwanted impulses to check their devices [van Deursen et al. 2015; 
Wolniewicz et al. 2017]. Problematic use may also make driving more dangerous and induce 
antisocial behaviour [Kuss et al. 2018]. 
METHOD  
This experiment applied the principles of CBM-Ap training to a Tabletop, using smartphones as the 
‘avoid’ stimuli and books as the alternative ‘approach’ stimuli. This experiment was adapted from the 
Wiers et al. alcohol approach-avoidance task (AAT) [2011] detailed in Chapters 3 and 5, where heavy 
drinkers initially showed an approach bias to alcohol pictures, which reverted to a small avoid bias on 
training.   
DESIGN  
There were two experimental phases (i) testing smartphone addiction using a survey on a laptop and 
(ii) interacting on the table for pre- and post- CBM-Ap measurement. The intervention group 
additionally completed a training task after the pre-CBM-Ap measurement. To test our hypothesis 
that our intervention would alter smartphone response times, we used a pre-test/post-test control 
group design. Our independent variables were intervention group (control and intervention, 
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between-subjects) and session (pre- and post-, within-subjects) Our dependent variable was a 
measure of approach bias derived from time taken for participants to complete the task. We used 
reaction time as a dependent variable rather than a measure of self-reported attitude as in previous 
experiments to counter issues of inaccurate self-report in the face of automatic behaviours, since 
they are not accessible to conscious reflective processes [Hagger et al. 2015]. We used a measure of 
smartphone addiction as a continuous predictor. 
HYPOTHESIS  
We hypothesised that there would be a statistically significant interaction between intervention 
group and session. We predict that, when compared to the control group, participants in the 
intervention group will show decreased smartphone approach bias score at post-test compared to 
pre-test measures. 
PARTICIPANTS  
40 people participated (age: mean=26.9, SD=4.17; 12 women), 20 in each group. They were recruited 
via email and text message.  
MEASURES  
Smartphone approach bias measure: to measure CBM-Ap, we recorded reaction times for 
participants to complete either a push (reject) or pull (accept) action for each smartphone stimulus 
on the Tabletop, measured from the time the stimulus appeared to the time at which the stimulus 
reached a target area. We calculated smartphone approach bias scores by using the difference in 
reaction times for pull and push stimuli, divided by each user’s standard deviation, following Wiers et 
al. [Wiers et al. 2011].  
Smartphone addiction: we used Kwon et al.s’ 10-point shortened Smartphone Addiction Scale (SAS-
SV) with a 6-point Likert scale [2013] as a measure of smartphone addiction. We chose the SAS-SV 
because it has high internal consistency (α = 0.91) and validity with respect to longer versions [Kwon 
et al. 2013], and has been validated in related research [Haug et al. 2015; Hawi and Samaha 2016].  
TASK 
Participants were tasked with a series of trials to accept or reject stimuli. To accept the stimulus the 
participant had to pull the stimulus towards them into a rectangular target area. To reject the 
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stimulus the participant had to push the stimulus away from them into a different rectangular target 
area on the opposite side of the Tabletop. The interface is shown in Figure 5.8.   
Each trial consisted of a stimulus appearing in the centre of the table, surrounded by a landscape, 
portrait or (for training intervention participants only) square frame. All participants completed a 
practice session (10 trials), and two measurement sessions (pre and post). Measurement consisted of 
40 trials with equal numbers of smartphone and book stimuli. Reaction time data from responses to 
smartphone stimuli were used to derive our measure of smartphone approach bias. For practice and 
measurement trials, participants were asked to respond to the frame shape by pushing landscape 
frames and pulling portrait frames as shown in Figure 5.8.  
 Figure 5.8 Stylised layout showing approach and avoid areas on Tabletop 
 
Intervention participants additionally completed 60 training trials in between the pre- and post-
measurement sessions. The intervention task was to push away images of smartphones and pull 
towards them images of books. Each training stimulus had a square outline to differentiate them 
from the landscape/portrait pull/push.  
Trials were conducted on a Microsoft Pixelsense SUR40 (Microsoft Surface), a 40-inch multi top 
Tabletop in the lab. We included target goal areas for “push” and “pull” trials to ensure participants 
completed a gesture directly towards/away from themselves and not, for example, into a corner of 
the screen.  
Stimuli were presented in a random order with no restriction on similarity with previous trial. 
Participants were encouraged to take a small rest between sessions to alleviate fatigue. 
PULL TARGET AREA 
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STIMULI  
Practice session stimuli were grey triangles within the landscape or portrait frames. Stimuli for pre- 
and post-test measures and intervention trials were smartphones and book covers. To match the 
smartphone stimuli with participants’ own phones, we asked participants to choose the smartphone 
that most closely resembled their own from a range of 10. We then used images similar to their 
selection as smartphone stimuli, although image restrictions meant numbers of stimuli for each 
smartphone model ranged from 3 to 8. For the book cover counter-stimuli, we used 52 images of 
book covers, displayed randomly.  
Pre- and post-test measures (40 trials) included equal numbers of book and smartphone stimuli, with 
equal numbers of push and pull tasks for each, as indicated by either landscape or portrait frames. 
INTERVENTION GROUPS  
Participants were assigned to either the intervention or the control groups, balanced for smartphone 
addiction score.  Participants in the intervention group performed a series of 60 training trials, as 
outlined above, while control participants received no training. This was in line with Wiers et al.’s 
finding of no statistically significant difference between control no-training vs control sham-training 
conditions [Wiers et al. 2011].  
PROCEDURE  
Participants attended a session in a common room in the University of Birmingham’s Computer 
Science building. They completed a consent form, demographics and the SAS-SV measure of 
smartphone addiction on a laptop. Participants then moved to the Tabletop and completed the task 
according to intervention group. The Tabletop training in action is shown in Figure 5.9. Participants 
stood near the ‘accept’ area.  
 
| P 5:91 
 
 
Figure 5.9 The application in use: a user pushes away a phone 
All participants completed the same practice and pre- and post- measurement procedure, while the 
intervention group completed an additional training set of trials in between pre- and post- 
measurement trials.   The experiment procedure summarised in Table 5:5. 
Group Control Intervention Protocol 
Practice 10 trials, grey rectangles 
Format training 








Equal numbers of books 
and phones; equal 
numbers of push and 
pull for each 
Intervention No trials 60 trials 
Equal numbers of books 
and phones; all square 
format; phones all “push” 





Equal numbers of books 
and phones; equal 
numbers of push and 
pull for each 
Table 5:5 Experiment procedure 
RESULTS  
SMARTPHONE ADDICTION  
Participants reported spending an average of 4.93 hours a day on their smartphones (SD=3.97). They 
reported checking their smartphones on average 54 times a day (SD=45.4). In response to the 
question “Do you think you have a maladaptive dependency or addiction over your smartphone 
usage?”, 17 (42.5%) said yes, 16 (40%) said no and 7 (17.5%) said “I don’t know”.  
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Descriptive statistics for raw SAS-SV scores are shown in Figure 5.10.  
Group Mean SD 
Intervention 30.11 7.84 
Control 31.95 8.42 
Figure 5.10 Raw SAS-SV scores by intervention group 
Unlike in the original scale validation tests [Kwon et al. 2013], we found no evidence that SAS-SV 
score differed by gender (Welch t-test t(19.4)=0.33, p=.75, mean difference = 0.96, 95% CI[-5.14, 
7.07], Cohen’s d=0.12). We also found no evidence of a statistically significant difference in SAS-SV 
scores between intervention group (mean= 30.1) and control group (mean=32.0); Welch t-test 
t(37.96) = 0.71 , p=.48,  95% CI[-3.36, 7.05], Cohen’s d=0.23. This is shown in Figure 5.11. Figure 5.11 
also shows that smartphone addiction scores broadly follow self-categorisation of smartphone 
addiction (No, Don’t know and Yes categories).   
 
 
Figure 5.11 Barplot of mean smartphone addiction scores (SAS-SV) with 1 Standard Error (SE) error bars  
by (left) intervention group and (right) self-categorised addiction   
EFFECT OF TRAINING  
From 1,600 pre- and post- trials with smartphone stimuli, we removed 29 (1.8%) error trials, 12 trials 
where reaction time exceeded 5 seconds (0.75%), and 186 trails (11.63%) where reaction time was 
less than 1 second after visual inspection showed a clear separation of reaction times around the 1s 
mark (see Figure 5.12).  
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This data observation reflected an experimental observation that some participants learned that they 
did not have to complete the full-arm action to move the stimuli from the starting position to the 
target; instead they completed the move with a ‘flick’. 
 
Figure 5.12 Raw completion time 
data 
Figure 5.13 shows the Smartphone Approach Bias scores by session and intervention group.   
 
Figure 5.13 Smartphone approach bias score barplot with 1SE error bars 
To investigate our hypothesis that the intervention group would alter smartphone approach bias 
after training, with differing effects depending on smartphone addiction score, we used a LMER 
model. Our model examined the effect of intervention group (control vs intervention, control as 
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baseline), session (Pre vs Post, Pre as baseline), and smartphone addiction (measured by SAS-SV as a 
continuous covariate) on the smartphone approach bias measure. It included a by-participant 
random intercept.  
The model results (R2ps=0.42) are shown in Table 5.6. Note that the p values are not Bonferroni-
corrected. The Bonferroni corrected significance level for 8 comparisons at the 95% confidence level 
would be .0063 (=.05/8).  
To support the hypothesis, we would have expected a statistically significant three-way interaction 
between intervention group, session and smartphone addiction, with smartphone addicted users 
reducing their approach bias between pre and post measures in the intervention but not the control 
group. The 3-way Group:Session:SAS-SV interaction not statistically significant p = .27.  
Fixed effects Estimate SE   t p value 
(Intercept) -2.44 0.74 -3.28   .002 
Group  3.53     1.08  3.27   .002 
Session  1.98     0.98  2.01    .05 
SAS-SV  0.25     0.09  2.73    .008 
Group:Session -2.74     1.43 -1.92    .07 
Group:SAS-SV -0.34     0.14  -2.52    .014 
Session:SAS-SV -0.13     0.12 -1.08    .29 
Group:Session:SAS-SV  0.20 0.18  1.12    .27 
 Random effects SD   
Participant (intercept) 1.20   
Residual 3.16   
Model formula: bias score ~ group * session * SAS-SV + (1|participant) 
Table 5:6  Smartphone approach bias model analysis results 
The highest-level statistically significant result was a 2-way interaction between intervention group 
and smartphone addiction score (SAS-SV) (b=0.34, SE=0.14, t=2.52, p=.01). This indicates that as 
smartphone addiction score increases, the effect on smartphone approach bias was lower for 
intervention participants compared to control participants.  
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This effect is shown in Figure 5.14, which plots fitted model values for smartphone approach bias 




Figure 5.14 Effect plot for smartphone approach bias and smartphone addiction score 
across intervention groups 
D ISCUSSION  
Overall, our results show no evidence that the intervention was effective in altering approach bias for 
smartphones. We expected participants reporting higher levels of smartphone addiction to have 
‘trained’ themselves in pulling their phones towards them in favour of other objects. Therefore, they 
would be expected to show positive smartphone approach biases at the outset, which we 
hypothesised would be moderated by the training in intervention participants.   
We found a 2-way statistically significant interaction between smartphone addiction score and 
intervention group, although this was not significant at Bonferroni-corrected p values. The effects 
plot showed that the interaction of smartphone addiction score on smartphone approach bias 
differed between our intervention group participants. Although for both groups, a high-addiction 
score was associated with high-approach bias scores, the converse was only true for the control 
group.  The results therefore indicate differing influences of smartphone addiction scores on 
smartphone approach bias across the control and intervention groups, regardless of the session in 
which people completed the task. 
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If the SAS-SV measure of smartphone addiction is a true measure of underlying issues with 
smartphones, it appears that this was not manifested consistently in the expected CBM-Approach 
bias in our experiment, i.e. that the problematic stimulus (the smartphone) triggers an automatic 
approach response.  
L IMITATIONS  
Our reaction time data was from a relatively small sample (n=40) and was noisy, and our residual 
measure of random effects was high within our data model relative to the effects explained by 
random variation per user. One source of noise was the semi-controlled nature of the experiment: 
the Tabletop was in a social space within the Computer Science department, with no restrictions on 
distractions. Re-running the study in a more controlled environment with a larger n and interaction 
shortcuts disabled would help to disambiguate the statistically non-significant results. 
Note from Figure 5.13 that the experiment may not have had sufficient power to detect small 
improvements in our measure of bias. In the context of confidence intervals approximately twice 
those of the 1 standard error bars shown (see p 4:61), the experiment would only detect a difference 
of around 3 points on the bias score. In terms of our RQ2, we have found no evidence that a Tabletop 
CBM intervention is an appropriate way to support people wishing to reduce smartphone addiction, 
either in terms of user-friendliness (given the high data variability and levels of circumventing the 
training) or effectiveness. Nevertheless, CBM remains a valid NDBCI given the evidence of its 
effectiveness from psychology labs; we return to its potential in Chapters 7 and 8.   
Although our experiment was based on Wiers et al. [2011], who used an approach-avoid task as both 
intervention and measure, there were some important differences. Firstly, we used a smaller number 
of testing and training trials (testing – us: 40 trials, Wiers et al., 80 trials; training – us: 60 vs Wiers at 
al.s’ 440), because of the risk of user fatigue and boredom. Secondly, we used the same randomised 
stimuli throughout, rather than using a mix of trained and untrained stimuli in the post-test phase to 
check for effect generalisability. Images of smartphones are much more similar to each other than 
images of different types of drinks; checking for generalisability would therefore be difficult even if 
we used untrained images of smartphones. Thirdly, our participants used different physical gestures 
– full-arm push and pull – rather than the Wiers et al. joystick with similar amounts of movement for 
a push/pull gesture. It may be that any underlying CBM-Approach bias is not accurately captured by a 
‘pull’ gesture.  
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Lastly, smartphone users re-train themselves to approach their phones through ordinary smartphone 
usage, undermining training interventions. Our intervention required a larger physical movement to 
‘reject’ and ‘accept’ items than either the previous study on smartphones (5.1) or lab joystick 
movements, and allowed us to replicate a more lifelike situation in which a participant might 
encounter smartphones.  However, this intervention may be insufficient to counter ingrained 
smartphone-approach behaviour in-the-wild unless it is repeated frequently. Given that Tabletops 
are not generally available, this is unlikely. Intervention participants also completed an intervention 
task, whilst the control participants did not, which may have impacted on post-intervention reaction 
times through fatigue. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter explored the application of CBM as a nonconscious intervention technique in two 
different formats and two different experimental contexts. We implemented an incidental CBM 
intervention in-the-wild on smartphones in the healthy eating domain, and a semi-controlled training 
task CBM intervention on Tabletops in the domain of problematic smartphone usage.  
We wished to assess CBM’s suitability as a nonconscious intervention technique in in-the-wild and 
semi-controlled conditions. Trial error rates were low (coincidentally 1.31% for both studies) 
indicating that participants found it relatively easy to comply with the specific task. However, our 
results highlight several difficulties in translating CBM techniques into spaces where users carry out 
their daily lives. We found some evidence from Experiment 5.1 that the intervention altered some 
general attitudes towards healthy food, although not at a Bonferroni-corrected level of significance. 
However, with no evidence of any accompanying shifts in specific attitudes, it is difficult to determine 
whether this was due to the incidental training, by participants being reminded to consciously 
consider healthy food choices by the training, by participants being nonconsciously primed by the 
training, or whether the statistically significant results were a false positive. We also note that our 
healthy food ratings had limited power to detect changes. Participants also completed the task in 
different time frames – from 11 days to 2 days. Experiment 5.3 tried to counter this problem by using 
reaction times as a proxy for attitude and using a single, focused training task in semi-controlled 
conditions. Again, although there was some evidence of statistically significant differences in 
approach bias, they were not related to session and therefore our intervention.  
CBM remains a candidate intervention paradigm for NDBCIs because of their evidence of efficacy 
from psychology. However, we have yet to show strong evidence of its impact in our small in-the-
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wild and semi-controlled experiments. In terms of our RQ2, “how can technology best exploit 
nonconscious opportunities to intervene in a user-friendly way”, we have found user interest in the 
technique in a broad range of domains including food, exercise and technology. However, we also 
found some evidence that our approaches were not overly user-friendly. Study 5.1 showed that 
whilst it is possible to apply lightweight CBM training to incidental interactions, there is a risk of user 
irritation if it is not embedded fully as part of existing interaction. For example, where users had a 
number unlock in place, they had to complete 2 unlocks, and the gesture recognition was not always 
perceived as accurate. We also found no evidence of a change in food attitudes, and we note that 
our experiment was not able to detect small changes in scales due to its design and our data 
variability. Study 5.3 showed similar levels of data noise, with our data model showing relatively high 
levels of residual random noise after accounting for individual variation, and evidence of participants 
circumventing the training, with 12% of trials not employing the full drag-and-drop.  
 Therefore, we suggest that a more promising avenue of CBM training is to attach more seamlessly to 
incidental tasks, such as swiping between images in a gallery or changing television channels. 
Delivering this as individualised training may be a fruitful avenue of future research, with n-of-1 trials 
where participants can specify their own preferred CBM  stimuli and mode of intervention 
[McDonald et al. 2017].  There remain interesting avenues of research in using CBMs in NDBCIs, 
which we return to further in Chapters 7 & 8. 
Overall, within CBM studies, it is difficult to determine whether the training might have nonconscious 
impact, or whether the conscious attention required to complete the task might shift reaction times 
via explicit attitude. It is therefore difficult for us to disambiguate the lack of results for our 
experiments. In both experiments 5.1 and 5.3, participants in the intervention received instructions 
to explicitly accept or reject specific objects. They were asked to focus on the content of the images 
rather than the orientation, as in other lab studies which concealed the explicit purpose of the 
training. We reasoned that if this sort of CBM intervention were to be deployed, then both for ethical 
and motivational reasons, participants would be fully briefed on its purpose. Therefore testing with 
informed users reflects the most-likely future use case. However, using informed testing makes the 
results more difficult to interpret with respect to the conscious/nonconscious divide.  
Therefore, our next research focused on a strategy that explicitly aims to disambiguate the 
conscious/nonconscious divide: subliminal priming. Subliminal priming is a method that does not 
consume deliberative cognitive resources. If a prime is subliminal, then it cannot be consciously 
recalled, so such primes are therefore less likely to trigger reactance since behavioural freedom is not 
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consciously perceived to be threatened. This also enables us to avoid context-detection issues; if the 
prime is not consciously perceived, then it should not matter if it is delivered at an inconvenient or 
incorrect moment. Nevertheless, there are many open research questions around how best to 
translate subliminal priming onto personal technology such as smartphones to be effective as a 
NDBCI strategy; this is the focus of the next chapter. 
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6. SUBLIMINAL PRIMING ON SMARTPHONES 
This chapter addresses two broad questions: firstly, is subliminal priming possible on smartphones; 
and secondly, how might researchers apply the technique to nonconscious interventions? It discusses 
technical, ethical and design issues in delivering mobile subliminal priming. It presents four 
explorations of the technique: a technical feasibility study, and three participant studies: 
 Study 6.1, a pilot (n=34) to explore subliminal goal priming in-the-wild over 1 week;  
 Study 6.2, a technical feasibility experiment exploring the boundaries of timing issues on 
smartphones in the context of subliminal priming  
 Study 6.3, a semi-controlled study (n=101) exploring the immediate effect of subliminal 
priming on 3 different types of stimuli, together with a further follow-up study (6.3B, n = 50) 
which investigated variations of stimuli and masks for the same purpose; 
 Study 6.4, a semi-controlled study (n = 103) exploring semantic subliminal number priming 
on smartphones. 
An MSc student, Po-Wei Chen, carried out data-gathering only for experiments 6.3.B and 6.4.  
MOTIVATION 
 We wished to explore the impact of an intervention strategy that unambiguously targets the 
nonconscious: subliminal priming. It has the potential to influence people's attitudes and behaviour, 
making them prefer certain choices over others. With respect to the BAF, it focuses on providing 
triggers via Type 1 attention and memory processes to generate the required impulses on the 
Potential Response stack. As we identified in Chapter 3, there is a research gap in exploring the 
application of subliminal techniques on smartphones and related design, ethical, user acceptance 
and technical challenges.   
Little research has explored the feasibility of subliminal priming on smartphones, despite them 
offering multiple opportunities for priming, with an average of 5-105 uses [Truong et al. 2014], or 5 
hours use [Andrews et al. 2015] per day. Some of these uses may be habitual [van Deursen et al. 
2015; Oulasvirta et al. 2012], i.e. proceeding without conscious operation. This gives the opportunity 
to intervene without attracting conscious attention and risking disruption and/or reactance. Yet 
despite high smartphone ownership [Ipsos 2015] and many successful subliminal priming 
experiments in psychology labs, to our knowledge this is the first research to analyse the technique 
on mobile platforms. Replicating subliminal experiments on smartphones may yield different results 
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to those run in psychology labs since research shows replication is sensitive to contextual factors 
[Van Bavel et al. 2016].  
This chapter explores the boundaries of subliminal priming on smartphones through a pilot, a 
technical feasibility study and 2 semi-controlled studies. Subliminal priming is the showing of a 
stimulus that has some effect without the participant having conscious recall of the stimulus 
[Bornstein and Pittman 1992; Merikle et al. 2001]. Subliminal goal priming is showing people stimuli 
to increase the likelihood of the goal-orientated behaviour [Pinder et al. 2015b; Shalev and Bargh 
2011; Wood and Neal 2007]. Our particular interest is in the use of subliminal priming techniques in 
nonconscious behaviour change technology [Pinder et al. 2015a; Pinder et al. 2015b; Riener and 
Thaller 2014; Barral et al. 2014].  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
Dual process theories (DPT, see Evans [2008] for a review) help to explain subliminal priming. 
Subliminal priming techniques aim to covertly trigger automatic responses in the nonconscious 
system [Negri et al. 2014]. The advantage of subliminal instead of supraliminal triggers are that they 
can support people during tasks with high load on the conscious system [Wallace et al. 1991], 
potentially avoid irritation [Ham and Midden 2010], be less likely to promote behaviour that is in 
contrast with the prime [Glaser and Kihlstrom 2005], and can increase authenticity in responses 
[Shalev and Bargh 2011]. 
MECHANISMS OF SUBLIMINAL PRIMING  
Subliminal priming aims to activate cognitive representations of stimuli outside of conscious 
attention [Macmillan 1986; Negri et al. 2014]. Subliminal goal priming tries to make it more likely an 
individual will perform a behaviour in line with a given goal. For this to work, the individual must 
have a pre-existing associative network of cognitive constructs related to the goal, including the 
means to achieve it. Priming re-activates this network, increasing its accessibility, making goal-
related behaviour more likely [Aarts and Dijksterhuis 2000; Bargh et al. 2001; Custers and Aarts 
2007].  
Priming may also increase a goal construct’s reward value via the mere exposure effect [Bornstein et 
al. 1987; Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc 1980; Custers and Aarts 2007]. The mere exposure effect is where 
exposure to stimuli increases subsequent liking judgements [Zajonc 1968b]. This effect has been 
extended into the subliminal, i.e. experiments where participants tend to prefer the stimuli they’ve 
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been shown, despite not being able to consciously recall seeing them [Seamon et al. 1984]. Monahan 
et al. [Monahan et al. 2000] found that the effect of subliminal mere exposure (SME) effects further 
increased with the number of exposures of a stimulus.  
A second approach to increasing liking via priming (affective priming) is subliminal affective 
conditioning. This technique pairs a target item with a valenced (positive or negative) affective 
subliminal prime to alter participant attitudes and/or behaviour towards the target [Dijksterhuis 
2004; Winkielman et al. 1997]. Dijksterhuis found that participants exposed to a ~17ms exposure of 
the word “I” alongside a positive trait showed an improvement in levels of self-esteem compared to 
a control group [Dijksterhuis 2004].  
An additional important question is whether subliminal effects are due to a simple associative 
stimulus-response effect, or whether some deeper semantic processing can occur below conscious 
attention. The effectiveness of subliminal goal priming depends on semantic processing, i.e. 
activation of the goal-related associative network. Several researchers have found evidence of 
subliminal semantic processing [Naccache and Dehaene 2001; Ocampo 2015]. We address this 
question in section 6.4. With reference to the BAF, subliminal semantic priming should in theory both 
add stimulus-related impulses to the Potential Behaviour stack, and increase the implicit value of 
those impulses on the stack. 
SUBLIMINAL HCI  RESEARCH  
In HCI, subliminal experiments have primarily focused on enhancing “just-in-time” decision making. 
Experiments have investigated domains including visual search tasks [Aranyi et al. 2014; Pfleging et 
al. 2013], performance support in 3D intelligent tutoring systems [Chalfoun and Frasson 2011], 
memory support [DeVaul et al. 2003] and driving assistance [Riener and Thaller 2014]. Aranyi et al. 
[2014] found some evidence that subliminal cues can support selection tasks in virtual environments, 
but found only larger effect sizes for trials with fast response rates (≤1 second).  
SUBLIMINAL SCEPTICISM  
Researchers have expressed scepticism about both subliminal perception and subliminal priming 
[Pratkanis 1992; Moore 1988], partly due to lack of replicability and the weakness of the effect 
[Greenwald and Draine 1997; Greenwald et al. 1996]. The existence of subliminal perception is less 
controversial since neuroimaging techniques have shown activation in reward areas of the brain in 
response to subliminal presentation of meaningful stimuli [Pessiglione et al. 2007; Wetherill et al. 
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2014]. However, subliminal priming remains controversial, with ongoing discussions including how to 
demonstrate a lack of awareness of stimuli, methodological issues and how to establish reliable and 
replicable subliminal priming  experiments [Draine and Greenwald 1998; Greenwald and Draine 
1997; Shanks et al. 2013; Cheesman and Merikle 1984].  
The technique is not universally accepted as effective in HCI: Pfleging et al. [2013] found no evidence 
that subliminal cueing on desktops can improve visual search tasks, compared to supraliminal cues, 
despite tailoring subliminal cue presentation to individual participants’ perception thresholds.  
Similarly, Riener & Thaller’s research [Riener and Thaller 2014] into the effect of subliminal lane 
change requests on steering behaviour found no statistically significant effects compared to a control 
group. 
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS  
PRIME MODALITY  
Riener et al. [2011] identified four possible channels of subliminal communication: visual; auditory; 
olfactory and tactile. We selected visual as the most suitable channel for research on smartphones: 
auditory signals may not be attended to and phone sounds are often disabled; there are few tactile 
opportunities on a static touchscreen; and research into olfactory HCI on smartphones is in its 
infancy [Le Laboratoire 2015].  
STIMULI TYPE  
Visual stimuli have additional design considerations, in particular around whether to use words or 
images as stimuli. Although there is evidence that images activate meaning faster than words [Carr et 
al. 1982], it is more difficult to select an unambiguous image than an unambiguous word. Single 
words are thought to maximise the likelihood of activating related concepts, because they are easier 
to parse than phrases. However, subliminal word primes should avoid ironic effects. For example, 
Earp et al. found that “no smoking” is unsuitable as a prime because it activates concepts related to 
smoking [Earp et al. 2013]. Our Study 6.3 explores the question of stimulus type by comparing the 
impact of photos, text and polygons. 
PRIME DELIVERY  
Subliminal priming is delivered by displaying the stimulus for a period of time that makes people 
unable to consciously recall the stimulus. Yet there is some debate about appropriate timings. 
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Previous studies have used durations ranging from 4ms [Murphy and Zajonc 1993], 5.55ms [DeVaul 
et al. 2003], 16.67ms (i.e. 1 frame at 60 frames per second, fps) [Dijksterhuis 2004; Hull et al. 2002; 
Strahan et al. 2002], 30ms [Veltkamp et al. 2011] and 33ms (2 frames at 60fps) [Aranyi et al. 2014].   
MASKING  
Subliminal priming cannot be done on smartphones without users being aware that something is 
happening, for example seeing flickers related to stimuli exposure, since humans can detect flickers 
at rates over 500 Hz [Davis et al. 2015a]. Smartphones also cannot replicate the precise millisecond 
or sub-millisecond exposure times of tachistoscopes [Sperdin et al. 2013]. Smartphone interventions 
may be able to use masking:  the use of additional images shown in the same location as a target 
within a brief time period in order to reduce the target’s visibility [Enns and Di Lollo 2000]. Masking is 
a common technique in psychophysics to limit or remove the ability of participants to consciously 
recall a target, particularly when there are technical constraints on target exposure times [Bachmann 
and Francis 2013].  
However, choosing an appropriate masking method, duration, and mask type is not trivial. Firstly, a 
mask may be presented both before and after a target (sandwich masking), just afterwards 
(backward masking) or just before (forward masking) [Enns and Di Lollo 2000; Wiens and Öhman 
2007]. Secondly, mask durations are also varied across experiments, from 50ms [Spalding and Hardin 
1999]  to 200ms [Aranyi et al. 2014]. Thirdly, masks may be a pattern (e.g. random dots [Ham and 
Midden 2010]), a similar image (e.g. a neutral face mask shown after a stimulus of an emotive face 
[Liddell et al. 2005]), a bright-field energy mask [Seamon et al. 1984] or a composite of all stimuli 
[Aranyi et al. 2014].  
Greenwald et al. showed that sandwich-masking targets shown for 50ms meant that some subjects 
could consciously recall them [Greenwald et al. 1996]. To maximise the chance of stimuli being 
invisible to all subjects, for our studies we selected a sandwich-masking technique with a stimulus 
duration of 17ms, or one frame at 60fps [Google 2016a]. This is consistent with fMRI studies that 
suggest a subliminal threshold of ~20ms [Meneguzzo et al. 2014] – i.e. above 20ms a stimulus is likely 
to be consciously recalled by at least some subjects. 
AFFECTIVE PRIMES  
Researchers have used smiling and angry faces as affective primes, with random polygons as “non-
affective primes” [Winkielman et al. 1997]. Murphy & Zajonc found that subliminal priming of non-
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affective items with smiling faces improved liking of those items compared with those primed with 
angry faces [Murphy and Zajonc 1993]. The results show evidence that emotions can be elicited 
outside of awareness. Winkielman et al. [Winkielman et al. 1997] suggest that affective priming is 
more effective with unfamiliar targets, compared with trying to change pre-existing affect for familiar 
ones. 
SUBLIMINAL PRIMING IN MOBILE APPS  
Several commercial subliminal apps are available. However, some have features that make them 
unlikely to be able to deliver subliminal priming effectively. Megabit [Megabit 2015] presents primes 
for 300ms, which contradicts the evidence of a subliminal threshold at 20ms [Meneguzzo et al. 
2014]. iSubliminal [2015] presents long phrases as stimuli, which are unlikely to be processed in 
subliminal display times.  
USER ACCEPTANCE OF SUBLIMINAL PRIMING TECHNIQUES  
A key question is whether users would accept subliminal priming techniques, even with informed 
consent. In a separate survey of users of activity trackers (n=26)6, we asked: “Would you consider 
enabling subliminal prompts on your mobile device?”. People generally had fairly negative attitudes 
towards priming: 13 said “Definitely not”, 7 “neutral”, 1 “Definitely” and 5 people provided no rating.  
The participant that responded “Definitely” said, “Curious how and if this could work?”. Reasons for 
responding “Definitely not” included scepticism over effects (“Don’t think it’s useful”), a rejection of 
the idea of subliminal prompting (“[prompts should] be obvious or not at all”); and possible fear 
about the technique (“subliminal prompts sounds like it could scar[e] people”). Neutral respondents 
also expressed possible fear (“it does make me aware of the fact that anyone could [p]ut any sort of 
subliminal message in my devices and I wouldn't like that”), and wanted subliminal prompts that 
would comply with their conscious goals (“the messages should comply with my other […] goals and 
not conflict with them”).  
EXPERIMENTS OVERVIEW  
Our set of experiments proceeded as follows: first we carried out a week-long pilot in-the-wild to 
investigate how we might use subliminal techniques in behaviour change applications on 
                                                            
6 Not reported fully in this thesis for reasons of brevity 
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smartphones (Experiment 6.1); next we conducted rigorous timing tests on a set of experiment 
smartphones to determine precisely how long stimuli are shown for (Experiment 6.2); and finally we 
carried out two semi-controlled experiment on these experiment devices: the first to determine the 
immediate impact of 3 different types of subliminal primes on subsequent liking judgements 
(Experiment 6.3), and the second to explore semantic subliminal priming using numbers (Experiment 
6.4). 
EXPERIMENT 6.1:  1  WEEK IN-THE-WILD NONCONSCIOUS GOAL REMINDERS 
MOTIVATION  
This in-the-wild pilot measured the impact of one week of goal-related subliminal primes, shown at 
unlock time, on measures of direct and indirect goal activation. The domain was physical activity 
because it is important for general health [Rhodes et al. 2012].  We also wanted to pick up on one of 
the key domains of interest to users: surveys 4.2 and 5.2 found respondents were concerned about 
exercise and sedentary behaviour. 
METHOD  
This experiment’s intervention involved showing participants goal-related primes on their own 
phones at unlock time. Participants were requested to use PIN unlock to try to maximise user 
attention on the screen at this point. We used both subliminal affective conditioning by associating a 
goal word with a smiley “:)” and subliminal mere exposure in the form of many repetitions of the 
goal word.  
DESIGN  
This experiment used a pre-test/post-test control group design for explicit and implicit measures of 
goal activation. For the explicit measure, our dependent variable was a self-report goal commitment 
scale. Our independent variables were intervention group (control and intervention, between-
subjects) and session (pre- and post- intervention, within-subjects). For the implicit measure, our 
dependent variable was reaction time to goal-related word stimuli. Our independent variables were 
intervention group (control and intervention, between-subjects), session (pre- and post- 
intervention, within-subjects) and word type (active, inactive and neutral, within-subjects). 
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Reactance was measured at post-test. Our dependent variable was a reactance scale score (outlined 
below); our independent variable was intervention group (control and intervention, between-
subjects). 
HYPOTHESES  
We hypothesised that: 
1. H1 there would be a statistically significant interaction between intervention group and 
session. We predict that, when compared to the control group, participants in the 
intervention group would show increases in both explicit and implicit measures of goal 
accessibility at post-test compared to pre-test measures.  We also predicted that the 
intervention group at post-test would show increases in positive attitude towards being 
active, and decreases in positive attitude towards being inactive compared to the pre-test 
measures and control group. 
2. H2 there would be no evidence of statistically significant differences in reactance scores 
between participants in the control vs intervention group.     
PARTICIPANTS  
38 participants (24 female, Mean age = 28.8 years, SD 8.22 years) took part. All were adult native 
English speakers who owned Android devices and used a PIN unlock, recruited at the University of 
Birmingham. 34 participants were included in the final analysis: 17 in a control group, 17 in an 
intervention group. 1 other participant in the intervention condition was excluded because they 
reported they saw the prime on unlock. 3 other participants were excluded because they did not use 
their phones during the week. This study has similar sample sizes to related work that has found 
effects [Aranyi et al. 2014; Dijksterhuis 2004; Strahan et al. 2002].  
Recruitment material asked for people who wished to be more active, to address evidence that 
participants need to be motivated to pursue a goal for subliminal goal priming to be effective 
[Strahan et al. 2002]. All participants gave consent to participate in an experiment that “may prompt 
you to be more active”, but were naïve to the subliminal nature of the experiment until the end. 
PRIME CONDITIONS  
The experiment had a between-subjects intervention group condition: 1) an intervention group that 
received a goal prime at smartphone unlock time and 2) a control group that did not receive this 
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prime at unlock. Participants were randomly assigned, balanced for gender, to either the 
intervention group or the control group. For both conditions, all experiment materials (adverts, 
emails, surveys, instructions) repeatedly contained the prime active :). Participants were also asked 
to form a specific active goal for the duration of the experiment. They were advised that the goal 
should be clear, specific and relatively difficult to achieve, in line with Goal Setting Theory (GST, 
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Figure 6.2. Unlock procedure – control 
After unlock, following a 500ms pause, a sandwich-masked stimulus was shown in black font on a 
white background in the centre of the screen for both conditions. Intervention participants (Figure 
6.1), were shown the active :) stimulus for one frame (~17ms at 60fps [Google 2016b]), sandwich-
masked by a non-word pre- and post- for 3 frames (~51ms at 60fps). The non-word was chosen to 
mask each character of the stimulus including the smiley characters. Control participants were only 
shown the non-word masks for ~102ms (Figure 6.2). 
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For the Intervention condition, we used a simple word, active, as a goal prime. This was chosen as it 
was relevant to the recruited participants’ goal (i.e. to be more active) ensuring that it was goal-
relevant [Strahan et al. 2002]. It is also commonly understood to form part of a general action goal 
[Albarracin et al. 2011]. We used text rather than a potentially faster-parsed image because of the 
difficulty of selecting an image that would be meaningful to a large group of people. The smiley was 
included to add affective conditioning for the goal prime [Custers and Aarts 2007].  We used a 
punctuation-based smiley :) because of evidence from neuroscience that these sorts of smileys are 
readily interpreted as smiling faces and provoke similar brain responses [Churches et al. 2014], and 
evidence that smiling faces can be effective subliminal affective conditioning cues [Ham and Midden 
2010]. This smiley also has less ambiguity than a smiling-face photo or pictograph since pictographs 
differ across platforms and software versions [Tigwell and Flatla 2016], and selecting a photo means 
making choices about a person’s characteristics such as gender that might make a difference in 
impact [Deutsch 1990]. 
MEASURES  
To measure goal accessibility, we used an implicit measure and an explicit measure, both pre- and 
post-intervention. The  implicit measure was reaction time in a modified Stroop task [Williams et al. 
1996] . The explicit measure was a subscale of the Hollenbeck, Williams, and Klein (HWK) measure of 
goal commitment [1989] as validated by DeShon & Landis [1997].   
IMPLICIT MEASURE 
The modified Stroop task is an implicit measure because it uses reaction times (RT) to estimate 
processing bias towards different categories of words, rather than using self-report. Increases in RT 
in such tasks indicate higher activation for the longer-response words because they interfere more 
with the colour-naming task. Using this task builds on evidence that smartphones are a viable tool to 
deliver reaction-time based assessments [Enock et al. 2014].  Our modified Stroop followed Berry & 
Spence [2009] to measure RT in a colour naming task for three word types: active, inactive and 
neutral related words (forming the independent variable Word Type in the analysis below).  
The neutral words used were matched for length and frequency with the active and inactive words 
using the British National Corpus [BNC 2016]; word stimuli are shown in Table 6:1. Our hypothesis 
was therefore that reaction time for intervention participants to active words would increase in 
comparison to the other word groups, representing higher interference from the repeatedly-
activated ‘active’ concept. 
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Stroop category Word 
Active   active, walk, move, lively 
Active control writer, leaf, none, candle 
Inactive static, asleep, idle, lazy 
Inactive control inside, hammer, back, prop 
Table 6:1 Stroop word stimuli 
EXPLICIT MEASURES 
To test hypothesis H1, that the intervention would have an impact on explicit measures of goal 
accessibility and attitude, we used the HWK sub-scale and a set of attitude semantic differentials. 
The HWK sub-scale is an explicit measure using Likert scale 1-5 ratings on goal commitment 
statements shown in Table 6:2. We added “I like this goal” as a proxy for positive affect. Goal 
importance and affect are argued to be strong predictors, along with goal progress, of feelings of 
success [Locke and Latham 1990]. 
HWK item 
Quite frankly, I don’t care if I achieve this goal or not. (R) 
I am strongly committed to pursuing this goal. 
It wouldn’t take much to make me abandon this goal. (R) 
I think this goal is a good goal to aim* for. 
I am willing to put in a great deal of effort to achieve this goal. 
I like this goal 
*original wording = “shoot” 
(R) = reverse scored 
Table 6:2 HWK Goal Commitment scale questions 
Table 6:3 shows the 8 semantic differentials used to measure general attitude towards being active 
and inactive. 
To what extent do you feel that being ACTIVE / INACTIVE is: 
Important Unimportant 
Harmful Beneficial (R) 
Healthy Unhealthy 





(R) = reverse scored 
Table 6:3 Attitude semantic differentials 
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We expanded on the set of semantic differentials used in study 5.1, adding “Foolish-Wise” and 
“Interesting-Boring” to derive a richer attitude score, and measured the items on a 5-point rather 
than on the 7 points as before to make the procedure simpler. 
To test hypothesis H2, that there would be no evidence of differences in reactance between the 
intervention groups, we calculated a post-test reactance score from a set of 8 explicit attitude 
statements towards the app. Dillard & Shen show that reactance can be measured using anger and 
negative cognition components [2005].  Reactance items are shown in Table 6:4. 
To what extent did you find the app: 
Easy to use | Difficult to use  
Easy to ignore | Difficult to ignore (R) 
Made me angry | Did not make me angry (R) 
Helpful | Unhelpful 
Enjoyable | Not enjoyable 
Annoying | Not annoying (R) 
Irritating | Not irritating (R) 
Aggravating | Not aggravating (R) 
(R) = reverse scored   
Table 6:4 Reactance scale items 
PROCEDURE  
Participants were recruited via social media across the University of Birmingham. They received a link 
to a demographics survey to start the experiment, after which they were prompted to form and 
declare an active goal, and completed the HWK measure. They were randomly assigned to one of the 
two conditions, balanced for gender. Participants received a download link to an Android app. The 
first task in the app was to complete the modified Stroop task. 
 
Figure 6.3. Modified Stroop task example  
The modified Stroop task is shown in Figure 6.3. Following a short practice, participants were shown 
each word from the stimuli list at random in each of four colours, with a restriction that two words of 
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the same colour should not appear at adjacent times. Participants were asked to select the correct 
colour as quickly and accurately as possible. We recorded reaction time and correct selection.  
The app then primed each group (intervention and control) for a week at unlock time as outlined 
above. At the end of the week of priming, participants were asked to complete a second modified 
Stroop task, and received a link to an online survey to measure Reactance and the HWK measure. 
Participants were asked whether they had seen any words on unlock, and which ones if any.   
RESULTS  
APP USAGE 
Mean daily unlocks (and therefore stimulus exposures) was 49.0 (SD 28.0). A Chi-squared test of 
independence of unlock usage between intervention and control groups showed no evidence of a 
statistically significant difference X2(1, N=34) =.06, p=.80.   
To examine hypothesis H1, that our intervention would increase explicit and implicit goal activation 
measures, we examined the HWK goal commitment score (explicit measure); reaction times to 
‘active’ words in our modified Stroop task (implicit measure); and our explicit measures of attitude 
towards activity and inactivity. 
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GOAL COMMITMENT  
Table 6:5  shows descriptive statistics for the HWK measure, and Figure 6.4 shows a barplot with 1 SE 
error bars for the same data.  
Group Session N Mean SD 
Control Pre 17 4.12 0.52 Post 17 3.93 0.48 
Intervention Pre 17 4.42 0.34 Post 17 3.97 0.63 
Total Pre 34 4.27 0.46 Post 34 3.95 0.55 
Table 6:5 HWK mean descriptive statistics by session and intervention group 
 Figure 6.4 HWK mean barplot with 1SE error bars 
HWK measures for each intervention group and session were tested for normality (all group x session 
cells Shapiro-Wilk p>.05 except control-pre W= 0.89, p=.05) and homogeneity of variance, which 
showed no evidence the variances differed significantly between groups  F(3,64)=1.71, p=.17. We ran 
a 2x2 mixed-ANOVA to explore the effects of intervention group as a between-subjects factor 
(control or intervention) and session (pre or post) as a within-subjects factor on the HWK score. The 
model showed no statistically significant interaction effects between intervention group and session 
on the HWK measure (F(1,32)=1.28, p=.27), nor a statistically significant main effect of group 
(F(1,32)=1.82, p=.19), but showed a statistically significant main effect of session between pre- 
(mean=4.27) and post- (mean=3.95) sessions, F(1,32)=7.43, p =.01, ηp
2= .19. Thus there is no 
evidence to support our hypothesis that our intervention would improve scores (no statistically 
significant interaction effects), but there is evidence that goal commitment scores decline over time, 
regardless of intervention. 
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MODIFIED STROOP  
One participant was removed because of a high error rate (27.5%) and another participant’s second 
session data was lost, so the final sample included 32 participants (16 in each condition) with 8365 
trials. 161 colour-naming errors (1.92%) and 10 outliers with reaction times more than 8,000 ms 
(0.12%)  were removed in line with Dresler et al. [2009]. Table 6:6 shows the mean reaction times (in 
ms) for each intervention group (control or intervention), session (pre or post) and word type (active, 
inactive or neutral), with a barplot (1 SE error bars) for the same data shown in Figure 6.5. 
  Word Type 
Group Session Active Inactive Neutr  al
Control 
Pre 934 (±349) 903 (±290) 940 (±333) 
Post 897 (±279) 905 (±279) 918 (±318) 
Intervention 
Pre 1022 (±479) 1049(±505) 1041 (±500) 
Post 1005 (±476) 1037 (±532) 1013 (±496) 
Table 6:6. Stroop colour-naming reaction times (ms) across word types, intervention groups and session 
 
Our hypothesis was that if the intervention was successful, correct reaction times to active-related 
words would increase in the post-test session for participants in the intervention condition compared 
to the control condition and the pre-test session. This is because as exposure to the active :) prime 
activates their goal-related associations, active words become more salient and interfere more in the 
colour naming task. Reaction times to neutral words should not change, and inactive word reaction 
times may decrease as inactivity becomes less salient relative to activity.  
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Figure 6.5 Stoop colour-naming reaction times (ms) across word types, intervention group and session (1 SE error bars) 
We constructed a GLMER model to explore the effect of condition (control and intervention, control 
as baseline), session (pre and post, pre as baseline) and word type (neutral, active, inactive, neutral 
as baseline) on reaction time in the remaining 7944 trials. We trimmed 387 (4.87%) trials based on 
model residuals. The model that converged (R2ps= .33) included within-participant random slopes for 
session. The results in Table 6:7 show that the highest-order statistically significant interaction is 
Post:Intervention:Active (b=24.91, SE=12.00, t=2.07, p= .04). Note that the p values given are not 
Bonferroni-corrected. The Bonferroni corrected significance level for 11 comparisons at the 95% 
confidence level would be .0018 (=.05/11). 
To ease interpretation, we also plotted the model’s estimated marginal means generated by the 
lsmeans package [Lenth 2016], and their 95% confidence intervals in Figure 6.6. This shows that for 
the intervention group, correct responses to both control and active words are predicted to be faster 
in the post-test, while inactive words RT did not drop by as much. However, post-hoc Tukey-adjusted 
pairwise tests indicates no statistically significant difference between Intervention-Pre-Active and 
Intervention-Post-Active (b= 19.69, SE=20.85, z=0.94, p =.99). There is therefore no evidence to 
support our hypothesis that our intervention would slow reaction times to active-goal-relevant 
words only because they have become more accessible. 
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Fixed effects Estimate Std. Error t value p value 
(Intercept)         939.93 14.90 63.09 <.001 
Post     3.84 13.46  0.29 0.78 
Intervention 126.70 19.56  6.48 <.001 
Active words   -8.03  7.45 -1.08 .28 
Inactive words -22.92  8.64 -2.65 .01 
Post:Intervention -35.54 19.77 -1.80 .07 
Post:Active words -12.91  8.97 -1.44 .15 
Post:Inactive words  10.72 10.67      1.00 .31 
Intervention: Active words  -7.15 10.40 -0.69 .49 
Intervention:Inactive words  21.93 13.03  1.68 .09 
Post:Intervention:Active words  24.91 12.00  2.07 .04 
Post:Intervention:Inactive words  11.07 15.00  0.74 .46 
  
Random effects SD 
 Participant (Intercept)  60.76 
   Session (Session Post)  44.66 
 Residual    0.01 
 
Model formula: RT ~ (session * condition * word type) + (1 + session | participant) 
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ATTITUDES TOWARDS ACTIVITY AND INACTIVITY 
Descriptive statistics are for our attitude scores towards being active and inactive are shown in Table 
6:8 and Figure 6.7.  
  Active Inactive 
Condition Session Mean SD Mean SD 
Control Pre 4.32 0.43 1.86 0.59 
Post 4.38 0.35 1.89 0.68 
Intervention Pre 4.20 0.34 1.89 0.65 
Post 4.29 0.70 1.68 0.77 
Table 6:8 Attitude semantic differential scale descriptive statistics 
To examine our hypothesis H1 that the intervention would improve positive attitudes towards being 
active and reduce positive attitude towards being inactive, we examined the two attitude score 
dependent variables (active and inactive) across our two independent variables: intervention group 
(control and intervention, between-subjects) and session (pre- and post- intervention, within-
subjects).   
   
Figure 6.7 Barplots with 1 SE error bars for (left) attitudes towards activity and (right) attitudes towards inactivity 
We first examined the active attitude dependent variable. A Shapiro-Wilk normality test indicated 
that positive attitude data was not normally distributed for the post-session control (W=0.88, p=.03) 
and intervention groups (W=0.86, p=.01), both pre-session normality tests p>.05. There was no 
evidence of a violation of homogeneity of variance (F(3,64)=1.62, p=.19). Wilcoxon rank-sum tests 
showed no evidence of an impact of session on positive attitude for either intervention (W = 107, 
p=.20) or control group (W=135, p=.75). 
Mean inactive attitude was assessed between the intervention groups across sessions for normality, 
which showed no evidence of departures from normality (all group x session tests p > .05) and 
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homogeneity of variance, which showed no evidence of differences in variance (F(3,64)=0.21, p = 
.89). A 2x2 mixed-ANOVA showed no evidence of statistically significant differences for main effects 
(group F(1,32)=0.26, p=.61; session F(1,32)=0.33, p=.57) or interaction between group and session 
F(1,32)=0.59, p=.45. Therefore there was no evidence to support the hypothesis that explicit 
attitudes would change as a result of the intervention. 
REACTANCE 
We generated a reactance score by averaging over reported anger and negative feelings towards the 
app from the post-test data gathering session. Mean reactance for the intervention group was 0.34 
(SD=0.75) and for the control group was 0.56 (SD = 0.67). To examine hypothesis H2 that the 
intervention would not cause reactance, we examined the effect of our between-subjects 
intervention group independent variable (intervention or control) on our dependent variable, mean 
reactance score. The data in each group showed no evidence of departures from normality (Shapiro-
Wilk intervention W=0.93, p=.25; control W= 0.89, p=.06) and no evidence of heterogeneity of 
variance (F(1,32)=0.01, p=.93). A Welch Two Sample t-test showed no evidence of a difference in 
reactance scores between the control and intervention groups, t(31.63) = 0.90, p = .37, mean 
difference = 0.22, 95%CI[-0.28, 0.72], Cohen’s d=0.31.  
STIMULUS RECALL 
26 participants (76%) responded “yes” to the question “Did you notice any words appear on the 
screen after unlocking your phone?”, but no participants could correctly identify the words. Some 
who responded “yes” reported confusion: “Was it meant to do something? It just had a v.quick flash 
when I unlocked my phone”.  
D ISCUSSION  
Contrary to our first hypothesis that our intervention would improve explicit measures of goal 
accessibility, the goal commitment HWK score decreased over 1 week, regardless of subliminal 
primes. This alone is not necessarily problematic, since other research has found evidence for effects 
of priming outside conscious goal commitment [Hassin et al. 2009]. However, the modified Stroop 
tests showed no evidence that the intervention had an impact on nonconscious goal activation, 
contrary to our hypothesis that our intervention would improve goal accessibility, which should slow 
reaction times to naming active-goal-relevant words compared to other word types and the control 
group.  
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Participants unlocked their phones on average 49 times a day, a higher number than some previous 
research of 25 mean unlocks per day [Hintze et al. 2014], although Truong et al. found highly variable 
numbers of daily unlocks of between 5-105 [Truong et al. 2014], in line with our SD of unlocks of 
28.0. Most participants reported seeing words that they could not identify on unlock, reinforcing our 
design decision to select unlock time as the time most likely to hold user attention.   
LIMITATIONS  
This experiment was limited by a small number of participants running the app for only a short 
amount of time. The data was noisy: our Stroop data shows the intervention groups had broadly 
different response times to active words at the start of the experiment, and the GLMER R2PS of .37 
indicates a relatively low correlation between fitted and observed values. Since the study was run in-
the-wild, although we targeted unlock as an intervention time at which participants were likely to be 
paying attention to their phone, we had no direct eye gaze metrics for this, nor for the Stroop test 
participation.  
Note from Figure 6.7 that the experiment may not have had sufficient power for our measure of 
attitude towards activity would detect a small improvement in attitude. Participants recorded a 
mean response of 4.26 on this 5-point scale at the outset, leaving little room to detect improvement 
in the context of confidence intervals approximately twice those of the 1 standard error bars shown.  
From Figure 6.6, showing 95%CIs for Stroop task reaction times, the experiment would only have 
been able to detect differences in the intervention group of approximately 100 ms, with average 
marginal means of 1050ms for the intervention group and 925ms for the control group, although 
note that estimated marginal mean CIs can be misleading because they do not include random 
effects. Although we expect longer RTs in-the-wild compared to lab experiments, we note that a lab-
based experiment measuring responses to exercise and sedentary words [Berry 2006] showed means 
of around 588ms for exercisers and 636 for non-exercisers (although n for the latter group was small, 
n=8, and the experiment found that these differences were not significant).  
Further work is required to validate the use of emotional Stroop tests on smartphones in the wild. 
Future studies could also gather additional information about the performance of the app in 
displaying the prime, i.e. by logging frame display times. Therefore it is difficult to determine why we 
found no evidence for an impact of our intervention. 
We conducted further investigations into subliminal priming with a series of follow-up studies to help 
disambiguate these issues. Experiment 6.2 addresses possible technical issues with delivering image-
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based primes on smartphones by measuring precise frame times for primes on particular experiment 
phones. Experiment 6.3 uses these phones to implement immediate reaction tests, in semi-
controlled conditions where users were asked to concentrate, with direct measures of visibility and 
likeability. We also expanded the number of participants to deal with a possible lack of power in 
experiment 6.1. 
STUDY 6.2:  TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY 
Our motivation was to examine in more detail the technical boundaries in displaying primes to help 
disambiguate the lack of results in experiment 6.1. We therefore explored the timing parameters of 
displaying sandwich-masked subliminal primes on specific smartphones. The tests were constrained 
to a set of four same-batch Android smartphones, later also used in experiments 6.3 and 6.4.  
METHOD  
APPARATUS 
We ran the experiment timings app on a set of four Samsung Galaxy Nexus smartphones running 
Android 4.3. Android smartphones are capped at 60 fps or ~16.67ms per frame and use vertical sync 
to align the software’s refresh rate with the display hardware refresh rate [Google 2016b]. 
PROCEDURE 
We built an Android app to test frame durations for showing short-lived stimuli. We used the 
sandwich-masked stimulus exposure (mask-stimulus-mask) shown in Figure 6.9 using 3 different 
types of stimuli (text, polygons and photos, see Figure 6.11). We ran multiple sessions on each of 4 
experiment phones. Mask duration was set at 3 frames (50ms at 60fps), while the stimulus duration 
was set at 1 frame (~16.6ms at 60fps). No images were preloaded. We used Android’s Choreographer 
functionality [Google 2016c] to log precise frame times for stimulus animation. Where frame time 
exceeded 25ms, the mid-point between frames at 60fps, we recorded a “dropped frame”.  
Although it is possible to measure exact frame durations, this is not the same as a length of the 
stimulus actually appearing because each pixel takes time to update once it receives the signal: the 
pixel transition rate. LCD television screens pixel response rates show rates of approximately 1 frame 
duration or longer [Elze and Tanner 2012], but we were unable to locate any stated pixel response 
times for manufacturers of LCD or AMOLED smartphone displays for comparison. To investigate 
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further, we filmed our experiment on our Samsung Galaxy Nexus' AMOLED display using a GoPro 
Hero 4in WGVA in 240fps mode, equal to 4.17ms per frame. 
RESULTS  
FRAME TIMINGS 
Results are shown in the first row of Table 6:9. There were some dropped frames, 0.09% of total (n= 
89714), and all of these occurred during the first or second frame captured. This suggests that the 
animation object may sometimes not be ready by the first VSYNC, but that subsequent frames 
appear at around 60fps. As a comparison, we also ran the timing app with Wi-Fi connected as a proxy 
for extra load. The results are in the second row of Table 6:9.  
Wi-Fi state Dropped frames 
Length of non-dropped frames in ms 
Median Max Min Mean SD 
Off 0.09% 16.97 17.97 15.99 16.98 0.17 
On 0.32% 16.97 18.64 15.25 16.97 0.19 
Table 6:9. Frame timings 
A Kruskal-Wallis test showed no statistically significant differences between frame lengths between 
our devices with Wi-Fi off [X2(3) = 1.42, p=.70], but a statistically significant difference with Wi-Fi on 
[X2(3) = 18.38, p < .001]. A higher number of dropped frames occurred with Wi-Fi on (0.32%) in 
multiple positions, not just the first frame. 
PIXEL TRANSITION RATES 
Figure 6.8 shows transitions between mask and stimulus from a GoPro recording (4.17ms per frame).  
 
 
Figure 6.8. Mask-polygon stimulus-mask screenshot timeline in ms 
The stimulus is clearly discernible for 4 frames, ~16.7 ms (8.3ms—25ms), although transitions 
between the stimulus and mask before and after the stimulus is fully visible can be seen.  
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The study app was filmed on the experiment phones under the same conditions as Experiment 6.3 
(WiFi off, no other apps running) several times (n=10) on different occasions, with similar results. 
D ISCUSSION  
Overall, we have demonstrated that it is technically possible to show stimuli on Android smartphones 
at times comparable to those used in subliminal priming studies in psychology labs. The timings show 
that a 1-frame item appears for ~16.7 ms and a 3-frame mask appears for ~51ms on the experiment 
phones when Wi-Fi is disabled. We also found that enabling Wi-Fi leads to unpredictable dropped 
frame rates and hence unpredictable display times, a finding relevant for comparative studies. A 
future task is to confirm whether these results generalise to different types of display hardware. 
We have therefore shown that subliminal priming is technically possible on our Android 
smartphones. However, with respect to RQ2, we still have not established how best to deliver 
subliminal priming on smartphones such that it has a measurable impact. The lack of statistically 
significant results in Experiment 6.1 may have been due to variations in user technology, the 
incidental nature of the priming delivery, i.e. at unlock, which meant priming exposures varied 
between participants and potential decay effects, lack of relevance of the primed word and/or low 
power. To disambiguate these points, we next limited our priming experiments to these experiment 
phones, with an experiment design measuring the immediate impact of a range of stimuli more 
closely based on those shown to have effects in psychology labs, with a larger number of people.  
EXPERIMENT 6.3:  STIMULI PRIMING 
MOTIVATION  
The previous study showed that it is technically possible to display items subliminally on our 
experiment Android smartphones. However, it is not yet clear whether the statistically non-
significant results from Experiment 6.1 were due to the procedure having little or no impact when 
delivered on smartphones. Therefore we next concentrated on determining whether we can 
demonstrate an immediate impact of subliminal priming on smartphones, and whether there are 
differences between different stimulus types.  
This study built on subliminal priming experiments from psychology [Bornstein et al. 1987; Seamon 
et al. 1984; Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc 1980]. To demonstrate subliminal priming, experiments need to 
satisfy two conditions: participants cannot consciously recall the stimulus (direct effect); and the 
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same stimulus has some measurable indirect effect [Dijksterhuis et al. 2005; Draine and Greenwald 
1998]. A common measure of the indirect effect is participant preference of the primed stimulus 
[Monahan et al. 2000].  
We selected three different types of stimuli: polygons, photos and text as shown in Figure 6.9. The 
stimuli were non-affective (non-smiling faces, abstract polygons and text) to focus the study on 
exploring the effects of subliminal mere exposure effects. We selected polygons because they have 
been used in previous subliminal priming experiments and could therefore act as a baseline 
comparison for text and photos. We selected text because we used it in Study 6.1 and photos 
because images can activate meaning faster than words [Carr et al. 1982].  
This study was conducted in semi-controlled conditions: we approached people in-the-wild, but 
participants used the experiment phones and were asked to concentrate for the duration of the 
session, thus reducing potential distraction issues from our in-the-wild Experiment 6.1.   
METHOD  
DESIGN  
There were 2 independent variables in the experiment:  
1. Repetitions Group– how many times the prime was shown to participants [3 levels: 0xRepetitions 
(Control, N=29), 1xRepetitions (N=32) and 3xRepetitions (N=40)] 
2. Stimulus Type – the type of stimuli shown to participants [3 levels: polygon, photo and text]. 
Repetitions Group was varied between subjects with Stimulus Type varied within subjects. For 
Repetitions Group conditions, participants were unaware of which condition they were allocated to 
until they were debriefed at the end of the experiment. Experimenters were also unaware of the 
precise allocation of participants. 
Our two binomial dependent measures were whether participants could correctly identify which 
stimulus they’d just been shown from a choice of two; and whether participants selected the primed 
stimulus when asked which they preferred from the same choice of two. 
HYPOTHESES  
Subliminal perception is argued to exist where there is no evidence that participants are able to 
correctly select the target item (i.e. the item they were primed with) yet participants prefer that 
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same item [Bornstein et al. 1987; Dehaene et al. 2006]. This means there should be no evidence of 
different rates of visiblity for those shown stimuli compared to the control, but evidence of different 
rates of preference compared to the control.  
Our related hypotheses to examine subliminal priming were:  
 H1: there would be no statistically significant simple main effect of Repetitions Group on the 
probability of participants being able to correctly identify the prime in the Visibility Task (the 
direct effect) or interaction with Stimulus Type. That is, there would be no difference in 
identification rates between the repetitions groups or evidence of a difference between 
Repetitions Groups that differed according to Stimulus Type . 
 H2: where participants failed the Visibility Task, there would be a statistically significant simple 
main effect of Repetitions Group on the probability of participants preferring the prime 
regardless of stimulus type (the indirect effect). We predicted that, compared to the control 
0xRepetitions group, participants in the other Repetitions Groups would show increased 
preference rates for stimuli they had just been shown, regardless of Stimulus Type. 
PARTICIPANTS  
101 participants (36 women, age mean= 25.9 years, SD= 8.22 years, 1 participant declined to give 
their age) completed the experiment. Participants were recruited in person and via posters at our 
institution and in social and work situations within our social networks. They were offered a small 
non-monetary reward at the end of the experiment and could choose to enter a prize draw for a £30 
voucher.  
TASK 
The experimental task involved participants completing a series of trials, during which participants 
were shown a single masked prime stimulus (Exposure Phase). The priming procedure is shown in 
Figure 6.9.  
 


























Figure 6.10. Selection Phase example (polygons) 
 
Figure 6.11. Stimuli groups, examples and masks 
Visibility task Preference task 
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Participants were exposed to the primes as follows:  
1. A focus dot for ~1003ms  
2. A mask for ~51ms  
3. A stimulus for ~17ms (prime)  
4. A mask for ~51ms  
5. A blank screen for ~204ms 
The prime exposure procedure varied depending on the participants’ Repetitions Group condition: 
• 0xRepetitions (control) condition: steps 1-5 where the stimulus in step 3 was a blank image 
(n=29).  
• 1xRepetitions condition: steps 1-5 repeated once (n=32).  
• 3xRepetitions condition: step 1-5 repeated three times (n=40). 
After priming, participants were immediately given two 2-alternative forced choice tasks in sequence 
to measure (i) whether they had seen the prime (Visibility Task) and (ii) whether they preferred the 
stimulus they had been primed with (Preference Task). After answering both questions, participants 
switched back to the exposure phase to start another trial until they had been shown all the primes 
in each stimulus type group. The order of type groups and order of pairs within the type group were 
randomised between participants. The order in which items were shown as primes were also 
randomised within participants and between stimulus types.   
PRIMING ITEMS  
Over the task participants were primed with three Stimulus Types: 
 Polygons (control stimuli): Black irregular polygons on a white background, 12.5px 
high, adapted from [Cornell 2016]; chequerboard mask  
 Photos: 200x200px black and white headshots of people with neutral expressions 
from the Chicago Face Database [Ma et al. 2015], each pair balanced for the 
database’s attractiveness rating, race and gender, and masked with a chequerboard 
mask.  
 Text: a set of words shown in 42px Verdana bold black font on a white background. 
Words were menu items from the top 10 apps in the Android Play store, balanced for 
word length. The word pairs are given in Table 6:10. Each word was masked with a 
series of ‘x’s. 
 










log in-log out 
print-pause 
Table 6:10 Stimulus word pairs 
In total, participants were exposed to 10 different polygons, 10 different words and 20 different 
faces, in line with [Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc 1980] for polygons & words and [Murphy and Zajonc 
1993] for photos, thus making 40 trials for each participant. We used an ethnically diverse range of 
male & female faces (10 male, 10 female). Polygons were used as the baseline stimulus type because 
they have been shown to elicit subliminal mere exposure effects in previous experiments [Kunst-
Wilson and Zajonc 1980]. We used photos and text as comparison stimuli because they are likely 
candidates for inclusion in behaviour change apps, and to re-examine text stimuli as a follow up to 
experiment 6.1. We used the same sandwich-masking technique and mask duration as in experiment 
6.1. Example images from each group and corresponding masks are shown in Figure 6.11. 
MEASURES  
After the prime Exposure Phase, participants were shown two sets of two images, in sequence, and 
asked to select one of the images displayed in each case (Selection Phase).  These sets were made up 
of a target stimulus identical to the prime7, and a distractor, a randomly chosen stimulus that was 
different to the prime, but of the same stimulus type. Participants were asked: 
1. Which one have you seen before? (Visibility Task) 
2. Which one do you prefer? (Preference Task).  
The order of asking was randomised between participants. Whether participants selected the same 
image as the prime (i.e. the target, coded as a 1) or the distractor (coded as a 0) were recorded. 
Participant’s selections in the Visibility Task form the binary outcome variable in the Visibility analysis 
and their selections in the Preference Task form the binary outcome measure in the Preference 
analysis, both reported below.  
                                                            
7 In the Control condition, where participants did not experience a prime, one of the stimuli displayed was randomly assigned the role of the target. 
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PROCEDURE  
Participants completed the study on our experiment smartphones from Study 2: “clean” same-batch 
Samsung Galaxy Nexus smartphones running Android 4.3 with Wi-Fi disabled. They completed the 
task in natural surroundings such as the coffee room and our atrium. Prior to the test, participants 
completed a consent form, demographics and a training session. Participants gave informed consent 
based on an experiment that would “show images one by one for a very short space of time” but 
were naïve to the subliminal nature of the experiment until the end. All participants completed a 
brief training session before the experiment started. The training stimuli were colour flower photos. 
During the main experiment, for each trial, participants were shown a target in the Exposure Phase, 
followed by a two-alternative forced choice between the target and its distractor stimulus in the 
Selection Phase as outlined above. Once the experiment was completed, participants were debriefed 
and thanked. A summary of the experiment procedure for a given participant is given in Table 6:11. 
 User randomly assigned to Repetitions Group (0xRepetitions, 1xRepetitions or 3xRepetitions) 
 User randomly assigned to always asked Visibility Task or Preference Task first 
 User shown training phase 
 Stimulus group order randomised (polygons; text; photos) 
 For each stimulus group: 
 Randomly assign whether first or second stimulus in group pairs list (A1-B1, A2-B2, A3-B3, …, AN-BN) acts 
as the target (i.e. target stimuli always A or B; distractor stimuli are the other set) 
 Group pairs list  order randomised 
 For each target-match pair: 
 For each target-distractor pair in Stimulus Type list: 
 Repetitions Phase: show target as prime based on user group assigned in Step 1 (0, 1 or 3 times) 
 Selection Phase:  
 show target and distractor  
 ask user Visibility Task and Preference task in order selected in Step 2 
Table 6:11 Pseudocode for experimental procedure 
RESULTS  
DATA ANALYSIS  
Data with reaction times less than 200ms (n=246, 3.04%) was removed. The GLMER for the Visibility 
Task analysis had data from 101 participants with 4032 observations. The Preference Task analysis 
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was on a subset of data where participants answered the Visibility Task incorrectly, so that we could 
ensure the participants were not consciously aware of the stimulus, with 722 observations on 53 
participants.  
The dependent outcome variable in both the visibility and preference tasks—whether the stimulus 
selected was the target (1) or not (0)—is binary. Our GLMER models examined the effect of our 
independent variables Repetition Group (control, 1xRepetitions, 3xRepetitions) and Stimulus Type 
(photo, polygon and text) on the log odds of participants correctly selecting the target item (correct 
or not). Our baselines were control (no prime shown) and polygon, the latter chosen because of its 
affect-neutral appearance, which may not be the case with photos or text.  The models included 
random intercepts for participant and target item to allow for random variation in responses both by 
individual participants and by individual items.  
VISIBILITY TASK  
In the Visibility Task, participants were asked to select the image they thought they had seen before. 
Figure 6.12 shows the results of the Visibility Task in terms of total proportions selected in each 
Repetitions Group condition by Stimulus Type. Note that the figure does not represent individual 
variability, which is accounted for in our model. 
 Figure 6.12 Total Proportion of Target Selections in Visibility Task by Repetitions Group and Stimulus Type 
Table 6:12 summarises our Visibility Task model results (R2M=.05, R
2
C=.11). There was a statistically 
significant effect of repetitions, and no statistically significant interaction effects. Participants in the 
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1xRepetitions and 3xRepetitions conditions, regardless of stimulus type, were more likely to correctly 
select the target than baseline participants who were not shown a prime (0xRepetitions).  
This does not support our hypothesis H1 that there would be no significant differences in detection 
rates between participant groups. In short, participants could see the stimuli to a certain extent. 
There was also a statistically significant simple effect of showing photos (b=0.41, SE=0.19, z=2.20, 
p=.03) on the likelihood of a participant correctly selecting the target compared to the polygon 
baseline condition.  
This can also be seen from the Visibility Task results shown in Figure 6.12. Note that the p values are 
not Bonferroni-corrected, which would not affect the simple main effects of 1x and 3x Reps (critical p 
value = .0056) but does affect the statistical significance of the Photos condition. 
  
Fixed effects Estimate Std. Error Wald Z p value 
(Intercept) -0.31 0.16 -1.93   .05 
1xRepetitions  0.68 0.18 3.72 <.001 
3xRepetitions  0.66 0.17 3.79 <.001 
Text  0.21 0.21 0.98   .33 
Photos  0.41 0.19 2.20   .03 
1xText -0.44 0.24 -1.8   .07 
3xText -0.22 0.23 -0.97   .33 
1xPhotos  0.09 0.21 0.44   .66 
3xPhotos  0.28 0.20 1.38   .16 
Random effects  SD  
Participant (Intercept)  0.26  
Item (Intercept)  0.40  
Model formula:  correct ~ repetitions * type + (1 | user) + (1 | item) 
Table 6:12. Visibility Task analysis, summary effects 
The plot of estimated marginal mean probabilities with 95%CIs is shown in Figure 6.13, which shows 
that the model predicts that detection rates for 1xPhotos, 3xPhotos, 1xPolygon and 3xPolygon will 
exceed the relevant control (0x repetitions) with no overlapping CIs. 
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Figure 6.13 EMM probabilities of correct selection in Visibility Task with 95%Cis 
 
PREFERENCE TASK 
To test the hypothesis that participants in 1x and 3x repetitions groups preferred items at greater 
levels than control group participants (0xRepetitions), we analysed the outcomes of the Preference 
Task (“Which one do you prefer?”) where participants got the Visibility Task wrong, i.e. they did not 
correctly identify the image they’d see before. The Preference Task results in terms of total 
proportion of primed targets selected by Repetitions Group and Stimulus Type are shown in Figure 
6.14. These results represent the proportions of answers that were switched between the tasks: i.e. 
participants changing their response to the 2-alternative forced-choice question between tasks 
(Visiblity Task incorrect, Preference Task correct). For example, in the 1x Photos condition, only 26% 
of correct targets were selected when the visiblity task was incorrect, representing a switch of 26%. 
The results therefore show a low degree of switching across the conditions (all < 50%). 
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Figure 6.14 Total Proportion of Target Selections in Preference Task where Visibility Task was incorrect 
Table 6:13 summarises the outcome of our Preference Task GLMER model (R2M=.05, R
2
C=.29). Note 
that the p values are not Bonferroni-corrected, although in this instance it would not make a 
difference to the statistical significance of the 1xText fixed effect (p<.001, Bonferroni-corrected 
critical p =.006).  
Fixed effects Estimate Standard Error Wald Z p value 
(Intercept) -1.80 0.47 -3.81 <.001 
1xRepetitions 0.91 0.61 1.50 .13 
3xRepetitions 0.48 0.59 0.81 .42 
Text 0.81 0.48 1.68 .09 
Photos 0.83 0.44 1.89 .06 
1xText -2.20 0.67 -3.30 <.001 
3xText -0.09 0.61 -0.14 .89 
1xPhotos -1.20 0.60 -2.00 .05 
3xPhotos -0.58 0.58 -1.01 .31 
Random effects SD   
Participant (Intercept) 1.00   
Item (Intercept) 0.29   
Model formula: correct ~ repetitions * type + (1 | participant) + (1 | item) 
Table 6:13. Preference Task where Visibility Task was failed  
The results show that the effect of repetitions is not statistically significant, i.e. there is no evidence 
that showing a stimulus to a participant increases the likelihood that they will prefer it when they 
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cannot see it (1xRepetitions p=.13; 3xRepetitions p=.42). The model also shows different effects 
across Stimulus Type: when participants cannot detect a Text stimulus, showing it once (1xText) 
decreases the likelihood of it being preferred (i.e. the participant switches their answer between 
Visibility and Preference tasks) compared to the baseline control condition (0xPolygon), (b=2.20, 
SE=0.67, z=3.30, p<.001), whereas there is no evidence that showing text three times makes an 
impact (p=.89).  
This can also be seen in Figure 6.13 and from the plot of estimated marginal mean probability of 
people correctly selecting the target in the Preference Task after failing to identify the target in the 
Visibility Task shown in Figure 6.15. The figure shows that the data is noisy, with switching rates low 
overall (the vast majority below 50%), and particularly low for 1xText, i.e. participants in the 1xText 
condition are predicted to be consistent with their answers between Visibility and Preference 
responses compared to 3xText and 1xPolygon. 
 
Figure 6.15 Estimated marginal mean probability of preferring target after getting the visiblity task wrong 
D ISCUSSION  
Our results indicate that subliminal priming effects on smartphones may be inconsistent, with 
contradictory results across different stimulus types. Using text seems detrimental to subliminal 
priming when primed once compared to the other conditions (a statistically significant negative 
impact for 1xText in Table 6:13).  
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There is some evidence that stimuli are difficult to conceal. Our participants could detect target 
stimuli to a certain extent when they were shown the prime once and three times, compared to the 
control, on our experiment phones. However, the marginal R2 measure for the Visibility Model 
(R2M=.05) indicates that this detection effect seems to be small.  
One explanation for detection effects is stimulus and mask design. Some participants commented on 
strategies used in the discrimination task, indicating that alternate approaches to masks and stimuli 
may produce different results. In line with results from the Visibility Task showing participants were 
more likely to distinguish photos than polygons, some participants reported using hairstyles to 
distinguish between photos. Therefore for some stimuli, including naturalistic photographs of 
humans, simple pattern sandwich-masking may not be sufficient to conceal the item. An alternative 
approach is to crop images to include facial features only (which we adopted in the next study) 
and/or to use a composite backward mask, e.g.  [Khalid et al. 2013]. We therefore ran a follow-up 
experiment, 6.3B, to remedy some of these issues: we increased the mask shown duration to try to 
reduce visibility; cropped our photo images to include facial images only; altered the polygon mask to 
a composite mask; and changed Text stimuli to capital letters to increase legibility.  
In cases where participants do not correctly identify the target they’ve been shown, the results of the 
Preference Task show no evidence that showing the target increases target preference. There is 
some evidence that showing the target decreases preference for text and photos shown once, 
although again the marginal R2 measure (marginal R2=.05) indicates that the amount of variance 
explained by our fixed effects (Repetitions Group and Stimulus Type) seem to be small.  Further, our 
estimated marginal means plot shows that the variance in the fixed effects was high (large CI bars). 
LIMITATIONS 
As with other research into subliminal research focusing on establishing an indirect effect 
(preference) without a direct effect (visibility) [Greenwald and Draine 1997], the study is limited by 
using self-reports from participants on visibility of stimuli to indicate whether stimuli were indeed 
visible. For text stimuli, the words were not balanced for frequency-of-occurrence in the English 
language or valence, nor were participants limited to native English speakers (75% of participants 
were native English speakers). Participants were also not screened for dyslexia. These factors may 
have a confounding effect on subsequent preference judgements, although the stimuli sets were 
randomised to counter this.  Our data for the Preference Task had a low n compared to the Visibility 
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Task (722 vs 4032 trials), and only featured trials from 53 participants, and therefore had reduced 
power compared to the Visibility Task analysis.  
Our low R2 figures indicate our experiment was noisy. Therefore, in our next experiment 6.3B we 
altered the experiment design to try to reduce noise. In this, all participants answered the Visiblity 
Task first, then the Preference Task, rather than randomising the order, and use a fixed stimulus list 
so that all participants (except the control) see the same stimuli and Tasks in the same order. We also 
increased the number of repetitions in the multiple-exposure condition to try to amplify any effect. 
EXPERIMENT 6.3B  FOLLOW-UP  
MOTIVATION  
To address some of the possible limitations from experiment 6.3, we conducted a follow-up to try to 
improve the concealment of stimuli and to reduce noise. 
METHOD  
DESIGN  
We re-ran the experiment study with the following alterations to try to improve stimulus 
concealment for the visiblity task and to reduce noise: 
 Stimuli changes: 
 Face stimuli – added a circle mask to conceal hairstyles 
 Text stimuli – changed to capital letters to improve legibility 
 Masks changes: 
 Mask length increased to 200ms to try to reduce visibility further 
 Altered the polygon mask to a composite after we found that a longer mask duration with 
the existing mask made the polygons visible 
 Experiment changes:  
 We added a fourth repetitions condition, visible, where stimuli appeared for 500ms to 
provide an additional indicator of participant preference where stimuli were visible. We 
renamed this independent variable Exposure Group. As before, this was between-
subjects. 
 Increased number of repetitions in the multiple repetition condition to 5  
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 In each of the 4 exposure groups (control, 1x, 5x, supra), participants were given a 
selection task first, in which they were asked EITHER “which did you prefer” OR “choose 
one” immediately after stimulus exposure. All participants were then asked to complete 
the Visibility Task (indicate which stimulus they thought they’d seen). 
 Instead of randomising the Stimulus Type lists for each participant, each participant saw 
the same list of pre-randomised text, polygons and images.  
 The experiment logged all frame times that exceeded 18ms in order to be able to exclude 
trials that indicated a dropped frame. 
HYPOTHESES  
Our hypotheses were similar to the previous experiment, with additions for the supraliminal (visible) 
Exposures Group condition.   
H1: there would be no difference in the probability of participants being able to correctly identify the 
prime in the Visibility task between Exposure Groups 0x, 1x and 5x (control and subliminal 
exposures), but that the supra (visible) Exposure Group would show a higher rate of prime 
identification, with no statistically significant differences in identification between Stimulus Types.   
H2: where participants failed the Visibility Task, compared to the control 0x Exposures Group, 
participants in the other exposures groups would show statistically significant increased selection 
rates for stimuli they had just been shown, with no statistically significant interactions between 
Exposures Group and Stimulus Type. 
PARTICIPANTS  
50 participants (24 women) took part (0x Exposures Group n=14; 1x Exposures Group n=13, 5x 
Exposures Group n=12, supra Exposures Group n=11). Age data for 26 participants was lost due to a 
software bug; the remaining participants had an average age of 24.08 years (SD=6.77). 
APPARATUS  
The same experiment phones were used as before, with Wi-Fi again disabled. 
PROCEDURE  
Participants were approached around the University campus and asked to participate in a 5-minute 
experiment on our experiment phone. They read a consent form, entered their demographic 
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information and completed the tasks on the phone. They were shown a debrief screen informing 
them which exposures group they were in, and for non-control participants, presenting their results 
in the form of proportion of shown-before stimuli selected at ‘seen’, and ‘choose’ or ‘prefer’ stages. 
RESULTS  
DATA ANALYSIS 
In line with Study 6.3, responses with reaction times less than 200ms (n=39, 1.3%) were removed. 
TIMINGS 
Of 2879 observations frames, 4 (0.1%) had frames that conformed to the previous definition of a 
dropped frame (>25ms); these were omitted from the analysis. The results for overall average 
percentages of correctly selecting the target are shown in Figure 6:14. The data shows that the 
combination of the new polygon masking procedure and 5 repetitions is problematic: high 
proportions of polygons were identified by participants in the 5x exposures group (85%) and was 
relatively high for the 1x exposures participants (68%).   
 
Figure 6:14  Descriptive statistics for correct selection proportions follow up study 6.3B 
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VISIBILITY TASK 
The proportions of correctly identified targets from the Visibility Task are shown in Figure 6:14. To 
test hypothesis H1, that participants in non-supra conditions would show no difference in identifying 
the prime, we examined 1499 observations in the visibility task from 50 participants (14 Control, 13 
1x, 12 5x, 11 Supra). Our dependent variable was the binomial correct identification (correct or not); 
our independent variables were exposures group (control, 1x, 5x and supra, between-subjects) and 
stimulus type (polygons, photos and text, within-subjects). We tested our hypothesis with a GLMER 
model with a random intercept for each item (R2M=.41, R
2
C=.42) to examine the impact of exposures 
group and stimulus type on the binary dependent variable of correct identification of the prime. As 
before, exposure group of 0x repetitions was the baseline. We selected text as the baseline stimulus 
type instead of polygons as before to investigate the high proportions of polygon selections shown in 
Figure 6:14. The model included a random intercept for item because including a random intercept 
for user only accounted for a very small proportion of the residual variance.  
Table 6:15 shows a summary of the results. Note that the p values are not Bonferroni-corrected, 
although in this instance it would not make a difference to the statistical significance of the 
5xPolygon interaction (p<.001, Bonferroni-corrected critical p =.004). 
Fixed effects 
Visibility 
Estimate Standard Error Wald z p value 
(Intercept) -0.15     0.19 -0.77      .44 
1x  0.08     0.25   0.34      .74 
5x  0.32     0.25   1.25      .21 
Supra  4.87     1.02   4.78 <.001 
Polygon -0.15     0.27 -0.55      .59 
Photos  0.12     0.27   0.44      .66 
1x:Polygon  0.89     0.35   2.52      .01 
5x:Polygon  1.61     0.39   4.11 <.001 
Supra:Polygon -1.50     1.13 -1.33     .18 
1x:Photos  0.04     0.35   0.12      .91 
5x:Photos -0.52     0.36 -1.47      .14 
Supra:Photos -2.13    1.10 -1.92      .05 
     
Random effects SD    
Item (intercept) 0.26    
Model formula:  correct ~ exposures group * stimulus type + (1|item) 
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The results show evidence of positive statistically significant simple main effect of the supraliminal 
exposures group on the log odds of selecting the primed target (b=4.87, SE=1.02, z=4.78, p<.001) but 
no other exposures group simple main effects. However, this effect is superseded by the higher-
order statistically significant 1xPolygon and 5xPolygon interactions.   
The model shows a statistically significant increase in the log odds of selecting the primed target for 
the 1x and 5xPolygon (b=0.89, SE=0.35, z=2.52, p =.01 and b=1.61, SE=0.39, z=4.11, p<.001 
respectively), compared to the baseline control and text conditions. There is no evidence that our 
new Photo stimuli are detected differently at 1x and 5x repetitions relative to control and the Text 
baseline (p=.91 and p=.14 respectively), but our changes to the Polygon mask have made them more 
detectible, relative to the Text baseline. This can also be seen in Figure 6:14 and in the estimated 
marginal mean probability figures given in Figure 6.16. 
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Figure 6.16 Estimated marginal means probability plot and values of Visiblity Task responses correctly identifying the 
prime 
SELECTION TASKS 
Descriptive statistics for our two preference tasks, Choose and Prefer, are shown in Figure 6.17. As 
can be seen in the charts, there were no data for choose or prefer 5xPolygons or Supra:Polygons 
conditions or Supra:Text, i.e. there were no trials for these combinations where the user got the 
visibility task wrong.   
 
















Figure 6.17 Preference task selections where visibility task was failed (top) Prefer task, (bottom) Choose task 
The selection tasks show similar patterns for choose and prefer, although overall prefer rates were 
lower. To investigate our hypothesis H2, that participants in the 1x, 5x and supra exposures groups 
would have a statistically significant higher rate of Prefer and Choose Task selection compared to the 
control 0x participants, regardless of stimulus type, we constructed a GLMER for each of the “Prefer” 
and “Choose” data sets where participants had answered the visibility task incorrectly. The GLMERs 
examined the effect of exposures group (control, 1x, 5x and Supra) and stimulus type (polygon, 
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photo and text) on our dependent binomial variable, correct selection of the target (0 or 1). We were 
unable to run the analysis because the very high numbers of correct answers meant insufficient data 
to model selection choices where participants were unable to detect the prime. This also can be seen 
in the missing data in Figure 6.17. The missing data means we are unable to compare switching 
across visibility conditions (0 and 1). i.e. the tendency for participants to select opposite answers in 
visibility and preference trials.  Instead, we ran a GLM8 (R2PS = 0.75) to analyse the 944 trials where 
the target was correctly selected in the visibility task. We examined the effect of exposure group 
(control, 1x, 5x and Supra, control as baseline) and stimulus type (Text, Photos, Polygons, text as 
baseline) on the subsequent selection of target (correct or not, incorrect as baseline), with the model 
results given in Table 6:16 and the model’s estimated marginal means plot given in Figure 6.18. Note 
that the p values are not Bonferroni-corrected. 
Fixed effects Estimate Standard Error Wald z p value 
(Intercept)   2.72         0.52  5.28 <.001 
1x  -1.28     0.61 -2.10   .04 
5x  -1.24         0.61 -2.04   .04 
Supra  15.84    624.76  0.03     .98 
Photos  -0.54          0.65   -0.83      .40 
Polygons   0.64     0.89  0.73   .47 
1x:Photos   0.74          0.80     0.93      .35 
5x:Photos    1.12          0.85     1.32      .19 
Supra:Photos -14.11    624.76  -0.02      .98 
1x:Polygons     0.19          1.01     0.19      .85 
5x:Polygons     1.34          1.11     1.21      .23 
Supra:Polygons -14.56    624.76   -0.02      .98 
Model formula:  select ~ exposure group * stimulus type 
Table 6:16. Selection switch analysis, results summary 
 
The results show evidence of similar statistically significant simple main effects for 1x and 5x 
exposure group conditions; both had a negative impact on the log odds of the response to the 
preference task matching that of the visibility task compared to the baseline, indicating a higher 
tendency to switch for these conditions (1x b=1.28, SE=0.61, z=2.10, p=.04; 5x b=1.24, SE=0.61, 
z=2.04, p=.04). There is no evidence of a statistically significant difference for supra exposures group 
reactions either as a simple main effect (p=.98) or as interactions with different stimulus types 
(Supra:Photos p=.98; Supra:Polygons p=.98), but there is a high standard error for supra conditions, 
                                                            
8 Models with random effects included did not converge. Our R2PS for the GLM was that of Nagelkerke [Nagelkerke 1991] , calculated using the modEvA 
package [Barbosa et al. 2016]. 
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reflecting the lack of data for switching selection once visibility was correct. The intercept of the 
selection model is statistically significant even at Bonferroni-corrected p values, which indicates that 
overall for the baseline condition (control, text), selection responses tended to agree with the 
visiblity selection: regardless of priming, people tended to stick with their first answer.  This can also 
be seen from the EMM probabilities given in Figure 6.18. Note that the 95% Cis for the Supra Text 
condition could not be calculated due to missing data. 
























Figure 6.18 Estimated marginal means probability of Selection Task response agreeing with visibility task response 
where visibility task was correct by stimulus type and exposures group condition with 95%CIs 
 
 
| P 6:144 
 
D ISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS  
Our adjustments to the polygon masks as a follow-up to Experiment 6.3 made them more visible, not 
less as had been our intention. This indicates some fragility in the masking procedures to make 
stimuli not accessible to conscious perception. Further, the high proportions of supraliminal stimuli 
subsequently selected in the Prefer and Choose tasks prompts the question of how to determine the 
situations in which subliminal priming should be used instead of supraliminal priming on 
smartphones. Even where differences exist, they are of limited practical use – e.g. for 1x and 5x, 
stimulus exposures that are correctly identified seem to have a negative impact on their subsequent 
preference selection, although the estimated differences are around 10 percentage points.   
Experiments 6.3 and the follow-up also restrict processing of the stimuli to a recognition factor. A 
more fundamental question, which we address in the next experiment, is whether subliminal 
perception can extract meaning from stimuli.  
EXPERIMENT 6.4:  SUBLIMINAL SEMANTIC NUMBER PROCESSING ON SMARTPHONES  
MOTIVATION  
We wanted to investigate whether there is any evidence of semantic priming, i.e. that people can 
extract meaning from subliminal primes despite not being able to identify them. If such meaningful 
transfer of information is possible, then it is evidence of cognitive activation of concepts related to 
the prime, over and above simple stimulus-response learning. This activation opens up the possibility 
of subliminal priming placing items on the Potential Behavioural stack in the BAF, thus increasing the 
likelihood of the related behaviour occurring without increasing cognitive load. 
We based this experiment on a psychology experiment exploring subliminal semantic priming effects 
[Ocampo 2015]. The aim was to understand the impact of novel (i.e. not-seen-before) subliminal 
primes on free choices. In contrast to previous experiments in this chapter, where all primes 
appeared as targets in subsequent 2-alternative-forced-choice questions, this experiment used some 
novel primes that never appear supraliminally as targets. This allowed us to determine whether 
responses are based on some semantic processing of the concealed prime: response to novel primes 
indicate some level of semantic processing. 
 




Our experiment addresses three research questions: (RQ1) can people consciously recall concealed 
number primes on smartphones; (RQ2) are these concealed number primes processed on a semantic 
level with different effects for novel and repeat primes; (RQ3) can these concealed number primes 
affect people’s free choices, and is that effect different between repeat and novel primes. We use 
novel and repeat primes, since   repeat primes may have an effect via stimulus-response implicit 
mappings, while novel primes instead may only have an effect via semantic or meaningful cognitive 
processing. Our related hypotheses, in line with Ocampo [33], are: 
H1: the probability of participants correctly identifying concealed primes would be no better than 
chance. This would suggest that people could not see the concealed primes on smartphones (RQ1) 
H2: forced-choice (a) reaction times and (b) accuracy rates would be affected by prime congruence 
with no difference between novel and repeat primes. This would suggest that semantic processing of 
primes is as efficient in terms of accuracy and reaction time as stimulus-response processing (RQ2).  
H3: free-choice (a) reaction times for responses would be faster for responses in line with prime, 
with no differences for either novel and repeat primes; and (b) selections would be in line with prime 
with no impact of novelty. This would suggest that subliminal semantic priming can affect user’s free 
choices in similar ways as stimulus-response priming (RQ3). 
PARTICIPANTS 
103 people (age: mean= 24.57 years, SD= 4.08; 38 women) completed the experiment. 8 had 
completed a previous subliminal experiment (6.3 or a follow-up). We used the same-batch 
experimental phones as before. 
PROCEDURE 
Participants were approached on campus and asked to participate in a number sorting task. They 
read a consent screen which informed them that the aim of the task was to categorise numbers as 
less than or more than 5, completed a demographics questionnaire, and a brief practice run.  
Next, participants completed 576 response task trials. A response task trial required looking at a 
smartphone screen with a display area for a stimulus (the target- either a number or a symbol), and 
two buttons below, as shown in the screenshot in Figure 6.19. 
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The left-hand button was marked with the less than symbol “<”; the right button was marked with 
the more than “>” symbol. In each trial, following a forward mask, a number prime, and a backward 
mask, a target appeared in the display area. Target stimulus was randomly either a number (forced 
choice trials) or a “#” symbol (free choice trails). If the target stimulus was a number, participants 
were asked to use the left or right button to indicate whether the number was greater or less than 5. 
We recorded reaction times as one outcome variable. Forced-choice trials in which participants 
correctly identified whether the target was greater or less than 5 were categorized as correct with 
others categorized as incorrect. This forms a binary accuracy outcome variable for the forced-choice 
trial analysis below.  
If the target stimulus was the “free choice” symbol “#”, they were asked to respond freely using 
either button. Participants were asked to avoid using a set response scheme (e.g. “always left”) to 
respond to the free choice symbol “#”. We recorded reaction times as one outcome variable. Trials in 
which participants chose the button that corresponded to the prime were categorized as agreeing, 
with others categorized as not agreeing. This forms a binary outcome variable for the free-choice 
trials analyses below. 
Two-thirds of the 576 trials had a number as a target, one-third were free choice trials. Half of the 
number trials had a congruent prime (i.e. the same side of 5 as the target); half had an incongruent 
prime (i.e. the opposite side of 5 as the target). 50% of all trials used a novel prime number as a 
prime, i.e. a number that never appeared as a target. Numbers 1,4,6 and 9 appeared both as targets 
and repeat primes; numbers 2,3,7 and 8 appeared as novel primes only.  Masks were randomly 
generated 30x30 pixel black backgrounds with multiple overlapping letters in white, with different 
forward and backward masks. Numbers appeared in white Verdana font size 20 on a 30x30 black 
background. We used this sans-serif font at size 20 because of evidence that sans-serif fonts and font 
sizes greater than 18pts are more accessible for people with dyslexia [Rello et al. 2013; Rello and 
Baeza-Yates 2013], and therefore suitable for a more accessible intervention should the technique be 
shown to be successful. 
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The procedure is shown in Figure 6.19.  
  
Figure 6.19 Experiment procedure (left) incongruent repeat forced-choice trial, (centre) free choice trial, and (right) 
experiment screenshot 
Participants were given 1.5 seconds to respond, and the app informed them if they got the answer 
wrong or they timed out. The prime appeared for 2 frames, approximately 34ms on our experiment 
phones, and masks appeared for 4 frames, approximately 68ms, in line with the original experiment 
(masks ~70ms, primes ~33ms). Targets were displayed for ~203ms. Trials were split into 3 blocks, 
with a chance to rest in between.  
After completing these 576 response task trials, participants were informed of the existence of the 
subliminal prime. They then completed 144 visibility trials with the same stimulus proportions as the 
response task. In visibility trials, participants were asked to try and identify the prime by answering 
whether the prime itself, and not the target as in previous trials, was greater than or less than 5.  
Table 6:17 shows a summary of our independent variables (IVs) and dependent variables (DV) for the 
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Trial type DV IVs 
Visibility (RQ1) Response (binomial, more than or less than) 




Response time (continuous, ms) 
Congruence (congruent or incongruent 
primes) 
Novelty (repeat or novel primes) 
Forced-choice 
(RQ2) 
Correct selection of target (binomial, correct or 
incorrect) 
Congruence (congruent or incongruent 
primes) 
Novelty (repeat or novel primes) 
Free-choice (RQ3) Response time (continuous, ms)  Novelty (repeat or novel primes) 
Free-choice (RQ3) Agreement with prime (binomial, yes or no) Novelty (repeat or novel primes) 
 Table 6:17 Experiment trials variables summary 
 
RESULTS  
DATA CLEANING & SUMMARY 
The final analysis included 72,720 trials from 101 participants after one participant was excluded 
because they recorded more than the 720 trials, and one was excluded because they did not 
complete all the trials. Trials where the participant timed out were then excluded (394 trials, 0.54%), 
as were trials where frame timing errors indicated a potential problem, i.e. a dropped frame of > 
25ms was recorded (22 trials, 0.28%). In contrast to Experiments 6.3 above, we retained trials with 
reaction times less than 200ms (n=6435) in case fast responses capture primed responses, since the 
responses did not switch sides.   
Descriptive statistics for reaction times for 38,450 forced-choice tasks by congruent group 
(congruent, incongruent) and novelty of prime (repeat, novel) are shown in Table 6:18 and Figure 
6.20.  
Group Prime type Mean SD 
Congruent Novel 560.08 138.00 
Repeat 607.59 145.73 
Incongruent Novel 560.41 141.99 
Repeat 562.04 141.48 
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Figure 6.20 Forced-choice RTs congruence * novelty in ms barplot with 1 SE error bars 
This shows that responses to Congruent Repeat primes had on average a slower reaction time of 
around 47ms, with no overlap of confidence intervals (approximately 2x the 1SE error bars shown, 
see discussion on p 4:64), and little difference between the other conditions with responses around 
the 560ms mark.  
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Table 6:19  shows descriptive statistics for the overall percentage of forced-choice trials that 
correctly identified the target number as more or less than 5, grouped by prime congruence and 
novelty. 
Group Prime type Mean % SD 
Congruent 
Novel 87.54 8.31 
Repeat 88.29 7.83 
Incongruent 
Novel 87.15 8.48 
Repeat 87.03 7.60 
 
Table 6:19 Forced-choice descriptive statistics for correctness with 1SE error bars 
The data shows little difference between the conditions if we consider CIs of 2x the 1 SE error bars 
shown (see discussion on page 4:61). 
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Descriptive statistics for the percentage of free choice trials that agreed with the prime, grouped by 
whether the prime was novel or not, are shown in Table 6:20. 
Group Mean SD 
Novel prime 50.47% 5.08 
Repeat prime 53.32% 7.69 
 Table 6:20 Free choice agreement with prime by prime novelty 
The data shows little difference between the conditions if we consider CIs of 2x the 1 SE error bars 
shown (see discussion on page 4:61). 
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Descriptive statistics for the 14,544 Visibility Task trials are shown in Table 6:21. “Correct” trials are 
ones in which participants correctly identified whether the prime was greater or less than 5, 
regardless of the target. 
Group Mean % correct SD 
Novel prime 50.94 5.71 
Repeat prime 49.33 5.94 
 
Table 6:21 Visibility task %correct trials by prime novelty 
Again, the data shows little difference between the conditions if we consider CIs of 2x the 1 SE error 
bars shown (see discussion on page 4:61). 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
In contrast to our previous (G)LMER models, we used deviation coding since there is no clear 
‘baseline’ for our factors, and to ease comparison with the original experiment. This means the 
intercept of each model represents the grand mean, rather than the mean of the baseline factors. 
VISIBILITY TASK 
To examine hypothesis H1, that participant ability to identify concealed primes would be no better 
than chance, we examined the data from Visibility Trials conducted after participants had been 
informed of the nature of the experiment using GLMER. We removed 1 participant with an outlying 
same-response rate. For the remaining 14,313 trails, our model analysed whether the binomial 
participant response (more than or less than) could be predicted by the prime value (more than or 
less than), allowing for a random by-participant intercept. The model (R2M=<.001, R
2
C=0.03) results 
are shown in Table 6:22. Note that the p values are not Bonferroni-corrected, although in this 
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instance the corrected p value would not change the statistical significance (corrected for 2 
comparisons, critical p = .025). They show that although overall there was a statistically significant 
positive intercept, indicating an overall pattern of selecting the “more than” answer at a higher rate 
than “less than” answer (b=0.10, SE=0.03, z=3.44, p = <.001), there was no evidence that prime 
direction affected the likelihood of particular responses (p = .36).  This supports our hypothesis H1.  
 Visibility task 
Fixed Effects Estimate SE Wald z p value 
(Intercept)               0.10 0.03  3.44  <.001 
Direction  -0.02 0.02 -0.91    .36 
Random Effects SD   
Participant (intercept) 0.30   
Model formula: response ~ prime direction + (1 | participant) 
Table 6:22 Visibility Task model results 
FORCED-CHOICE TASK 
To examine H2, we removed the data of 2 outlying participants who responded with the same 
response more than 65% of the time (759 trials, 1.97%).  To examine the first part of hypothesis H2, 
that reaction times for correct responses would differ for congruence and novelty, we constructed a 
GLMER model to analyse raw reaction time data and allow for within-participant variation. This 
contrasts with the ANOVA used on mean values in the original study [23].  
Our model analysed the effect on reaction time of prime congruence (congruent or incongruent) and 
prime novelty (repeat or novel), and included a per-participant random intercept. We removed 1020 
trials (3.71%) based on model residuals. For the remaining 36,671 trials, the model that converged 
(R2ps= 0.27) included a per-participant random intercept.  
The results are shown in Table 6:23. Note that the p values are not Bonferroni-corrected, although in 
this instance the corrected p value would not change the statistical significance (corrected for 4 
comparisons, critical p = .0125).  
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Fixed Effects Estimate SE t p value 
(Intercept) 588.91 4.44 132.52 <.001 
Congruence 12.11 0.49 24.66 <.001 
Novelty 13.19 0.49 26.92 <.001 
Congruence:Novelty 11.76 0.49 24.00 <.001 
Random effects SD    
Participant (intercept) 19.99    
Residual   0.01    
Model formula: RT ~ congruence * novelty + (1 | participant) 
Table 6:23 Forced-choice reaction time model results  
The results show a statistically significant interaction between congruence and novelty (b=11.76, 
SE=0.49, p <.001). This is also shown in the barplot in Figure 6.17 and in the model’s estimated 
marginal mean RTs and 95%CIs in Figure 6.18. Congruent repeat primes (estimated RT=626ms) are 
estimated to have a slower response time than both congruent novel primes (576ms) and 
incongruent repeat primes (578ms). 
 Prime novelty 
Prime congruence Novel Repeat 
Congruent 576.1 626.0 
Incongruent 575.4 578.2 
 
 
Figure 6.18 Estimated marginal mean forced-choice task RTs (ms) and plotted with 95%CIs 
 These results contrast with those from the lab: Ocampo found with a 2x2 ANOVA only a statistically 
significant main effect of congruence (p < .001, d=.96), where incongruent responses were slower, 
and no evidence of a statistically significant novelty main effect or congruence -novelty interaction  
[2015]. Our results instead suggest that where primes are congruent (prime and target are both 
either above or below 5, so the prime provides pertinent information about the target), people were 
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faster at responding where the primes were novel (indicating some semantic processing) compared 
to where the primes were repeat (indicating some stimulus-response processing), although the 
difference is small (~50ms). 
To examine the second part of H2, that forced-choice correct target selection would be influenced by 
prime congruence, we used a logistic regression GLMER model to analyse the effect on correct 
selection of (correct or not) of prime congruence (congruent or incongruent) and prime novelty 
(repeat or novel), with a per-participant random intercept.  
Fixed Effects Estimate SE Wald z p value 
(Intercept)              2.16     0.08    26.14 <.001 
Congruence  0.04     0.02    2.50      .0126 
Novelty  0.02     0.02        0.98       .33 
Congruence:Novelty  0.02     0.02      1.34    .18 
Random Effects SD   
Participant (intercept)  0.80   
Model formula: correct ~ congruence * novelty + (1 | participant) 
Table 6:24 Forced choice task agreement model results 
The model (R2M <0.01, R2C = 0.16) results are shown in Table 6.24. Note that the p values are not 
Bonferroni-corrected. The results show that there is evidence of a small statistically significant main 
effect of congruence on the log odds of correct selection (b=0.04, SE=0.02, z=2.50, p=.01), but no 
other main or interaction effects. This is in line with Ocampo’s findings of a main effect of 
congruence and no other statistically significant effects on correct selection [Ocampo 2015]. 
Congruent primes, i.e. the prime is on the same side of 5 as the target number, are estimated to 
improve the correct categorisation of the number as above or below five on average by a very small 
amount, less than 1 percentage point, with overlapping confidence intervals, as shown in the 
estimated marginal probability of correct categorisation of target in Table 6:25. 
Prime type Estimated marginal probability % 95%CI  
Incongruent 89.3  [88.2,91.2] 
Congruent 90.0   [87.9,91.0] 
 
Table 6:25 Forced choice agreement estimated marginal probability of correct categorisation 
FREE-CHOICE TASK 
Next, we addressed RQ3. We hypothesised that people’s free choices (i.e. their response to the # 
symbol, the binomial response variable “more than” or “less than”) would be influenced by the 
concealed primes. We examined the data from the free-choice task and removed trials from 6 
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participants who responded with the same answer more than 80% of the time. A barplot with 
reaction times from the remaining 18,084 trials are shown in Figure 6.21. 
 Figure 6.21 Free trial RT by novelty and agreement barplot with 1SE error bars 
Figure 6.22 shows a barplot for agreement by novelty. 
 Figure 6.22 Free trial agreement by novelty barplot with 1SE error bars 
For hypothesis H3(a), that reaction times for responses would be faster for responses in line with 
prime, with no differences for either novel and repeat primes, we constructed a GLMER model to 
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analyse whether novelty (novel or repeat) x agreement (free choice agreed with prime or not) 
affected reaction time, with a by-participant random intercept.  We trimmed 573 trials (3.17%) based 
on model residuals. The model that converged (R2PS = .37) is summarised in Table 6:26. Note that the 
p values are not Bonferroni-corrected, although in this instance the corrected p value would not 
change the statistical significance (corrected for 4 comparisons, critical p = .0125). 
 Free choice RT  
Fixed effects Estimate SE t p value  
(Intercept) 567.98 5.88 96.56 <.001  
 Novelty   -0.09 0.59 -0.16   .87 
Agreement    1.11 0.59  1.86   .07 
Novelty:Agreement   -1.55 0.60 -2.61   .009 
    Random effects SD     
Participant (intercept) 22.77     
Residual  0.01     
Model formula: RT ~ novelty*agreement + (1 |participant) 
Table 6:26 Free-choice RT model results 
As hypothesised, there was no evidence of a main effect of novelty (p=.87), but no evidence of an 
expected main effect of agreement (p=.07), and the results also showed a very small statistically 
significant interaction between novelty and agreement (b=1.55, SE=0.60, t=2.61, p=.01).   
The estimated marginal mean RTs in Figure 6:27 indicate that the model predicts a very small crossed 
interaction effect:  for novel primes, responses that agree with the prime are predicted to be slower 
than disagreeing answers by less than 1ms, with the opposite pattern for repeat primes, where 
agreeing responses were faster by around 5ms.   
Again, our results contrast with those from the lab: Ocampo found no statistically significant main 
effect of novelty on free choice reaction time, but found a statistically significant main effect of 
agreement (faster RTs for agreement). No interaction significance was reported. Instead, we found 
that agreeing responses for repeat primes were faster, compared to agreeing responses for novel 
primes. 
 











FALSE 567 [554,580] 
TRUE 568 [555,581] 
repeat 
 
TRUE 565 [552,578] 
FALSE 571 [558,584] 
 
Figure 6:27 Free trial model estimated marginal means (EMM) plot and data 
To investigate hypothesis H3(b), whether the prime and prime novelty affects participant free 
choices, we used a logistic GLMER on the trimmed data to analyse the effect of the prime value 
(more than or less than 5) and prime novelty (novel or repeat) on participant response (whether they 
responded in the same direction as the prime, yes or no). The model included a by-participant 
random intercept as a random effect. The model (R2M = .01, R
2
C = .02) results are shown in Table 6:28. 
Note that the p values are not Bonferroni-corrected, although in this instance the corrected p value 
would not change the statistical significance (corrected for 4 comparisons, critical p = .0125). 
The model showed no statistically significant prime direction x novelty interaction effect (p=.37), but 
showed both a statistically significant effect of prime value (b=0.36, SE= 0.03, z=11.85, p<.001), and a 
smaller statistically significant main effect of prime novelty (b=0.07, SE=0.02, z=3.40, p <.001) on the 






Free choice matches prime 
Estimate SE Wald z p value 
(Intercept)             -0.10 0.03  -3.68 <.001 
 Novelty -0.07 0.02  -3.40  <.001 
Value  0.36 0.03  11.85 <.001 
Value:Direction  0.03 0.03   0.90    .37 
     Random Effects SD    
Participant (intercept)  0.14    
Formula:  agreement ~ novelty * value + (1 | participant) 
Table 6:28 Free choice task agreement results 
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Considering the main effect of prime value, there is evidence that participants had a higher 
probability of agreeing with the prime when it was more than 5 (56.6%) than when it was less than 5 
(47.6%) as shown in Table 6:28. This may indicate some default tendency of participants to select the 
“more than 5” or right-hand answer overall. 
In terms of prime novelty, our model indicates a statistically significant impact of novelty on 
agreement. There was a small increase in the estimated marginal mean probability of participants 
agreeing with the primed response in the repeat primes condition (53.6%), compared to the novel 
primes condition (50.7%) as shown in Table 6:29. Although there is a smaller probability of 
agreement for novel primes, these probabilities are close to what would be expected by chance. 
Prime value EMM probability % 95%CI 
Less Than 5 47.6 [46.3, 48.9] 
More Than 5 56.6 [55.4, 57.9] 
 
Prime novelty EMM probability % 95%CI 
 Novel 50.7 [49.4, 51.9] 
 Repeat 53.6 [52.3, 54.8] 
 
Table 6:29 Free-choice agreement model EMM probability of agreement for levels of prime value and prime novelty 
Again, these results contrast with those from the lab. Ocampo found a statistically significant overall 
positive trend for participants to select the primed response, which we did not, but no evidence of 
the impact of novelty. Our results indicate a statistically significant impact of novelty, with a small 
increase in the log odds of a participant selecting the primed response with repeat primes compared 
to novel primes, and a statistically significant impact of prime value, with an increase in the likelihood 
of correctly selecting “more than” responses compared to “less than” responses. This may indicate a 
default tendency for participants to favour a “more than” selection in general, regardless of prime. 
Once more, our R2 values are small, requiring caution in interpreting the model results. 
DISCUSSION  
Our results are summarised in Table 6:30.  
Our aim was to determine whether participant responses were based on some semantic processing 
of our concealed primes. Responses to novel primes indicate some level of semantic processing, 
whereas responses to repeat primes may indicate basic stimulus-response priming. Participants 
completed three sets of tasks; forced-choice tasks in which they were shown a prime, then a target 
and asked to respond whether the target was greater than or less than 5 (with reaction time and 
correct-answer dependent variables); free-choice trials where they were shown a prime and a 
symbol target and asked to respond freely greater than or less than (with reaction time and 
agreement-with-prime dependent variables); and finally a visibility task after the presence of primes 
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had been revealed where they were asked to respond whether the prime, not the target, was greater 
than or less than 5 (with a binomial agreement-with-prime dependent variable). 
Trial and hypothesis Result 
Visibility H1 No evidence of visibility (no evidence of impact of prime direction on correct 
selection). 
Forced-choice H2a 
No evidence for different impact of semantic processing on accuracy (no evidence 
of impact of novelty).  
Evidence of very slightly improved accuracy (<1 percentage point) for congruent 
primes.  
Forced-choice H2b 
Evidence of slightly slower stimulus-response processing than semantic pro-
cessing where primes contain correct information about the target (congruent 
repeat primes estimated to have a ~50ms slower reaction time than congruent 
novel primes) 
Free-choice H3a 
Evidence that stimulus-response processing very slightly improves agreement 
compared to semantic processing (repeat primes estimated to improve probability 
of answers matching the prime compared to novel primes by ~3 percentage points 
to 53.6%). 
Free-choice H3b 
Evidence that semantic processing is very slightly slower than stimulus-response 
processing for answers matching the prime (responses to novel primes estimated to 
be ~3ms slower than repeat primes). 
Table 6:30 Results summary 
The first research question was whether we can conceal number primes. From the Visibility Task 
(H1), we found a small statistically significant overall tendency for participants to respond in the 
“more than” direction, but no evidence of a statistically significant effect according to prime value 
(more or less than 5). Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest that the primes were visible. This 
contrasts with some evidence of visibility from the original Ocampo experiment, and our research in 
experiment 6.3 finding different sorts of primes were visible to a certain extent.   
The second question is whether congruent masked primes (i.e. primes that semantically agree with 
the target) increased agreement and reduced reaction time, and whether this effect differed 
between repeat and novel primes. Forced-choice categorisation results (H2a) showed a very small 
statistically significant impact of congruence, where congruent primes slightly improved the 
probability of correct categorisation of target by <1 percentage point but no evidence of a 
statistically significant impact of prime novelty. The results from the forced-response task reaction 
times showed evidence of a statistically significant interaction between congruence and novelty, 
where congruent repeat primes tended to result in slightly slower reaction times (~50ms) than other 
conditions.  
The third research question was whether the primes affected people’s free-choices. Where 
participants freely chose the answer that matched the prime (H3a), we found a statistically 
significant main effect of both prime novelty and prime value on participant responses. Repeat 
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primes statistically significantly improved the probability of answers matching the prime compared 
to novel primes by ~3 percentage points to 53.6%. This is some evidence that repeat primes may 
influence free choice to a small extent. How-ever, the evidence is mixed since participants also 
tended to select one answer (the “more than” answer) rather than the other (the “less than” 
answer), with a higher estimated selection probability of 56.6%. This may indicate that subliminal 
priming is insufficient to overcome a user tendency to default to one answer in situations of arbitrary 
selection such as the free-choice task. 
In terms of free-choice reaction times (H3b), there was an interaction effect of prime novelty and 
agreement (i.e. answers that matched the prime). The results show that when the answer agreed 
with the prime, novel primes tended to result in a very slightly slower response (~3ms) than repeat 
primes. This suggests that semantic processing of novel primes – i.e. so that the participant 
processed the semantic information in the prime to agree with it - slows reaction times to small 
extent compared to stimulus-response processing acquired from the repeat primes. 
Overall, on the definition of subliminal priming of an indirect effect (our forced-choice and free-
choice trials) without a direct effect (our visibility task), there is evidence of subliminal priming 
impacting user choices to a small extent. Our visibility task showed no evidence that prime value 
affected selections, i.e. no evidence that participants could detect the prime, while our forced-choice 
task accuracy showed a very small increase in accuracy (less than 1%) where targets were in line with 
primes.  
The evidence also shows that the impact of semantic subliminal processing is inconsistent across 
free- and forced-choice trials. In free-choice trials, novel primes are estimated to have a smaller 
impact on correct selection than repeat primes. Prime novelty also impacted on reaction time in the 
free-choice task, with repeat primes (i.e. those that may not be processed semantically) decreasing 
correct reaction times compared to novel primes very slightly by ~3ms. Within the forced-choice 
trials, where primes were congruent with the target, repeat primes increased reaction times slightly 
by ~50ms. There was no evidence of an impact of prime novelty on correctness in forced-choice 
trials. 
In summary, our results show some evidence of a small trade-off between efficiency metric (speed or 
accuracy) between stimulus-response and semantic processing (novel or semantic primes) of number 
primes depending on the task (forced-choice or free-choice). This trade-off is shown in Table 6:31. 
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 Efficiency metric 
Task Speed Accuracy 
Forced-choice Semantic/novel Either* 
Free-choice Stimulus-response/repeat Stimulus-response/repeat 
*No evidence of statistically significant difference 
Table 6:31 Efficiency trade-off for semantic vs stimulus-response processing of subliminal primes by task 
The results indicate that the appropriate choice of subliminal prime to improve interaction efficiency 
depends on whether the task is forced choice (e.g. between two fixed options with one correct 
answer), or whether there is a free choice (no correct answer).  For forced-choice trials, if speed is 
the main efficiency consideration, using novel primes is faster. For free-choice trials, on speed and 
accuracy grounds, using repeat, stimulus-response processing is more efficient.  
However, caution is advised, since the size of the estimates and R2 values are small: there is little 
evidence that subliminal priming is an effective way to improve interaction efficiency to any great 
extent. The evidence shows that using subliminal primes to improve interaction efficiency on 
smartphones is likely to make little difference. Likewise, given the lack of evidence of any strong 
semantic priming effects, there is no support for the application of semantic priming in behaviour 
change applications such as the use of subliminal goal priming of short word phrases. This is 
consistent with our lack of results from attempts to use subliminal goal priming in-the-wild 
(Experiment 6.1) . 
Our results differed from Ocampo’s original lab experiment [Ocampo 2015] in several respects. For 
visibility, we found no evidence of visibility, while the lab study found that participants’ ability to 
discriminate primes did differ from zero. For free-choice trials, Ocampo found a statistically 
significant overall positive trend for participants to select the primed response, but no evidence of 
the impact of novelty. By contrast, we found an overall negative trend for participants to select the 
primed response in free choice trials, with small statistically significant main effects of both novelty 
and value (i.e. whether the answer was “more than” or “less than”). Ocampo did not report value 
results, but our results indicates some potential default preference for responding in a particular 
direction (towards “more than”) on mobile devices.  
For forced-choice trials, Ocampo found a statistically significant main effect of prime agreement 
(faster RTs for agreement). Instead, we found an interaction effect between novelty and agreement: 
agreeing responses for repeat primes were slower, compared to agreeing responses for novel 
primes. 
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The differences are interesting: our analysis included 101 participants compared to Ocampo’s 19. Our 
results with a larger sample indicate little point in implementing practical applications of subliminal 
priming, at least of numbers, on smartphones. Ocampo’s study provided some evidence that in 
controlled lab conditions, apparently free choices can be influenced by subliminal novel primes. Our 
larger sample in a noisier environment with a similar experiment on smartphones found some 
evidence that free-choices are influenced differently to a small extent by novel and repeat primes, 
but the rates of selecting the option that matches the prime are close to chance (novel, 50.7%; 
repeat, 53.6%), the impact of novel is smaller than that of repeat primes, and our measures of model 
fit are very low. In all, despite some statistically significant differences between the effects of novel 
and repeat primes, the effects are very small. This may, in part, reflect a general tendency for less-
controlled participants to perform tasks faster with less accuracy than lab participants [Findlater et 
al. 2017], although our visibility tasks results indicate that some pre-existing response behaviours 
(e.g. to press the right-hand button) may have also influenced the experiment.  
In short, our research provides further evidence that subliminal priming is feasible on smartphones 
but is of limited practical use for NDBCIs. Nevertheless, this experiment shows that semantic 
processing can have a small limited impact in unbiased stimuli (numbers). It therefore leaves open 
the possibility that more salient primes may have a larger impact. Our stimuli in Experiment 6.1 (the 
prime “active”) were deliberately biased and intended to place action concepts related to the 
participants’ goals on the Potential Behavioural Stack in our BAF. In the next chapter we therefore re-
visit our participant goals from Experiment 6.1 to analyse whether the goal-setting process may have 
played a part in our lack of results from that study.   
LIMITATIONS  
As with all reaction time data, our data was noisy and some model residuals still indicated some 
departure from normality. Our R2 values of model fit indicate that the models were poor estimators 
of the explained variance. The semi-controlled nature of the experiment meant that participants 
could be distracted by environmental factors beyond our control, and we had less control over the 
visual display than in a psychology lab e.g. space between the participant and the screen. The original 
experiment displayed primes at approximately 10mm high on a 1024x768 monitor, whereas ours 
displayed primes at a slightly larger size of 20 pts / 50px / 18mm high on our 720x1280 smartphone 
screens. We used a sans-serif font size 20pts because of evidence that sans-serif fonts and font sizes 
greater than 18pts are more accessible for dyslexics [Rello et al. 2013; Rello and Baeza-Yates 2013], 
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We investigated the feasibility of applying subliminal techniques to smartphones. Experiment 6.1 was 
fairly broad: a week-long pilot in-the-wild into the effect of a repeated text prime on an indirect 
measure of goal activation. It used priming to try to increase goal accessibility, and two mechanisms 
to try to increase goal liking and therefore accessibility: the subliminal mere exposure effect 
(repeatedly exposing participants to the goal prime) [Monahan et al. 2000]; and subliminal affective 
conditioning via the pairing of a smiley with the goal prime, in line with Murphy & Zajonc [1993]. We 
found no evidence of impact of the intervention on implicit goal concept activation or on explicit goal 
commitment measures. Evidence for a decrease in goal commitment scores as a main effect of 
session regardless of intervention suggests that subliminal priming was insufficient to prevent a 
natural decay of goal commitment over time.  
T IMINGS  
Experiment 6.2 showed that it is technically possible to show stimuli at the durations similar to those 
in experiments that have found evidence of subliminal effects, i.e. ~17ms [Dijksterhuis 2004; Hull et 
al. 2002; Strahan et al. 2002]. Studies 6.2, 6.3 and  6.4 showed only a small number of dropped 
frames (0.09%, 0.1% and 0.28% respectively), although 6.2 also showed that dropped frames were 
more prevalent with Wi-Fi enabled (0.32%).   
V ISIBILITY  
Study 6.3 and 6.4 both showed that masking of stimuli on smartphones can partially prevent stimuli 
from entering conscious perception, in line with Greenwald et al. [1996]. From 6.3, there was no 
evidence of a stable preference effect for primed stimuli where people could not correctly identify 
the prime. These findings contrast with Dijksterhuis [2004], but support other HCI studies that could 
not identify a subliminal effect [Pfleging et al. 2013; Riener and Thaller 2014]. 
The statistically significant negative impact of the 1xRepetition of text primes on the Preference Task 
in experiment 6.3 indicates that the effects of subliminal priming are inconsistent across different 
prime types. This is in line with Winkielman et al.’s findings that “familiar” items may be more 
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resistant to subliminal affective priming than unfamiliar ones [1997]. Experiment 6.3B showed that 
maintaining subliminal exposures on smartphones is delicate: even a small change in mask and 
duration meant that users could ‘see’ stimuli more clearly. Experiment 6.4 again highlighted the 
delicacy of designing subliminal primes, showing slightly different effects for novel and repeat 
primes. We identified a trade-off in selecting the best type of subliminal prime between efficiency 
metrics of speed and accuracy depending on task type, but only very small effects for either 
measure. 
CONCLUSION  
Overall, we conclude that although subliminal priming is technically feasible on smartphones, there is 
no strong evidence to suggest that smartphones are an appropriate platform for subliminal priming, 
whether to increase preference or selection of stimuli or to increase behavioural goal activation as 
part of a behaviour change intervention. We can expect less stable results for both visibility and 
preference effects in-the-wild. Even where we did identify some effects, our R2 values were small, 
and effect sizes were small. In short, subliminal priming is possible but of limited practical use, 
particularly in the behaviour change domain. 
We have found mixed results for low-cognitive load interventions to try to avoid reactance.  The best 
guarantee of avoiding reactance and user irritation is to deliver an intervention that they cannot 
consciously recall. However, we have shown that it is not technically possible to deliver a subliminal 
prime without a user being aware that something has been shown. This is fortunate from an ethics 
point of view, but it retains the risk of user irritation. Given that the effects of delivering subliminal 
priming are small, inconsistent and not expected to be stable in-the-wild, we have found no evidence 
to suggest that using it as a stand-alone technique is an effective NDBCI. 
Our research in Chapter 5 showed some evidence of the shortcomings of both opportunistic training 
(may still cause irritation) and task-based training (difficult to complete in noisy contexts, and may be 
insufficient to overcome ingrained behaviour).  Therefore, in the next chapter, we move back up the 
cognitive load continuum back to higher-load interventions, and revisit the potential of goal 
automation strategies, including Implementation Intentions (Chapter 4). However, instead of relying 
on potentially disruptive context-aware reminders for Implementation Intentions that risk reactance 
as in Chapter 4, instead we focus on the content of user-set goals to analyse why they might fail, with 
particular focus on goal automation. Experiment 6.1 suggested that subliminal goal priming was 
insufficient to prevent a decline in goal commitment over 1 week. The next chapter therefore 
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analyses how DBCIs might be able to increase goal automaticity without attracting user irritation and 
reactance by shifting the cognitive load away from intervention time to creation and rehearsal time.   
The next chapter, Chapter 7, therefore explores how interventions could combine multiple NDBCI 
strategies at varying levels of cognitive load and at different time intervention points with the aim of 
achieving goal automaticity, i.e. goals are triggered in a low-cognitive-load manner by context cues.     
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7. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF GOALS 
This chapter re-considers the role of multiple NDBCI strategies, including Implementation Intentions 
(Chapter 4), to generate autonomous goals to achieve behaviour change. It draws on the BAF 
(Chapter 3) and our study in untracked goal setting (Chapter 6, study 6.1) to discuss strategies for 
technology to support goal automation via Implementation Intentions by implementing both high- 
and medium-cognitive load NDBCIs. It: 
 uses data from Study 6.1 in a qualitative analysis of 52 freely self-set untracked user goals, and a 
quantitative analysis of user attitudes; 
 generates a Goal Failure Framework which outlines potential sources of failures in technology-
supported goal setting; and 
 draws on Chapters 3-6 to outline strategies to combine high- and medium-cognitive load Type 1 
interventions to counter potential failures by focusing on autonomous goals, shifting the 
cognitive load of goal activation to goal creation time. 
MOTIVATION 
The preceding experimental chapters 4-6 have explored various strategies to automate goals, i.e. to 
embed goal actions in memory in such a way that they are triggered nonconsciously by cues, either 
already existing in the environment (as in our Implementation Intention and Cognitive Bias 
Modification chapters 4 and 5) or  technology-based (as in our subliminal priming experiments, 
chapter 6).  
Given the lack of statistically significant results in chapters 4 and 5, and the small effects we found for 
subliminal priming mere exposure effects in Study 6.3 and subliminal semantic priming in Study 6.4, 
we wanted to further investigate possible sources of goal failure.  
First we revisit the goal-setting process we used in Study 4 and 5.1 to identify potential sources of 
goal failure using a more qualitative approach.  Our data was the self-set goals of 52 people who 
started the 1-week subliminal goal priming study 6.1. With respect to RQ2, (“how can technology 
best exploit nonconscious opportunities to intervene in a user-friendly way”), as we noted in Chapter 
3, theory and evidence suggests that subliminal priming can only be effective where goal actions are 
sufficiently salient and related to the prime such that they do appear on the Potential Response Stack 
when exposed to a prime trigger. We were therefore interested to examine what types of goal users 
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set and to identify why these might fail, i.e. not reach the Potential Response Stack and/or not be 
enacted. 
Secondly, we examine goal attitude measures for both users that completed the study and those that 
dropped out. Finally, we reconsider the role that Implementation Intentions can have in overcoming 
potential sources of goal failure so that goal actions appear on the Potential Response Stack.  
This chapter addresses 3 sub-questions of RQ2: what physical activity goals do users set?; what are 
the possible causes of goal failure for goal-supporting DBCIs?; and how might technology address 
these failures?   
INTRODUCTION 
Goals are mental representations of desired future states [Hassin et al. 2009]. As shown in Chapters 2 
and 3, goal setting is an important construct in much behaviour change theory, and most activity 
trackers allow people to set goals. However, it is difficult to set effective goals, those with 
appropriate content and sufficient motivation [Ordóñez et al. 2009]. Yet most activity trackers and 
apps offer default goals [Fritz et al. 2014]. This can be problematic since few users alter default goals: 
Gouveia et al. found that only one-third of users changed the default [2015], while Tang & Kay  found 
that 67% of users adopted default goal targets [2017a]. Goal mismatch is one factor prompting user 
disinterest and abandonment [Kim et al. 2017a].  
We explored the goals created by all participants who started study 6.1 to examine whether tracker 
default goals and goal structures are a mismatch with goals that users set in-the-wild. Participants 
received brief guidance on forming effective goals, could enter their goal in free text, and were 
explicitly told behaviour would not be tracked. Untracked goals are important because tracking 
introduces dependence on the tracking device [Renfree et al. 2016], and tracking problems can 
trigger abandonment and reactance [Clawson et al.]. We then analysed the goals with reference to a 
Goal Setting Framework, which synthesises why goals fail from Goal Setting Theory and related work.  
GOAL SETTING IN PHYSICAL ACTIVITY APPS  
Goal setting is a frequent strategy in physical activity apps [Conroy et al. 2014; Middelweerd et al. 
2014]. Apps commonly provide a default: Google Fit sets a default of 1 hour’s activity a day [Google 
2017]; Active 10 sets a default of 10 minutes of active walking per day [Public Health England 2017]; 
and Fitbit sets a default of 10,000 steps per day [Fitbit 2017].  
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GOAL SETTING FOR PHYSICAL ACTIVITY IN HCI   
Goal setting is a frequent behaviour change strategy in HCI [Munson et al. 2015]. As with apps, much 
HCI research imposes default goals and/or goal formats. Walsh et al. set a goal of 30 mins walking 
per day [2016], Gouveira et al. required a daily walking goal with a default of 1km  [2015]; and 
Consolvo et al. asked participants to set weekly goals in a specific format: <number  of  
sessions><activity type><minimum session duration in minutes> [2009a].  
There is also much research into the use and abandonment of physical activity trackers. Choe et al. 
[2014] argue the inability of tools to provide goals users want to set drives adoption of other 
methods. Yang et al. [2015] also suggest that tracker accuracy gaps drive abandonment. This chapter 
builds on these works, and contrasts with the self-awareness informatics approach, e.g. [Li et al. 
2012], to outline  a nonconscious goal approach to outsource activation to the user's context to avoid 
goal and accuracy gaps. 
THE GOAL FAILURE FRAMEWORK (GFF) 
The GFF is shown in Table 7:1.   
Goal component Sources of possible failure 
Motivation 
Origin  
Low self-efficacy   
Attitude 
Content 
Too abstract  
Too easy 
User / System mismatch 
Conflicts 






High cognitive load 
Pursuit Situational constraints Conflicts 
Feedback 
Tracking failure  
Reflection failure  
Reward mismatch 
Dependence 
Table 7:1 Goal Failure Framework  
The GFF analyses why goal-setting interventions might fail by outlining key goal components 
alongside their sources of possible failure. In addition to Goal Setting Theory components of 
motivation, content and feedback, our framework also includes activation and pursuit components. 
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GOAL MOTIVATION  
Within Goal Setting Theory, the sources of possible failure in goal motivation are goal origin, low self-
efficacy and attitude.  
GOAL ORIGIN  
Goals may be freely self-set, assigned by a system or be a collaboration between the user and the 
system [Locke and Latham 2002]. Both Goal Setting Theory and self-determination theory [Deci and 
Ryan 2011] suggest that self-set goals provide users with more intrinsic, autonomous motivation to 
achieve their goals than imposed goals.  
LOW SELF EFFICACY  
Self-efficacy is an individual’s confidence in their ability to achieve a certain goal, and is a key concept 
in Social Cognitive Theory [Bandura 1977]. It can be improved by providing training, and persuading 
people of their abilities. There is evidence that high self-efficacy also affects other motivation sub-
components: it impacts on the level of goal difficulty selected, and on goal commitment levels [Locke 
1996]. 
ATTITUDE  
Goal attitude, including goal importance and affect, are argued to be strong predictors, along with 
goal progress, of feelings of success by Goal Setting Theory. Attitude is similarly assumed to be 
important in goal pursuit by several theories, including the Theory of Planned Behaviour [Ajzen 
1991]. This theory sees intentions, motivations towards goal behaviours, as key predictors of 
behaviour. Attitude is a predictor of these intentions, alongside subjective norms and an individual’s 
perception of how much control they have over the given behaviour (the latter concept being similar 
to self-efficacy). A goal towards which a user holds an ambivalent or negative attitude is unlikely to 
be enacted. 
GOAL CONTENT  
Within goal content, possible sources of failure according to Goal Setting Theory are goals that are 
too abstract (insufficiently specific) or too easy (insufficiently difficult). To this we add the problems 
of user-system mismatch, conflict and focus on outcome.  
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USER/SYSTEM MISMATCH 
Several researchers have identified that the inability of tools to provide the goals users want to set 
drives adoption of other methods [Choe et al. 2014; Kim et al. 2017b]. This mismatch extends to 
default goals; a substantial proportion of users adopt system goals rather than defining their own. 
Fritz et al. found users “overwhelmingly” adopted default goals [Fritz et al. 2014], while Gouveia et 
al. and Tang & Kay both found that around 2/3 of users used default goal targets [Gouveia et al. 
2015; Tang and Kay 2017b].  
GOAL CONFLICT  
Although Munson & Consolvo found evidence that users valued multiple goals so an easier goal could 
be used as a ‘fall-back’ [2012], multiple goals can interfere with goal pursuit compared with single 
goals because of goal conflict, where multiple behavioural plans match a given situation, which can 
undermine commitment [Dalton and Spiller 2012] and goal pursuit [Gray et al. 2017].  
FOCUS ON OUTCOME  
As outlined above, process goals have been found to be more effective than goals that focus on 
outcome [Wilson and Brookfield 2009]. 
GOAL ACTIVATION  
Goal activation failures occur where a goal is not pursued because it does not come to mind as a 
behavioural alternative [Cameron et al. 2017], i.e. never reaches the Potential Response Stack. 
Activation is captured by the trigger concept in the Fogg Behavior Model.  
FORGETTING  
The simplest source of failure is therefore when the individual forgets about the goal. Behaviour 
change technology often uses a “Just-In-Time” disruption strategy to try and counter the forget 
potential failure in activation [Lee et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2017b]. However, there are problems with 
this strategy: it can lead to disruption and reactance.  
DISRUPTION  
Bort-Roig et al.’s meta-review of DBCIs to increase physical activity on smartphones showed that 
engagement was limited by disruptive prompts and sounds [Bort-Roig et al. 2014]. Other research 
demonstrates negative impacts of notifications, e.g. disruption and stress [Pielot and Rello 2017; 
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Westermann et al. 2015], and evidence of inattention: users do not react to them in a just-in-time 
way [Mehrotra et al. 2016; Pejovic and Musolesi 2014]. Goals on the Potential Response Stack may 
therefore be downgraded below the Act threshold if users are irritated by prompts, or may never 
reach it if reminders are not attended to. 
REACTANCE  
Reactance is where users respond to a perceived loss of behavioural freedom – e.g. when a system 
tells them what to do - by acting to restore their freedom – e.g. refusing to comply [Brehm 2009; 
Ehrenbrink et al. 2016; Roubroeks et al. 2009]. 
HIGH COGNITIVE LOAD  
High cognitive load is an issue over and above forgetting. Dual process theories [Chaiken and Trope 
1999; Evans 2008] and limited-resource theory [Muraven and Baumeister 2000] argue that limited 
cognitive resources mean high load can result in unintended behaviour, not in line with consciously-
held goals. We showed in Chapter 3 how competing responses on the Potential Response Stack can 
result in goal-related behaviour not being enacted. 
GOAL PURSUIT  
Goal pursuit is carrying out the desired behaviour, i.e. the response exceeds the Act threshold and 
can be enacted. This can be prevented by situational constraints, such as unavailability of sports 
equipment, or lack of time to complete an exercise class because of a work meeting. Situational 
constraints as a source of failure feature in many behaviour change theories including COM-B [Michie 
et al. 2011] and the Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour [Triandis 1977].  
GOAL FEEDBACK  
TRACKING FAILURES  
Tracking failures, where devices cannot accurately capture activities, can frustrate goal behaviour, 
and even trigger abandonment [Clawson et al.; Yang et al. 2015]. Fritz et al. found some users 
tailored their goals to their trackers because of limited capture ability, and that trackers failed to 
adequately support changing activity profiles over time [Fritz et al. 2014]. 
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REFLECTION FAILURES  
A failure of reflection involves either the system failing to provide adequate information and/or the 
user having insufficient cognitive resources to process it [Muraven and Baumeister 2000]. Several 
studies show users prioritise short-term tracking over longer-term reflection [Gouveia et al. 2015; 
Rooksby et al. 2014]. Gouveira et al.’s 10-month study of fitness tracker usage found little interest in 
reflection, with feedback demands dominated by brief glances at current activity [Gouveia et al. 
2015].  
REWARD MISMATCH  
Reward misfit is an issue for activity trackers. Fritz et al. [2014] found users tended to use real-world 
rewards in addition to system rewards, and that system rewards could skew behaviour towards 
system not user goals. Munson and Consolvo also found mixed evidence for the efficacy of virtual 
rewards to motivate behaviour [2012].  
DEPENDENCE  
Even where feedback works perfectly, system dependence is problematic if the technology itself 
becomes part of goal-directed behaviour [Renfree et al. 2016]. Given high turnover in trackers and 
smartphone ownership, device dependence is not a strategy for long-term success. 
The Goal Failures Framework provides a method of identifying possible sources of failure to aid 
strategic design of DBCIs. Next we outline how we applied the framework to a series of qualitative 
and quantitative measures from 52 participants from study 6.1. 
STUDY 7.1 
Our study addresses two research questions: RQ1: how do users set physical activity goals regardless 
of tracking?; and RQ2: what are the possible sources of failure when such goals are supported by 
technology?.  
 




Goals from 52 participants (age: mean=27.7, SD=7.71; 32 women) were analysed, including 40 
completers of the 1-week experiment 6.19 (age: mean=28.2, SD=8.00, 25 women), and 12 drop-outs 
(age: mean=26.0, SD=6.64; 7 women). No drop-outs asked for their data to be deleted.  
PROCEDURE  
As outlined in Chapter 6, participants were recruited with the invite “Do you want to be more 
active?”. After an online demographics survey, participants were asked to form and commit to an 
“active goal” in line with Goal Setting Theory. They were told the goal should be clear, specific and 
somewhat difficult. They were given the example "I will walk for 30 minutes total a day". Participants 
then received a link to an app that “may prompt you to be more active”. They were specifically told 
the app did not track location or activity. 
MEASURES  
As outlined in Chapter 6, all participants completed the HWK sub-scale measure of goal commitment, 
and a set of semantic differentials to explore their explicit attitudes towards being active and being 
inactive.   
RESULTS  
To answer RQ1, what form do user-set physical activity goals take?, we conducted a qualitative 
analysis of participants’ self-set physical activity goal contents using iterative thematic analysis 
[Braun and Clarke 2006]. To answer RQ2, what are the possible sources of goal failure when 
supporting these goals with technology, we interpreted the results using the Goal Failure Framework, 
and examined quantitative measures of goal commitment and goal attitude.  
                                                            
9 34 of these were included in the analysis in Chapter 6; 6 were not included: 4 had their data excluded, 2 began the study 
late. 
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RQ1:  HOW DO USERS SET PHYSICAL ACTIVITY GOALS REGARDLESS OF TRACKING? 
Table 7:2 shows the results of our thematic analysis.  
Goal theme Total Completers Dropouts Example 
+ goal activity that can be automatically tracked by Google Fit 
Table 7:2 Goal themes emerging from 52 freely-set physical activity goals 
 
Two key high-level theme groups were activities and timeframes. 
ACTIVITIES 




Vigorous exercise 7 
Push-ups; sit-ups 5 
Cycle 2 
Table 7:3 Top 5 activities mentioned 
Walking was by far the most popular activity, included in 30 goals (58%). The results also show some 
level of abstraction: 7 goals mentioned “vigorous exercise” or similar (e.g. high-intensity exercise) 
(13%), which indicates a lack of specificity according to Goal Setting Theory. We grouped push-ups 
and sit-ups together as similar strength exercises, mentioned in 5 goals (10%). 
Specific activity 51 40 11 P9 “I will do sit ups every day for 30 minutes” 
Day-based 43 35 8 P24 “I will do two 15 mins walks a day” 
Trackable  34 26 8 P44 “I will walk over 10,000 steps every day” 
Duration  30 25 5 P4 “I will walk for 90 minutes each day” 
Default  17 16 1 P23 “I will walk for 30 minutes each day” 
 Completion  15 11 4 P16 “I will complete my push up routine every day” 
Week-based 10 5 5 P21 “Walk for 20 minutes for 3 days in the week” 
Step-based 5 4 1 P36 “I will walk or run 20000 steps a day” 
Flexible  5 3 2 P37 “To walk or run for 30 minutes each day” 
Multiple sessions 5 2 3 P3 “I will do 30 press ups a day. 15 morning and evening” 
Specific sessions 4 3 1 P43 “Go to two spinning classes (>45 min each) per week” 
Context-aware 4 1 3 P9 “I will leave home at 7.20am Monday-Friday” 
Chaining  3 2 1 P31 “I will go and come back from the gym running” 
Additional  3 2 1 P39 “Walk for 30 minutes a day (outside of commuting)” 
Google Fit+ 25 21 4 P47 “I will walk for 60 minutes total a day” 
Google Fit / 
Fitbit default 
9 7 2 P11 “I will walk for 60 minutes a day” 
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TIMEFRAMES 
Only 2 users did not specify a timeframe for their goals, and the timeframe was overwhelmingly day-
based: 43 participants (83%) used per-day goals. In line with previous research, most durations were 
defined as totals rather than minimums [Mentis et al. 2017]. One participant defined both a day-
based and a week-based goal. Only 6 participants (12%) specified minimum or at least durations, e.g. 
P50 “High intensity exercise 30 minutes at least a day”.    
30 participants (58%) specified a duration-based goal, e.g. P38 “I will walk for over an hour every day 
this week”. The overall mean duration specified was 39.5 minutes (SD =21.1), with completers 
tending to specify slightly longer durations on average (mean=41.0, SD=21.0) than dropouts 
(mean=33.3, SD=22.7). 15 participants (29%) specified a completion goal e.g. P31 “I will reach 8000 
steps every day”.   
RQ2:  WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF GOAL FAILURE IN OUR SET OF GOALS? 
This section outlines how we analysed our results for potential goal failures using the Goal Failure 
Framework. We analysed the goal components of the framework in turn: motivation, content, 
activation, pursuit and feedback. 
GOAL MOTIVATION 
The Goal Failure Framework identifies low self-efficacy, origin and attitude as possible sources of goal 
failure within the motivation component.  
ORIGIN 
Our goals were all explicitly self-set so according to the Goal Failure Framework, there are no 
potential goal failure issues from system-set goals. 
SELF-EFFICACY 
We did not explicitly test participants’ self-efficacy. Requiring participants to self-set specific, 
concrete, challenging goals implicitly requires them to select goals that they realistically think they 
can achieve. However, it is difficult to establish the appropriate relationship between task difficulty 
and self-efficacy. 
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ATTITUDE 
Our first attitude measure of participants’ goals themselves was the HWK goal commitment subscale 
measure. Table 7:4 shows the descriptive statistics for the HWK for both completers (n=40) and 
dropouts (n=12).  
Group Mean SD Lower 95%CI Upper 95%CI 





0.50 3.76 4.40 
 
Table 7:4 HWK subscale descriptive statistics 
 Internal consistency was good (6 items, α=.72), and the mean scores in each group were tested for 
normality (all p > .05). Welch t-tests showed no evidence of a statistically significant difference in 
HWKs between participants that completed the experiment and those that did not t(16.8)=1.13, 
p=.28, mean difference=0.14, 95%CI[-0.53, 0.16], Cohen’s d=0.38). There was also no evidence of a 
statistically significant difference between HWKs of participants that adopted default goals or not 
t(30.46) = 0.60, p=.55, mean difference = 0.09, 95%CI[-0.21, 0.38], Cohen’s d=0.18. 
These results are somewhat counter to the contention of the Goal Setting Theory that self-set goals 
(i.e. not adopting the default) should be associated with higher levels of goal commitment, and an 
implicit assumption that higher levels of goal commitment would be associated with experiment 
completion. However, we also note that absence of evidence of an effect is not evidence for the 
absence of that effect. For ethical reasons, we were also unable to gather data on why participants 
dropped out; it may have been for reasons unrelated to goal commitment. Further research is 
therefore required to disambiguate these null results. 
Our second measure was of explicit attitudes towards being active or inactive more generally. Data 
for 2 participants for explicit active and inactive attitudes was lost, leaving 50 participants (39 
completers; 11 dropouts). Scores for active and inactive attitudes were tested for normality across 
the completion groups (all p > .05).  
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Table 7:5 shows the descriptive statistics for the attitude measures.  
Attitude Group Mean SD Lower 95%CI Upper 95%CI 
Active 
Completed   4.22 0.40 4.09 4.35 
Dropouts 4.44 0.25 4.28 4.61 
Inactive 
Completed   2.11 0.60 1.91 2.30 
Dropouts 2.06 0.71 1.59 2.55 
Table 7:5 Descriptive statistics for explicit attitude measures 
Internal consistency was acceptable for both attitude measures (8 items, active: α =.64, inactive: α 
=.77). Attitude scores towards being active for completers (mean=4.22) and dropouts (mean=4.44) 
had a statistically significant difference according to a Welch's t-test, t(26.7)=2.23, p=.03, mean 
difference =0.22 , 95%CI[0.02, 0.42], Cohen’s d=0.66. Note that we did not adjust the p values using a 
Bonferroni correction to reflect the fact that we have analysed parts of this data before in previous 
chapters. Slightly counterintuitively, this indicates that dropouts tended to start out with more 
positive attitudes towards being active than those who completed the experiment. Attitude scores 
towards being inactive did not have a statistically significant difference between completion groups 
according to a Welch's t-test, t(14.18)= 0.16, p=.88, mean difference = 0.04, 95%CI[-0.54, 0.47], 
Cohen’s d= 0.06.  
We identified a statistically significant weak negative correlation between active and inactive means, 
r(46)=-0.35, p=.01. This means that although, as expected, there is a negative relationship between 
attitudes towards being active and being inactive, only a small proportion (12%) of the variation in 
the active attitude measure can be explained by our inactive attitude measure. For designers of 
systems supporting physical activity goals, gathering both measures should therefore be considered, 
since one measure cannot be assumed from the other.  
GOAL CONTENT 
The Goal Failure Framework suggests that within goal content, potential sources of failure are: too 
abstract, too easy, user/system mismatch, conflicts and focus on outcome.  
TOO ABSTRACT 
51 participants (98%) mentioned particular activities in their goals, as shown in Table 7:3. However, 
as we noted above, some were abstract (e.g. P50 “High intensity exercise 30 minutes at least a day”) 
which may indicate problems in goal attainment according to Goal Setting Theory, since it requires 
goals to be specific.  
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TOO EASY 
As noted above, there is some tension between self-efficacy and goal difficulty. Participants were 
requested to set moderately difficult goals, but in the absence of data over prior participant 
behaviour, it is difficult to establish the extent to which they complied. One strategy to overcome the 
“too easy” problem is the imposition of a step goal 10% above participants’ baseline [2014] or setting 
goals based on the participant’s existing routine [Cabrita et al. 2014]. However, this strategy may in 
turn cause goal failures because it is a system-set rather than user-set goal. 
USER/SYSTEM MISMATCH 
17 participants (33%) set goals in line with the default goal given in the goal setting instructions, “I 
will walk for 30 minutes total a day”. 5 participants directly adopted the default, while 12 
participants set variations including different durations or using the default as a minimum. 9 
participants (17%) set goals the same as the Google Fit or Fitbit defaults outlined above.  
CONFLICTS 
We only asked participants to set one physical activity goal for the purposes of our experiment. 
Nevertheless, 5 (10%) mentioned multiple activities (e.g. P36 “walk or run”), while the same number 
mentioned splitting their activity into multiple sessions. We also did not ask participants about other 
concurrent behavioural goals that may conflict. We should therefore consider goal conflicts as a 
possible issue. 
FOCUS ON OUTCOME 
We found no cause for concern in this category: all participants set process goals (e.g. perform a 
given exercise for a specific amount of time) rather than outcome goals (e.g. lose a certain amount of 
weight).  
GOAL ACTIVATION 
The Goal Failure Framework proposes that the following are potential sources of failure within 
activation: forgetting, disruption, inattention, reactance and high cognitive load. 
FORGETTING  
Very few participants formed goals that might be triggered by contextual features, including pre-
existing behaviours, risking potential forgetting since they are not reminded of their goals by the 
environment or other behaviours. Only 4 participants (8%) formed context-aware goals, which 
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mentioned specific locations and/or times and locations in which to perform the goal behaviour, e.g. 
P9 “I will leave home at 7.20am Monday- Friday to get to university”.  
Even fewer participants (3, 6%) formed chaining goals linked to pre-existing behaviour, e.g. P31 “I 
will go and come back from the gym running”. 3 (6%) defined additional goals, activity in addition to 
existing behaviour (e.g. P39 “walk for 30 minutes a day (outside of commuting to lectures)”. 
DISRUPTION, INATTENTION, HIGH COGNITIVE LOAD 
Our experiment delivered goal reminders at the point at which participants unlocked their 
smartphones. This is a disruptive strategy, which risks inattention, particularly if participants were 
under situations of high cognitive load e.g. if they had another task in mind for which they were 
unlocking their smartphone. 
REACTANCE 
We avoided using a direct behavioural command in our goal reminder to try to minimise reactance. 
Nevertheless, given that the purpose of our intervention was to remind participants of their goals, it 
risked triggering reactance. 
GOAL PURSUIT 
We did not directly mitigate against goal pursuit issues that may occur through situational 
constraints. However, the experiment instructions asking participants to set goals that they could 
commit to achieving over one week implicitly requires them to consider at least short-term 
constraints within their goal setting procedure.  
GOAL FEEDBACK 
The Goal Failure Framework proposes that sources of failure within goal feedback are tracking 
failure, reflection failure, reward mismatch and dependence.  
TRACKING 
The majority of participants (34, 65%) set goals that could be tracked – e.g. minimum walking 
durations, but only 5 (10%) set goals that require tracking, i.e. step-counts, which without tracking 
are difficult to self-estimate.  
We assessed whether each goal was trackable within a particular fitness app, Google Fit [Google 
2017], without the user having to enter their own information. 27 (52%) of goals were not trackable. 
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Some of the failures were due to different timeframes: for example “I will run 3 times a week for 30 
minutes each” (P13). Although Google Fit has a weekly view, it shows weekly totals, not per-day 
session within a week. Other failures were due to specific exercises (e.g. push-ups are not easily 
trackable) or attending fitness classes (e.g. yoga). 
REFLECTION, REWARDS 
Neither of these sub-components were explicitly included in our experiment design, so they are not a 
direct possible source of failure. Nevertheless, further research is required to determine whether 
their absence is in itself a possible source of failure. 
DEPENDENCE 
Our experiment did provide goal reminders to participants. Therefore, dependence is a potential 
issue in achieving longer-term goal behaviour if participants required the reminders in order to 
perform their goal behaviour, rather than learning to perform the behaviour regardless of prompts 
from technology. Once the prompts stop, so does the goal behaviour. 
Table 7:6 summarises the possible failures in goal-related behaviour we have identified within our 
set of goals by analysing them using the Goal Failure Framework.  

















Table 7:6 Sources of possible failure identified from our participants' goals 
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D ISCUSSION  
Our aim was to establish what physical activity goals are freely set in-the-wild, what their potential 
sources of failure are when supported via technology, and to identify strategic design options to 
overcome these failures.  
Our participants tended to set process, day-based physical activity goals that feature walking. Our 
results indicate that apps need to support considerable flexibility in goal setting. Participants set 
more duration-based goals than step-based goals, but both should be supported. Likewise with 
durations: users employed both day- and week-based goals.  
The re-use of our example goal amongst the participants supports research that participants tend to 
accept default goals on activity trackers [Fritz et al. 2014; Tang and Kay 2017b]. Careful design of the 
default option is therefore critical. Default goals may also have driven 17% of participants to select 
goals that feature as default in Google Fit and Fitbit. Thus we have established evidence of some 
overlap between goals set in–the-wild and app-determined goals. 
We found evidence that users do not tend to set goals that can be activated autonomously: few 
participants set context-aware or chained goals. We also found evidence that users tend to set goals 
that cannot easily be tracked to provide adequate goal feedback. Although many goals had trackable 
features, we identified mismatches in goal timeframes with Google Fit (users defined x days per week 
goals) and in activity type (e.g. push-ups). According to Goal Setting Theory, untracked goals are less 
effective, yet manual tracking requires scarce cognitive resources.  
In terms of goal motivation, we found some evidence that participants who dropped out started with 
a more positive attitude towards being active than completers, although the effect was not stable 
across our two different measures of goal attitude. This may indicate some overconfidence effect 
that warrants further research. However, possible overconfidence is not shown elsewhere since 
completers tended to specify longer durations for physical activity than dropouts, and the difference 
in attitudes between completers and dropouts is not significant at a Bonferroni-corrected p value. 
Our attitude score results indicate only a weak negative relationship between attitudes towards 
“being active” and “being inactive”. These measures cannot therefore be considered the converse of 
each other, and system designers should consider gathering both measures. We also found that 
measuring attitudes towards activity and inactivity using simple semantic differentials had acceptable 
internal consistency.  
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SOLUTIONS  
Our analysis shows multiple potential sources of goal failure. To address these, we return to the 
concept of Implementation Intentions as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Using these, NDBCIs can 
target the sources of potential goal failure as shown in Table 7:7. 
Goal 
component Implementation Intention NDBCI mechanism to counter potential goal failure 
Motivation No need to maintain it and/or use complementary motivational interventions. 
Content Guide sufficiently specific goals that avoid conflicts. 
Activation 
Avoid disruption, inattention, reactance and high cognitive load issues by shifting activation 
to contextual cues. 
Pursuit Guide users to identify situational constraints;. Identify and avoid cue conflicts 
Feedback Avoid need for tracking and dependence 
Table 7:7 Implementation Intention mechanisms to address goal failures 
How, then might Implementation Intention NDBCIs address these potential failures? 
GOAL MOTIVATION 
Implementation Intention NDBCIs can avoid having to target the goal motivation concept: a 
sufficiently embedded Implementation Intention does not require ongoing goal motivation to 
activate. There is evidence that goal motivation does not increase Implementation Intention 
interventions [Sheeran et al. 2005b], which implies that the differences in goal motivation scores we 
observed in our participants and dropouts are not important. However, there is also evidence that 
NDBCIs focusing on Implementation Intentions can be complemented by DBCIs targeting Type 2 
concepts. Milne et al. [2002] found that a motivational Type 2 intervention aimed at increasing 
participants’ self-efficacy around exercise combined with an Implementation intentions intervention 
increased compliance to 91% compared to motivational-only compliance rates of 39% and control 
compliance rates of only 29%. 
GOAL CONTENT 
Implementation Intention NDBCIs should target the goal content component by guiding and 
supporting create and commit to an Implementation Intention at the outset to fulfil their goal in each 
stable context they encounter. Our results show that users wish to set a wide range of goals. 
Interventions should identify and suggest salient if triggers within each stable context, and support 
the user to create appropriately difficult, specific accompanying then goal behaviours. Give our 
results, interventions should avoid not only restricting thens to particular types of goal, but also avoid 
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defaults. Implementation intentions effectively ‘train’ a user to respond to contextual triggers as an 
alternative to having to perform complex anticipatory calculations in order to determine when and 
how to provide just-in-time goal reminders [Pejovic and Musolesi 2015]. Lightweight cognitive bias 
modification techniques may also be used (see Chapters 3 and 5) to increase the salience of the 
selected contextual triggers, again enhancing the likelihood that the related goal action will appear 
on the Potential Behaviour Stack.  
Interventions should also employ chaining, where a desired behaviour is linked to a pre-existing 
behaviour that has already become somewhat routine or automatic. If successfully linked, then 
performing the existing behaviour should trigger the new behaviour without the need for additional 
reminders or prompts [Judah et al. 2012].  
GOAL ACTIVATION 
Implementation Intention NDBCIs explicitly target the goal activation component to achieve Type 1 
nonconscious, autonomous activation without being affected by inattention, reactance or high 
cognitive load.  As we have argued above and in Chapters 3 and 4, for goal automaticity, users need 
to establish goals that are brought to mind by salient contextual cues [Aarts and Dijksterhuis 2000; 
Gardner et al. 2012b] instead of by disruptive Just-In-Time reminders that may be ignored, missed, or 
interpreted adversely. Chapter 4 highlighted possible irritation and reactance issues with context-
aware proximity triggers as reminders to support them. An alternative is to shift cognitive load away 
from disruptive reminders at activation time to goal creation time, i.e. focusing on goal content as 
outlined above.  
Yet goal content support may not overcome all potential goal activation failure since goal 
accessibility decays over time [Tobias 2009]. Rehearsal may enhance goal achievement by improving 
cognitive saliency and therefore  accessibility of Implementation Intentions [Knäuper et al. 2011; 
Veling et al. 2014]. Therefore, interventions should also provide users with multiple opportunities for 
Implementation Intention rehearsal to deepen their trigger-behaviour associations. Stawarz et al. 
suggest that reminding people before the intended goal-enactment time , i.e. to remind them of their 
intention rather than at the intended moment of action, can encourage people to remember the 
intention without technology dependency [Stawarz et al. 2015]. Shifting the cognitive load of goal 
activation from high-load disruption to medium-cognitive load training or rehearsal phases in this 
way has the advantage of not disrupting users at an intended goal-enactment time.  
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GOAL PURSUIT 
Implementation Intention NDBCIs should address situational constraints that might hamper goal 
pursuit at goal content (creation) time: they should explicitly ask users to consider previous failures 
due to situational constraints and develop Implementation Intentions to avoid or overcome them. 
Such NDBCIs also need to guard against cue conflicts. Goal automating methods are not without risk 
because the higher the number of cognitive connections a goal has, the more likely it is to be 
triggered, but the higher the likelihood of goal conflict [Austin and Vancouver 1996], and see Table 
3.1. Interventions should therefore (a) promote Implementation Intentions with the smallest number 
of salient cues as if triggers; and (b) monitor possible conflicts and advise users of them.  
GOAL FEEDBACK 
Although several researchers have suggested the use of context to support feedback for physical 
activity goals, e.g. [Gouveia et al. 2015; Lee et al. 2014], again the focus tends to be on a self-
awareness strategy to aid post-behaviour recall and planning, rather than a strategy to support goal 
activation itself. Context is also used as a strategy to target forgetting, often using a disruptive alert. 
However, Ding et al. found such context-aware alerts still frustrated users, risking reactance [Ding et 
al. 2016]. Implementation Intention NDBCIs can instead be seen as a feed-forward loop that can 
drive goal enactment regardless of feeback [Gärling and Fujii 2009; Vermeulen et al. 2013]. 
EXAMPLE 
Taking the example goal of  “I will do two 15 mins walks a day” (P24), systems should support the 
user to identify appropriate triggers and specific behaviours for each walk, e.g. “If I have finished my 
breakfast, then I will go for a 15 minute walk to location Z”; “If I have picked my kid up from the 
school, then we will walk home via the park”.  
These Implementation Intentions also incorporate the notion of chaining – pre-existing entrenched 
behaviours (eating breakfast; doing the school run) that can be co-opted as triggers from the new 
behavioural goals. A system should support the user to rehearse these Implementation Intentions, 
both by straight mental rehearsal, and by the use of user photos of the relevant context to further 
deepen the trigger-behaviour associations. Interventions should also design defensively against 
conflicts by tracking multiple Implementation Intentions and warning of possible conflicts between 
multiple triggers and multiple behavioural goals.   
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LIMITATIONS  
Due to ethics considerations, we did not contact our dropouts to ask why they did not continue with 
the experiment. The dropout group was also relatively small (n=12). Our timeframes analysis is 
limited since participants were directed to form a goal for a week-long experiment. We did not ask 
participants about concurrent use of goal-tracking technology, which may have primed their 
selection of an activity goal.  There is a limit to the extent to which our participants’ goals can be 
considered to be freely set regardless of tracking: they were still participating in an experiment on 
their smartphones, which may have implicitly primed goals with some expectations of tracking. 
Goal-setting is not a panacea to bridge intention-behaviour gaps due to possible side-effects 
[Ordóñez et al. 2009]. Likewise, evidence that self-set goals are more effective than alternatives is 
not equivocal [Shilts et al. 2004], and evidence on the relative efficacy of goals set collaboratively 
between users and their technology is sparse.  
SUMMARY 
We argue that strategic deployment of NDBCI techniques that require varied levels of cognitive 
resources may be the most promising avenues of future research. Shifting high-load collaborative 
goal-setting within Implementation Intentions to the start of an intervention, together with medium-
cognitive-load NDBCIs such as rehearsal in later stages, may best support users to generate 
autonomous goals that can alleviate multiple aspects of goal failure. Goal setting stages could also be 
augmented with trigger identification, cognitive bias modification in favour of the triggers, chaining 
advice and warnings of possible trigger clashes where possible. If the high- and medium- load 
strategies are deployed correctly, then goals should be triggered autonomously by the environment 
in a low-load manner.   
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8. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This chapter: 
 summarises the findings of the previous chapters 
 discusses the limitations of the BAF and our research 
 synthesises the lessons learned in theory, users and technology to guide future 
research   
 presents design guidelines for NDBCIs 
 outlines our contributions to research. 
FINDINGS SUMMARY  
What, then, have we discovered about targeting automatic processes to achieve behaviour change? 
The central research questions for this thesis were: (1) to identify nonconscious influences on 
behaviour; and (2) identify how best to use technology to intervene to alter them.  
Question 1 was addressed by Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 examined the theoretical underpinnings of 
nonconscious interventions, arguing that a lack of focus on nonconscious influences has contributed 
to intervention failure. Chapter 3 outlined a theory-based framework incorporating both conscious 
and nonconscious influences on behaviour, the Behaviour Alteration Framework. This identified 
multiple opportunities to target nonconscious processes at the Filter, Prepare and Act stages of 
behavioural preparation.  
We next moved to address Question 2: how best to exploit these opportunities. Chapter 3 
incorporated evidence from related research into the intervention points of the BAF. Chapter 4 took 
the strategy of Implementation Intentions and explored how context-aware technology could be 
used to support them. We ran a pilot and a qualitative survey to understand what sorts of 
Implementation Intentions people want to form. We found users needed more support than 
anticipated to form automatable Implementation Intentions, with intelligibility issues in our app. Our 
survey identified potential issues with just-in-time Implementation Intention interventions, including 
reactance and simple ignoring.  
Chapter 5 addressed these user concerns by shifting focus away from just-in-time interruptions to 
training-based interventions. It investigated the strategy of Cognitive Bias Modification on two 
different platforms – smartphones and Tabletops – in two different domains – healthy eating and 
 
| P 8:188 
 
smartphone addiction. Experiment 5.1 investigated whether opportunistic accept and reject training 
of food images on smartphones alters specific and general measures of healthy and unhealthy food 
liking. We found little evidence of any statistically significant impacts of the intervention. Follow-up 
survey Study 5.2 found evidence that users were concerned about irritation with opportunistic 
training and smartphone over-use; and they did not wish to use their smartphones to redress the 
latter.  We therefore designed Experiment 5.3 to explore a task-based CBM to counter smartphone 
over-use delivered on a Tabletop. It explored whether smartphone approach/avoid bias was related 
to smartphone addiction scale scores, and whether the bias was alterable via training. Results 
showed no evidence of an effect of the training, and indicated differing influences of smartphone 
addiction scores on smartphone approach bias across the control and intervention groups, regardless 
of the session in which people completed the task. For both Experiment 5.1 and 5.3, there was the 
problem of determining whether nonconscious or conscious processes were activated by a visible 
training paradigm.  
We addressed this problem in Chapter 6 by focusing on subliminal priming experiments. Conscious 
perception of stimuli was masked so effects could be attributed to nonconscious processes. 
Experiment 6.1 explored whether nonconscious goal priming on smartphones at unlock time alters 
implicit and explicit measures of goal activation. We found no evidence for a change in implicit 
measures, and evidence that self-report measures of goal commitment decreased over a week for all 
participants. To disambiguate these results, we ran a series of follow-up experiments. Experiment 6.2 
established that it is technically possible to deliver primes on smartphones at rates that have 
previously been used in subliminal experiments. Experiments 6.3 and 6.4 used semi-controlled 
conditions to examine the immediate impact of subliminal priming. Experiment 6.3 explored the 
subliminal mere exposure effect: whether participants would tend to prefer stimuli (polygons, 
photos, text) they had just been primed with even when they could not consciously recall them. The 
results showed difficulty in concealing stimuli, and even where participants could not identify them, 
contradictory results in terms of preference across different stimuli types. Follow-up experiment 6.3B 
confirmed the fragility of the masking effect, with our small changes to presenting polygon stimuli 
rendering them more visible. Experiment 6.4 focused on semantic subliminal priming effects on 
smartphones. It explored whether masked congruent number primes would decrease reaction times 
and tendency to select the correct answer; whether free choices could be affected by subliminal 
primes; and whether novel primes (not used as targets) would have a different effect to repeat 
primes, indicating that semantic processing occurs with subliminal primes. We found no evidence 
that participants could detect the primes, but mixed effects for novel and repeat primes. The 
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experiment showed evidence that subliminal semantic processing of numbers does occur on 
smartphones, and thus there is some potential for nonconscious goal activation, but the results are 
of limited practical use because they are not consistent across conditions and the size of the effects 
was small. 
Overall, we have established user scepticism over just-in-time interruption strategies, little evidence 
of effects with CBM-Ap training, and mixed evidence of subliminal effects on smartphones with very 
small effect sizes. In short, although from a theoretical and empirical viewpoint we established a 
solid foundation for taking nonconscious processes into account in DBCIs, we did not find equivocal 
evidence for the impact of NDBCIs that use single techniques to target Type 1 processes.  Instead, we 
found several limitations in applying techniques from psychology labs into more realistic in-the-wild 
and semi-controlled environments.  
Referring to the continuum of cognitive load imposed by an intervention (Table 1:1), we therefore 
outlined in Chapter 7 how NDBCIs might  deploy multiple strategies, by targeting high-cognitive-load 
conscious processes at goal creation time, and then use medium-load rehearsal in early intervention 
stages, rather than use just-in-time or opportunistic training type interventions to establish 
automatic Type 1 goals. Chapter 7 analysed a set of 1-week activity goals, partly arising from 
Experiment 6.1, drawing on the lessons learned from Chapters 4,5 and 6, and theory in Chapters 2 
and 3, to outline a Goal Failure Framework and establish how interventions might address sources of 
goal failure to automate goals by shifting cognitive load away from goal activation to goal creation 
and rehearsal time.  
We have shown that at the high-cognitive-load end (disruptive context-aware Implementation 
Intention reminders) and with medium-load opportunistic training, there is a risk of annoyance and 
reactance, while at the low-load end where these risks are minimised, effects do not appear stable 
enough to deliver a reliable change. To address this trade-off, we argued in Chapter 7 that a 
promising avenue of future research is combining different-load strategies by focusing on high 
cognitive load at pre-behaviour training with medium-load rehearsal in order to establish 
Implementation Intentions that automate goals to achieve low-load interventions that are triggered 
by the user’s context. This transfers goal activation to salient triggers in the environment, rather than 
creating a dependency on the technology and risk alienating users.    
Building behaviour-change systems requires an understanding of both behavioural psychology and 
interaction design [Dix 2016]. We have used behavioural psychology to build the BAF, and explored 
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various interaction design options within the framework. We argue that understanding nonconscious 
processes is central to explaining why behaviour change is difficult and why conscious behaviour 
change interventions tend to fail. Yet a research gap remains in determining how best to target those 
nonconscious processes. Chapter 7 argues that a possible way forward is to time-shift cognitive load 
to goal setting and rehearsal time, rather than disrupting users at goal behaviour time.   
SYNTHESIS:  THEORY, USERS AND TECHNOLOGY 
Our introduction and Chapters 2 and 3 identified issues in theory, users and technology as barriers to 
developing effective DBCIs. This thesis has provided a theory-based framework for (N)DBCIs, and 
focused on alternatives to ‘just-in-time’ context-aware interventions to address issues with users and 
 technology to such interventions. 
THEORY  
We have established a theoretical gap in common behaviour change theories to address the 
influence of Type 1 processes. The BAF addresses the theoretical gap in understanding why people 
sometimes act against their conscious intentions and goals. We expanded on the possible sources of 
goal failure in Chapter 7. The frameworks (the Behaviour Alteration Framework and the Goal Failure 
Framework) require further refinement from empirical evidence.  
USERS  
DOMAINS OF CONCERN   
Survey 4.2 showed that reported domains of behaviour change concern are health (increase physical 
activity, eat more healthily, drinking more water) and productivity (avoiding procrastination). Survey 
5.2 also showed concerns around healthy eating, physical exercise and problematic technology use. 
Within the physical activity domain, study 7.1 showed that participants primarily focused on walking, 
with day-based and duration goals being most frequently selected. Concerns over problematic 
technology use were also found in study 5.3: 43% of participants reported having a “maladaptive 
dependency or addiction” over their smartphone usage. A key additional theme that emerged from 
study 5.2 was user-reported problems in controlling automatic behaviours.  
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REACTANCE  
We found spontaneous mentions of the possibility of reactance and annoyance towards DBCIs in our 
qualitative elicitation surveys, 4.2 and 5.2. However, we found no evidence of reactance issues from 
our subliminal priming 1-week intervention, study 6.1.  
Survey 4.2 results also showed a continuum of attitudes towards disruption, from users requesting 
interrupting alarms to users requesting unobtrusive notifications. This highlights the importance of 
providing tailoring of disruptive interventions.  
ETHICS 
The BAF shows the potential impact of Type 1 processes on attitudes and behaviour. This impact has 
not been ignored by the advertising industry. There is evidence that advertisers are increasingly using 
NDBCI behaviour change techniques to increase consumption of their products, yet academic 
analysis of the impact of nonconscious advertising via new technology platforms lags behind their 
popularity [Nicholls 2012]. 
Three broad developments indicate advertisers are moving towards using “dark patterns” [Brignull 
2011; Greenberg et al. 2014] that exploit psychology to influence people beyond their intentions:  (i) 
increased use of technology-driven behavioural targeting, generated from both explicit user-shared 
information and implicit user information derived from behaviour such as browsing activity [Alt et al. 
2009];  (ii) increased use of neuroscience-based physiological monitoring to fine-tune nonconscious 
responses to adverts [Kennedy and Northover 2016; Khushaba et al. 2013]; and (iii) a movement 
towards ‘native’ ads, adverts integrated into social network content so they are difficult to 
distinguish from content  [Lee et al. 2016; Maréchal 2016]. These trends combine to create an 
asymmetry of information between advertisers and their targets. Advertisers know who has been 
watching their adverts and when, with what emotional affect and behavioural effect, with what 
interaction and in what context, while users are unable to consciously recall adverts. Couldry & 
Turrow [2014] argue that this asymmetry threatens democracy itself by eliminating collective 
experience: advertisers will be able to show different versions of reality to different audiences. The 
asymmetry has prompted how technology might enable people to calls for research into protect 
themselves against advertisers who seek to influence consumers’ choices beyond their conscious 
[Bargh 2002; Hassine 2014; Sunstein 2016]control . The BAF provides a framework within which to 
 carry out such research. 
 




The BAF outlines the critical impact of context on behaviour. Yet, as we found in study 4.1, 
smartphones without proprietary software or hardware can only support relatively limited context 
detection. Study 4.1 also indicated possible intelligibility issues with rich context-detection features 
that require further research.  Survey 4.2 investigated the feasibility of proximity beacons to support 
Implementation Intentions, with respondents identifying a rich set of possible locations for them. 
The approach needs experimental testing.  
There are two key strands of future research into the use of context-aware pervasive technology to 
support highly individualised BAF-based interventions. Firstly, to use technology to find out which 
features of BAF are active at different points for different behaviours for a given individual; secondly 
to exploit this knowledge in DBCIs that allow that individual to pick-and-mix their own interventions.  
TRIGGER HUNTERS 
Type 1 context-response associations are not easily available to introspection, but pervasive 
technology could potentially discover which cues act as triggers for particular unwanted responses. 
This would address the challenge of fluid causal influences affecting both Type 1 and Type 2 systems 
in-the-wild [Michie et al. 2013b]. Once discovered, people can avoid, approach and/or retrain their 
trigger cues accordingly. Technology with richer contextual awareness, including mood-detection, 
could identify both existing cues that trigger unwanted behaviour and candidate salient cues to be 
associated with wanted behaviours. Advances in context-cue detection and behaviour detection, 
perhaps driven by machine learning techniques [Banovic et al. 2017], will broaden our understanding 
of what sorts of cues can act as response triggers for different types of behaviours.  
SELF PICK-AND-MIX 
Future research should focus on enabling individuals to vary interventions according to preferences, 
personality traits and different digital devices [Lee et al. 2017a; Orji et al. 2017; Meinlschmidt et al. 
2016]. For example, interventions could allow people to use their own images of real-life problematic 
cues in CBM-Attention interventions. We foresee a crucial role for such flexible, tailored DBCIs to 
help solve the problem of fundamental variability in human behaviours, motivations and contexts 
[Rogers 2006]. From our analysis in Chapter 7, we also argue that this tailoring should extend to level 
of conscious attention available. This requires further research into reliable detection of what 
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cognitive resources are available. The pick-and-mix DBCI trend may also help avoid reactance if users 
feel more in control of their technology.  
 SMARTPHONE UNLOCK USAGE 
Two studies (5.1, 6.1) explored using opportunistic interventions tied to smartphone unlocks as an 
intervention strategy. We found that users unlocked their phones around 50 times per day (5.1 mean 
= 51; 6.1 mean = 49), slightly higher than previous research (Harbach et al. 40 unlocks/day [2016]; 
Hintze et al. 25 unlocks/day [2014] ). We found high variance in usage in line with previous research 
e.g. [Truong et al. 2014]:  study 5.1 showed that one participant took 2 days to complete the 
intervention, while another took 11 days; and study 6.1 showed that the standard deviation of 
smartphone unlocks was relatively high compared to the mean. Therefore, although tying 
interventions to smartphone unlocks is a good candidate for delivering multiple interventions per 
day, consistent usage across users cannot be assumed.    
As noted above, we also found evidence that people are concerned about technology overuse.  
SUITABILITY OF SMARTPHONES FOR SUBLIMINAL PRIMING  
Our analysis of the suitability of smartphones as a platform for subliminal priming showed few issues 
with dropped frames on our experiment phones with Wi-Fi disabled, but enabling Wi-Fi (a proxy for 
higher load) increased the dropped frames. Where a stimulus is only shown for one frame, a dropped 
frame is clearly an issue. Repeating the timing results on a broader range of phones in-the-wild 
would be an important future step to gauge the broad technical applicability of the strategy. 
Regardless of the technical restrictions, we also found only mixed evidence to support the impact of 
subliminal priming.  
INTEGRATING THEORY,  USERS AND TECHNOLOGY  
 In Chapter 7, we drew on our research into theory, users and technology in previous chapters to 
synthesise a Goal Failure Framework that explored potential reasons for goal failure where 
technology supports users to create and pursue goals. We showed multiple potential sources of goal 
failure, including goal activation, where sparse cognitive resources mean users do not recall the goal 
activity. Further, where interventions try to achieve activation through reminders, even where they 
managed to overcome issues with context detection to determine the correct reminder time, they 
still risk goal failure through user inattention and/or reactance.  We therefore argue that a key strand 
of future research for interventions should be to focus shifting cognitively-intensive interventions to 
 
| P 8:194 
 
goal creation time to make Type 1 goal activation more likely in the future. Interventions should 
support users to form automatable goals that tie behaviour to context cues by:  identifying 
appropriately specific and difficult goals with simplified behaviour and cue triggers; encouraging 
chaining where appropriate; avoiding ironic goals; providing opportunities for rehearsal and 
identifying cue clashes.   
LIMITATIONS 
This section summarises the limitations of our experiments. 
The main limitation of our experiments is that, in common with many HCI experiments, they were 
run in the short term and did not use a direct measure of behaviour. The rationale for this was that 
we were investigating elements of the BAF in NDBCIs. However, this has resulted in an attenuated 
experimental process: we have assumed that various measures of implicit activation (e.g. emotional 
Stroop measure of goal activation; reaction times; SRHI) are linked to behaviour, and have measured 
on the former. This is partly due to the failures of context-aware technology to adequately capture 
actual behaviour: in a longer-term pilot measuring daily steps10, we were unable to distinguish 
between days where participants did not carry their smartphone and days on which they did nothing.  
There is ongoing debate about the use of self-report measures to indicate implicit activation and 
related behaviour [Sniehotta and Presseau 2012; Nilsen et al. 2012]. Self-report indicates an 
individual’s view of what processes are impacting on them, but this is unlikely to be the full picture 
since the content of Type 1 processes are unavailable to introspection [Hagger et al. 2015]. Self-
report should therefore be used with caution. For example, as we showed in Chapter 7, the converse 
of a particular concept (e.g. ‘activity’ vs ‘inactivity’) does not guarantee converse self-reported 
attitudes. Although some of the measures we used (e.g. SRHI in pilot study 4.1, our HWK goal 
commitment measure in study 6.1) have been validated, these and others including our measure of 
reactance (study 6.1, chapter 7), measures of implicit food attitude (HTAS, study 5.1), measure of 
smartphone addiction (study 5.3) and use of semantic differentials (studies 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1) are still 
areas of active research.  There is also debate about the use of reaction time data to measure implicit 
activation [Blanton et al. 2015].  
                                                            
10 Not reported elsewhere for reasons of brevity. 
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The short-term nature of the experiments partly reflects the practicalities of running HCI experiments 
in CS departments with students; and partly our approach to determine the short-term effects of 
NDBCIs to identify the most promising areas of future research.  
The majority of our experiments used randomisation of stimuli rather than a set stimulus list. 
Although our statistical approach allows us to incorporate random reactions to stimuli by-participant, 
not all of our models converged with this added. Therefore, our analysis does not always allow us to 
disambiguate order effects from intervention effects. The majority of our experiments also used 
between-subjects experiments because we wished to avoid carry-over effects and use a control 
group to establish baseline responses (e.g. experiment 6.3). However, given our relatively small 
numbers of participants, this has limited the explanatory power of our experiments. Lastly, not all of 
our experiments included a control group (e.g. pilot study 4.1, study 6.4). 
In terms of statistical approach to demonstrate subliminal effects, we note ongoing debate about the 
most appropriate method of statistical analysis of such experiment data [Sand and Nilsson 2016]. 
Much of our data was noisy (e.g. reaction times in the semi-controlled study 5.3 and in the Stroop in-
the-wild results); reaction time data is inherently noisy, and we had the additional distraction of the 
more life-life environments acting on our participants.  
FUTURE RESEARCH  
Table 8:1 summarises our suggested future work arising from open research questions remaining in 
each application area from our experiment chapters and across the broader areas of reactance, 
context-aware technology and ethics.    
Area  Future Research 
Implementation 
Intentions (Chapter 4) 
Expand context-awareness:  test Implementation Intentions triggered by 
motion-aware Bluetooth Low-Energy beacons to test whether qualitative 
interest in their use from elicitation survey 4.2 is supported in-the-wild 
without issues of intelligibility and reactance.  
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Area  Future Research 
Cognitive Bias 
Modification (Chapter 5) 
Tailoring (healthy eating domain): user-chosen image targets would 
reflect individual user preferences. Using photos of foods in naturalistic 
contexts may result in a stronger effect since context forms part of the 
food-cueing process [Adams et al. 2015; Hanks et al. 2012; Wansink 
2010]. 
Tailoring (smartphone problematic use domain): enabling users to 
replicate their bedside tables, with images of their own phone and books. 
Subliminal priming on 
smartphones (Chapter 6) 
Generalisability: repeat feasibility study in-the-wild on participant 





Validation: determine the behavioural impact high-cognitive-resource 
setting at the outset coupled with medium-cognitive-load rehearsal 
approaches in long-term user study.   
Identifying cues: how can interventions best identify ‘good’ 
Implementation Intention candidate cues? 
Intelligibility: how can interventions support users to create effective 
Implementation Intentions of appropriate specificity from multiple 
candidate cues, employing chaining and clash-detection strategies? 
Reactance  Explore the boundaries of reactance in NDBCIs, particularly with respect 
to behavioural commands issued by smartphones.  
Determine whether pick-and-mix (N)DBCIs can help to reduce reactance? 
Explore how DBCIs can automate goals to trigger goal activation without 
causing reactance, forgetting or inattention.  
Context-aware 
technology  
Trigger hunters; Self pick-and-mix (as above) 
Ethics Research how to counter the use of NDBCI techniques by advertisers. 
Table 8:1 Future work themes 
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We have also derived a series of interaction design considerations s from lessons learned from our 
explorations of NDBCIs to help guide this future research plan. 
DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR NDBCI 
SIMPLIFY BEHAVIOUR AND CONTEXT  
NDBCI should start by supporting users to clearly identify their target response [Michie et al. 2014a]. 
To promote faster automaticity, the target response should be as simple as possible [Lally and 
Gardner 2013; Wood and Neal 2007]. Likewise, NDBCIs should select the smallest possible set of 
salient cues to form a ‘stable context’ as a habit trigger, since simpler context causation models 
support faster automaticity than complex ones [FitzGerald et al. 2014].  
NCDBIs can play an important role in identifying and avoiding cue clashes. Cues associated with 
multiple responses are likely to cause response conflict, triggering arbitration and conscious Type 2 
resources, and thus hinder automaticity  [Wood and Neal 2007]. For unwanted automatic 
behaviours, NDBCIs need to isolate the particular context cue(s) that trigger an unwanted response. 
We have shown that this level of rich context-detection is not trivial, and getting it wrong risks user 
reactance. Yet as context-detection technology and algorithms improves NDBCIs could play a key role 
in identifying introspectable trigger cues for their users. 
TYPE 1  /  TYPE 2  TAILORING  
It is a general DBCI principle that interventions should adapt to individual users [Ijsselsteijn et al. 
2006; Ranfelt et al. 2009; Orji et al. 2017]. The BAF requires a specific form of tailoring because 
individuals vary in relative influence of Type 1 and Type 2 behaviours [Sladek et al. 2006]. For 
example, one individual may be more “impulsive” or susceptible to temptations than others. In these 
circumstances, a DBCI may need to intervene earlier in the unwanted behaviour process, e.g. by 
altering the context to try to prevent a user from buying tempting snacks in the first place. Individual 
users at different points in the behaviour change process may also require different sorts of 
intervention. For example, as we argued in Chapter 7, in the early stages of habit formation via 
Implementation Intentions, a user may need a higher level of support via intention rehearsal and 
reminders than when automaticity emerges.  
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DESIGN FOR TYPE 1  AND TYPE 2  CONGRUENCE  
Recent research suggests that the most effective DBCIs may be those that influence Type 1 and Type 
2 processes in congruence [St Quinton and Brunton 2017]. We have argued that a likely failure of 
many interventions is the focus on Type 2 processes, undermined by incongruent Type 1 default 
processes. We caution against a similarly myopic focus on Type 1 processes only. For example, 
priming can only be successful where a person already has relevant cognitive constructs motivated 
towards the given behaviour [Strahan et al. 2002]. This may explain our lack of results from study 6.1: 
although we recruited participants that were motivated towards being more physically active, there 
was the additional motivation of a small honorarium which may have skewed recruitment. 
Congruence-focused DBCIs should support user behaviour change regardless of levels of user 
attention, deliberative resources and individual differences in Type 1 / Type 2 dominance.  
DESIGN FOR PERSISTENCE 
Behaviour change is a long-term process. Automatic behaviour only emerges over time, so 
interventions need to be viable over the longer term. NDBCIs should also aim to complement and 
augment  how our brains work [Rogers 2006] to leverage Type 1 processes, rather than leaving users 
dependent on their machines [Renfree et al. 2016]. Just-in-time interruption strategies risk 
dependency and reactance. DBCIs should anticipate technology and user failures, including failures in 
a user’s Type 2 processes due to limited conscious cognitive resources. As we argued in Chapter 7, a 
good alternative to just-in-time strategies is to shift cognitive load to pre-training and rehearsal.  
DESIGN ETHICALLY  
Ethics requirements are not new, but we have outlined how NDBCIs raise additional concerns.  They 
aim to create automatic behaviour resistant to change, so it is critical people can give informed 
consent. Users should in principle control their DBCIs, rather than the other way round [Rogers 
2006]. However, this principle is often violated with non-digital BCIs e.g. tobacco packaging warning 
messages [Peters et al. 2013].  
Safety is an ethical issue when delivering disruptive interventions to activate Type 2 processes. 
Disrupting users under cognitive load in potentially dangerous tasks (e.g. driving) is problematic. 
Using existing Type 1 triggers can also be dangerous, for example, triggering fear-based ‘flight’ 
responses as used in Zombies, Run! [zombiesrungame 2015] in inappropriate contexts (e.g. crossing 
the road). Most of our experiments were designed to avoid cognitive load at goal activation time. 
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Privacy is a particular issue where systems disclose automatically-sensed information to others, e.g. 
for off-device computation. The fusion of real-world sensing with social networks means users have 
limited control over how they are represented to their social network contacts [Efstratiou et al. 
2012].  
Finally, it remains unclear who bears responsibility for the effects of DBCIs: the end-user or the 
system designer [Verbeek 2009]?  The question is pertinent for configurable systems due to 
unintended consequences: for example, what if a user with an eating disorder alters a cue-valence-
altering system to devalue all foods instead of just unhealthy foods? Starting with asking “What’s the 
worst that could happen with this intervention?” is a good strategy. 
DESIGN FOR REACTANCE  
DBCIs should only deliver just-in-time behavioural directions (i.e. those that directly threaten users’ 
behavioural autonomy) when the system is confident that the timing is appropriate.  Where this is 
not possible, interventions should consider alternatives such as rehearsal, which can be delivered at 
a time of the user’s choosing. 
CONTRIBUTIONS SUMMARY 
NOVELTY  
To our knowledge we have presented the first framework to analyse opportunities for technology to 
intervene to change behaviour using Dual Process Theory, modern habit theory and Goal Setting 
Theory.  We have presented the first context-aware Implementation Intention intervention on 
smartphones, the first intervention to use CBM in an incidental way on smartphones, the first 
intervention to apply CBM for smartphone addiction, the first CBM on Tabletops, and the first 
intervention exploring subliminal priming in depth on smartphones both in-the-wild and in semi-
controlled conditions.  
SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS  
This thesis contributes to HCI and digital behaviour change knowledge by establishing an illustrative 
framework to explore behaviour change technology that targets automatic behaviours including 
habits. It provides a theoretical and empirical basis for interventions that consider nonconscious 
influences on behaviour. This consideration of nonconscious processes is crucial to designing 
effective DBCIs for three main reasons. Firstly, nonconscious behaviour is common in everyday life in 
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multiple domains. Secondly, reasoned-action theories and corresponding Type 2 techniques alone 
are unable to achieve lasting behaviour change in the presence of strong habits and other automatic 
behaviours. Thirdly, we have identified multiple opportunities for pervasive computing technology to 
deliver interventions that can target Type 1 processes.  
We addressed two main questions: what are the nonconscious influences on our behaviour, and how 
can we apply nonconscious behaviour change techniques using technology? We answered Question 
1 by analysing common behaviour change theories, and synthesising the illustrative Behaviour 
Alteration Framework from Dual Process Theory, Goal Setting Theory and modern habit theory. It 
shows how behaviour is strongly influenced by environmental and physiological cues, which trigger 
implicit memory stores to generate behavioural impulses. Where limited Type 2 resources are low, 
these impulses drive the default behaviour. We answered Question 2 by mapping a series of 
strategies to the intervention points identified in the BAF, then running a series of pilots and studies 
to explore a sub-set of these strategies including Implementation Intentions, CBM and subliminal 
techniques, on platforms including smartphones and a Tabletop. Overall, we found that despite the 
strong theoretical underpinnings, and empirical support for intervention strategies from psychology 
labs, the impact of interventions was either not evident, or small and somewhat fragile under in-the-
wild and semi-controlled conditions.  Therefore, we argue that the most promising strategy of future 
research is to focus on understanding how best to deploy multiple NDBCI strategies at different 
levels of cognitive load, by shifting high-cognitive-load tasks away from goal activation to focus on 
embedding that goal at creation time, and providing medium-cognitive-load rehearsal opportunities 
such that the goal becomes autonomous and can therefore be triggered unobtrusively by the user’s 
context in the future.  
  
 




AARTS, H., CUSTERS, R., AND MARIEN, H. 2008. Preparing and motivating behavior outside of awareness. 
Science (New York, N.Y.) 319, 5870, 1095–9203. 
AARTS, H. AND DIJKSTERHUIS, A. 2000. Habits as knowledge structures: automaticity in goal-directed 
behavior. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 78, 1, 53. 
AARTS, H., PAULUSSEN, T., AND SCHAALMA, H. 1997. Physical exercise habit: on the conceptualization and 
formation of habitual health behaviours. Health education research 12, 3, 363–74. 
ABRAHAM, C. AND MICHIE, S. 2008. A taxonomy of behavior change techniques used in interventions. 
Health Psychology 27, 3, 379–87. 
ADAMS, A.T., COSTA, J., JUNG, M.F., AND CHOUDHURY, T. 2015. Mindless Computing: Designing 
Technologies to Subtly Influence Behavior. UbiComp ’15, ACM, 719–730. 
ADAMS, M.A., HURLEY, J.C., TODD, M., ET AL. 2017. Adaptive goal setting and financial incentives: a 2 × 2 
factorial randomized controlled trial to increase adults’ physical activity. BMC Public Health 
17, 1. 
ADAMS, M.A., MARSHALL, S.J., DILLON, L., ET AL. 2009. A theory-based framework for evaluating 
exergames as persuasive technology. Persuasive ’09, ACM, 45:1-45:8. 
ADRIAANSE, M.A., VAN OOSTEN, J.M., DE RIDDER, D.T., DE WIT, J.B., AND EVERS, C. 2011. Planning what not to 
eat: Ironic effects of Implementation Intentions negating unhealthy habits. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin 37, 1, 69–81. 
AHARONY, N., PAN, W., IP, C., KHAYAL, I., AND PENTLAND, A. 2011. The social fMRI: Measuring, 
Understanding, and Designing Social Mechanisms in the Real World. Proceedings of the 13th 
International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing, ACM, 445–454. 
AJZEN, I. 1991. The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes 50, 2, 179–211. 
ALBARRACIN, D., HEPLER, J., AND TANNENBAUM, M. 2011. General action and inaction goals their 
behavioral, cognitive, and affective origins and influences. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science 20, 2, 119–123. 
ALT, F., BALZ, M., KRISTES, S., ET AL. 2009. Adaptive user profiles in pervasive advertising environments. 
European Conference on Ambient Intelligence, Springer, 276–286. 
AMORES, J. AND MAES, P. 2017. Essence: Olfactory Interfaces for Unconscious Influence of Mood and 
Cognitive Performance. CHI ’17, ACM Press, 28–34. 
ANDREASSEN, C.S. 2015. Online Social Network Site Addiction: A Comprehensive Review. Current 
Addiction Reports 2, 2, 175–184. 
ANDREWS, S., ELLIS, D.A., SHAW, H., AND PIWEK, L. 2015. Beyond Self-Report: Tools to Compare Estimated 
and Real-World Smartphone Use. PLOS ONE 10, 10, e0139004. 
 
| P 9:202 
 
ANKER, A.E., FEELEY, T.H., MCCRACKEN, B., AND LAGOE, C.A. 2016. Measuring the Effectiveness of Mass-
Mediated Health Campaigns Through Meta-Analysis. Journal of Health Communication 21, 4, 
439–456. 
ARANYI, G., KOUIDER, S., LINDSAY, A., ET AL. 2014. Subliminal cueing of selection behavior in a virtual 
environment. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments 23, 1, 33–50. 
ARMITAGE, C.J. AND CONNER, M. 2000. Social cognition models and health behaviour: A structured 
review. Psychology and Health 15, 2, 173–189. 
AVEYARD, P., MASSEY, L., PARSONS, A., MANASEKI, S., AND GRIFFIN, C. 2009. The effect of Transtheoretical 
Model based interventions on smoking cessation. Social Science & Medicine 68, 3, 397–403. 
BAAYEN, R.H. AND MILIN, P. 2015. Analyzing reaction times. International Journal of Psychological 
Research 3, 2, 12–28. 
BACHMANN, T. AND FRANCIS, G. 2013. Visual masking: Studying perception, attention, and 
consciousness. Academic Press. 
BANDURA, A. 1977. Self-efficacy: toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. Psychological review 
84, 2, 191–215. 
BANDURA, A. 1978. The self system in reciprocal determinism. American psychologist 33, 4, 344–358. 
BANDURA, A. 1986. Social foundations of thought and action: a social cognitive theory. Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 
BANDURA, A. 1998. Health promotion from the perspective of social cognitive theory. Psychology and 
health 13, 4, 623–649. 
BANDURA, A. 2001. Social cognitive theory: An agentic perspective. Annual review of psychology 52, 1–
26. 
BANDURA, A. 2011. Social cognitive theory. Handbook of social psychological theories, 349–373. 
BANGOR, A., KORTUM, P.T., AND MILLER, J.T. 2008. An empirical evaluation of the system usability scale. 
Intl. Journal of Human–Computer Interaction 24, 6, 574–594. 
BANOVIC, N., BUZALI, T., CHEVALIER, F., MANKOFF, J., AND DEY, A.K. 2016. Modeling and Understanding 
Human Routine Behavior. Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems, ACM, 248–260. 
BANOVIC, N., WANG, A., JIN, Y., ET AL. 2017. Leveraging Human Routine Models to Detect and Generate 
Human Behaviors. ACM Press, 6683–6694. 
BARBOSA, A.M., BROWN, J.A., JIMENEZ-VALVERDE, A., AND REAL, R. 2016. modEva: Model Evaluation and 
Analysis. . 
BARGH, J.A. 2002. Losing Consciousness: Automatic Influences on Consumer Judgment, Behavior, and 
Motivation. Journal of Consumer Research 29, 2, 280–285. 
 
| P 9:203 
 
BARGH, J.A. AND CHARTRAND, T.L. 1999. The unbearable automaticity of being. American Psychologist 
54, 7, 462. 
BARGH, J.A., LEE-CHAI, A., BARNDOLLAR, K., GOLLWITZER, P., AND TRÖTSCHEL, R. 2001. The Automated Will: 
Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of Behavioral Goals. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 81, 6, 1014–1027. 
BARGH, J.A. AND MORSELLA, E. 2010. Unconscious behavioral guidance systems. In: C.R. Agnew, D.E. 
Carlston, W.G. Graziano and J.R. Kelly, eds., Then a miracle occurs: Focusing on behavior in 
social psychological theory and research. Oxford University Press, 89–118. 
BARRAL, O., ARANYI, G., KOUIDER, S., ET AL. 2014. Covert Persuasive Technologies: Bringing Subliminal 
Cues to Human-Computer Interaction. Persuasive Technology, Springer International 
Publishing, 1–12. 
BARTON, K. 2017. MuMIn. . 
BATES, D. 2006. lmer, p-values and all that. r-help mailing list. https://stat.ethz.ch/pipermail/r-
help/2006-May/094765.html. 
BATES, D. 2010. lme4: mixed-effects modeling with R. http://lme4.0.r-forge.r-
project.org/lMMwR/lrgprt.pdf. 
BATES, D., MÄCHLER, M., BOLKER, B., AND WALKER, S. 2015. Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects Models Using 
lme4. Journal of Statistical Software 67, 1, 1–48. 
BATESON, M., NETTLE, D., AND ROBERTS, G. 2006. Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-
world setting. Biology Letters 2, 3, 412–414. 
BAUER, C. AND WALDNER, F. 2013. Reactive music: when user behavior affects sounds in real-time. CHI 
’13 Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems, ACM, 739–744. 
BAUMEISTER, R. 2002. Yielding to Temptation: Self-Control Failure, Impulsive Purchasing, and 
Consumer Behavior. Journal of Consumer Research 28, 4, 670–676. 
BAYER, J.B. AND CAMPBELL, S.W. 2012. Texting while driving on automatic: Considering the frequency-
independent side of habit. Computers in Human Behavior 28, 6, 2083–2090. 
BELLISLE, F., DALIX, A.M., AND SLAMA, G. 2004. Non food-related environmental stimuli induce increased 
meal intake in healthy women: comparison of television viewing versus listening to a 
recorded story in laboratory settings. Appetite 43, 2, 175–180. 
BERRY, T. AND SPENCE, J.C. 2009. Automatic activation of exercise and sedentary stereotypes. Research 
Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 80, 3, 633–40. 
BERRY, T.R. 2006. Who’s even interested in the exercise message? Attentional bias for exercise and 
sedentary-lifestyle related words. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology 28, 1, 4–17. 
BETTINI, C., BRDICZKA, O., HENRICKSEN, K., ET AL. 2010. A survey of context modelling and reasoning 
techniques. Pervasive and Mobile Computing 6, 2, 161–180. 
 
| P 9:204 
 
BEXHETI, A., FEDOSOV, A., FINDAHL, J., LANGHEINRICH, M., AND NIFORATOS, E. 2015. Re-Live the Moment: 
Visualizing Run Experiences to Motivate Future Exercises. MobileHCI ’15 Adjunct, ACM, 986–
993. 
BIAS MODIFICATION THERAPY. 2015. BMT homepage. BMT apps. http://www.biasmodification.com/. 
BIJOU, S.W. 1957. Patterns of reinforcement and resistance to extinction in young children. Child 
Development, 47–54. 
BLACKBURNE, T., RODRIGUEZ, A., AND JOHNSTONE, S.J. 2016. A Serious Game to Increase Healthy Food 
Consumption in Overweight or Obese Adults: Randomized Controlled Trial. JMIR Serious 
Games 4, 2, e10. 
BLANTON, H., JACCARD, J., STRAUTS, E., MITCHELL, G., AND TETLOCK, P.E. 2015. Toward a meaningful metric 
of implicit prejudice. Journal of Applied Psychology 100, 5, 1468–1481. 
BNC. 2016. British National Corpus, Distributed by Oxford University Computing Services on behalf of 
the BNC Consortium. http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/. 
BOLKER, B.M., BROOKS, M.E., CLARK, C.J., ET AL. 2009. Generalized linear mixed models: a practical guide 
for ecology and evolution. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 24, 3, 127–135. 
BORLAND, R. 2013. Understanding hard to maintain behaviour change: a dual process approach. John 
Wiley & Sons. 
BORLAND, R. 2016. CEOS Theory: A Comprehensive Approach to Understanding Hard to Maintain 
Behaviour Change. Applied Psychology: Health and Well-Being. 
BORNSTEIN, R.F., LEONE, D.R., AND GALLEY, D.J. 1987. The generalizability of subliminal mere exposure 
effects: Influence of stimuli perceived without awareness on social behavior. Journal of 
Personality & Social Psychology 53, 6, 1070. 
BORNSTEIN, R.F. AND PITTMAN, T.S. 1992. Perception without awareness: Cognitive, clinical, and social 
perspectives. Guilford Press. 
BORT-ROIG, J., GILSON, N.D., PUIG-RIBERA, A., CONTRERAS, R.S., AND TROST, S.G. 2014. Measuring and 
influencing physical activity with smartphone technology: a systematic review. Sports 
Medicine 44, 5, 671–686. 
BOUTON, M.E. 2014. Why behavior change is difficult to sustain. Preventive medicine. 
BRAUN, V. AND CLARKE, V. 2006. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative research in 
psychology 3, 2, 77–101. 
BREHM, J.W. 2009. A theory of psychological reactance. In: W. Burke, D.G. Lake and J.W. Paine, eds., 
Organization Change: A Comprehensive Reader. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, San Francisco, CA, 
377–390. 
BREVERS, D., ROGIERS, A., DEFONTAINE, A., ET AL. 2017. Implementation Intention for Initiating Intuitive 
Eating and Active Embodiment in Obese Patients Using a Smartphone Application. Frontiers 
in Psychiatry 8. 
 
| P 9:205 
 
BRIGNULL, H. 2011. Dark Patterns: Deception vs. Honesty in UI Design. Usability. 
BROOKE, J. 2013. SUS: a retrospective. Journal of usability studies 8, 2, 29–40. 
DE BRUIN, M., SHEERAN, P., KOK, G., ET AL. 2012. Self-regulatory processes mediate the intention-
behavior relation for adherence and exercise behaviors. Health Psychology 31, 6, 695. 
BRUNNER, T.A. AND SIEGRIST, M. 2012. Reduced food intake after exposure to subtle weight-related 
cues. Appetite 58, 3, 1109–1112. 
BRYNJARSDOTTIR, H., HÅKANSSON, M., PIERCE, J., BAUMER, E., DISALVO, C., AND SENGERS, P. 2012. Sustainably 
unpersuaded: how persuasion narrows our vision of sustainability. CHI ’12, ACM, 947–956. 
BUTRYN, M.L., PHELAN, S., HILL, J.O., AND WING, R.R. 2007. Consistent self‐monitoring of weight: a key 
component of successful weight loss maintenance. Obesity 15, 12, 3091–3096. 
CABRITA, M., OP DEN AKKER, H., ACHTERKAMP, R., HERMENS, H., AND VOLLENBROEK-HUTTEN, M. 2014. 
Automated Personalized Goal-setting in an Activity Coaching Application: Proceedings of the 
3rd International Conference on Sensor Networks, 389–396. 
CAMBO, S.A., AVRAHAMI, D., AND LEE, M.L. 2017. BreakSense: Combining Physiological and Location 
Sensing to Promote Mobility during Work-Breaks. CHI ’17, ACM Press, 3595–3607. 
CAMERON, D.S., BERTENSHAW, E.J., AND SHEERAN, P. 2017. Positive affect and physical activity: Testing 
effects on goal setting, activation, prioritisation, and attainment. Psychology & Health, 1–17. 
CARABAN, A., KARAPANOS, E., TEIXEIRA, V., MUNSON, S.A., AND CAMPOS, P. 2017. On the Design of Subly: 
Instilling Behavior Change During Web Surfing Through Subliminal Priming. PERSUASIVE ’17, 
Springer International Publishing, 163–174. 
CARR, T.H., MCCAULEY, C., SPERBER, R.D., AND PARMELEE, C.M. 1982. Words, pictures, and priming: on 
semantic activation, conscious identification, and the automaticity of information processing. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 8, 6, 757. 
CHAIKEN, S. AND TROPE, Y. 1999. Dual-process theories in social psychology. Guilford Press. 
CHALFOUN, P. AND FRASSON, C. 2011. Subliminal Cues While Teaching: HCI Technique for Enhanced 
Learning. Advances in Human-Computer Interaction 2011, 1–15. 
CHARTRAND, T.L. AND BARGH, J. A. 1996. Automatic activation of impression formation and 
memorization goals: Nonconscious goal priming reproduces effects of explicit task 
instructions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71, 3, 464–478. 
CHEESMAN, J. AND MERIKLE, P.M. 1984. Priming with and without awareness. Perception & 
psychophysics 36, 4, 387–395. 
CHEN, F.X., KING, A.C., AND HEKLER, E.B. 2014. “Healthifying” Exergames: Improving Health Outcomes 
Through Intentional Priming. CHI ’14, ACM, 1855–1864. 
CHOE, E.K., LEE, N.B., LEE, B., PRATT, W., AND KIENTZ, J.A. 2014. Understanding quantified-selfers’ 
practices in collecting and exploring personal data. CHI ’14, ACM, 1143–1152. 
 
| P 9:206 
 
CHURCHES, O., NICHOLLS, M., THIESSEN, M., KOHLER, M., AND KEAGE, H. 2014. Emoticons in mind: An event-
related potential study. Social Neuroscience 9, 2, 196–202. 
CIBRIAN, F.L., TENTORI, M., AND MARTÍNEZ-GARCÍA, A.I. 2016. Hunting Relics: A Persuasive Exergame to 
Promote Collective Exercise in Young Children. International Journal of Human-Computer 
Interaction 32, 3, 277–294. 
CLARK, B.K., SUGIYAMA, T., HEALY, G.N., SALMON, J., DUNSTAN, D.W., AND OWEN, N. 2009. Validity and 
reliability of measures of television viewing time and other non‐occupational sedentary 
behaviour of adults: a review. Obesity reviews 10, 1, 7–16. 
CLARK, N. AND JANEVIC, M.R. 2014. Individual theories. In: K.A. Riekert, J.K. Ockene and L. Pbert, eds., 
The handbook for health behavior change. 3–26. 
CLAWSON, J., PATER, J.A., MILLER, A.D., MYNATT, E.D., AND MAMYKINA, L. No Longer Wearing: Investigating 
the Abandonment of Personal Health-Tracking Technologies on Craigslist. UbiComp ’15. 
COLBERT, L.H. AND SCHOELLER, D.A. 2011. Expending our physical activity (measurement) budget wisely. 
Journal of applied physiology 111, 2, 606–607. 
COLIN CAMERON, A. AND WINDMEIJER, F.A.G. 1997. An R-squared measure of goodness of fit for some 
common nonlinear regression models. Journal of Econometrics 77, 2, 329–342. 
COMBER, R. AND THIEME, A. 2013. Designing Beyond Habit: Opening Space for Improved Recycling and 
Food Waste Behaviors Through Processes of Persuasion, Social Influence and Aversive Affect. 
Personal Ubiquitous Computing 17, 6, 1197–1210. 
CONROY, D.E., MAHER, J.P., ELAVSKY, S., HYDE, A.L., AND DOERKSEN, S.E. 2013. Sedentary behavior as a daily 
process regulated by habits and intentions. Health psychology : official journal of the Division 
of Health Psychology, American Psychological Association 32, 11, 1149–57. 
CONROY, D.E., YANG, C.-H., AND MAHER, J.P. 2014. Behavior Change Techniques in Top-Ranked Mobile 
Apps for Physical Activity. American Journal of Preventive Medicine 46, 6, 649–652. 
CONSOLVO, S., KLASNJA, P., MCDONALD, D.W., ET AL. 2008. Flowers or a robot army?: encouraging 
awareness & activity with personal, mobile displays. UbiComp ’08, ACM, 54–63. 
CONSOLVO, S., KLASNJA, P., MCDONALD, D.W., AND LANDAY, J.A. 2009a. Goal-setting considerations for 
persuasive technologies that encourage physical activity. Persuasive ’09, ACM, 8:1–8:8. 
CONSOLVO, S., MCDONALD, D.W., AND LANDAY, J.A. 2009b. Theory-driven design strategies for 
technologies that support behavior change in everyday life. CHI ’09, ACM, 405–414. 
CORNELL. 2016. Subliminal Perception Manual. http://www.csic.cornell.edu/201/subliminal/#appB. 
COULDRY, N. AND TUROW, J. 2014. Big Data, Big Questions| Advertising, Big Data and the Clearance of 
the Public Realm: Marketers’ New Approaches to the Content Subsidy. International Journal 
of Communication 8, 0. 
COWAN, B.R., BOWERS, C.P., BEALE, R., AND PINDER, C. 2013. The Stroppy Kettle: An Intervention to Break 
Energy Consumption Habits. CHI ’13 Extended Abstracts, ACM. 
 
| P 9:207 
 
COWAN, N. 1988. Evolving conceptions of memory storage, selective attention, and their mutual 
constraints within the human information-processing system. Psychological bulletin 104, 2, 
163. 
COWAN, N. 2010. The Magical Mystery Four: How Is Working Memory Capacity Limited, and Why? 
Current Directions in Psychological Science 19, 1, 51–57. 
COX, A.L., GOULD, S.J.J., CECCHINATO, M.E., IACOVIDES, I., AND RENFREE, I. 2016. Design Frictions for Mindful 
Interactions: The Case for Microboundaries. CHI’16 Extended Abstracts, ACM Press, 1389–
1397. 
CRANWELL, J., BENFORD, S., HOUGHTON, R.J., GOLEMBEWSKI, M., FISCHER, J.E., AND HAGGER, M.S. 2014. 
Increasing self-regulatory energy using an Internet-based training application delivered by 
smartphone technology. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking 17, 3, 181–186. 
CRAWLEY, M.J. 2005. Statistics: An Introduction using R. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, USA. 
CREED, C., BEALE, R., AND COWAN, B. 2015. The Impact of an Embodied Agent’s Emotional Expressions 
Over Multiple Interactions. Interacting with Computers 27, 2, 172–188. 
CUSTERS, R. AND AARTS, H. 2007. In search of the nonconscious sources of goal pursuit: Accessibility and 
positive affective valence of the goal state. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43, 2, 
312–318. 
DALTON, A.N. AND SPILLER, S.A. 2012. Too Much of a Good Thing: The Benefits of Implementation 
Intentions Depend on the Number of Goals. Journal of Consumer Research 39, 3, 600–614. 
DANDENEAU, D., BALDWIN, M.W., BACCUS, J.R., SAKELLAROPOULO, M., AND PRUESSNER, J.C. 2007. Cutting 
Stress Off at the Pass : Reducing Vigilance and Responsiveness to Social Threat by 
Manipulating Attention. Journal of Personality 93, 4, 651–666. 
DANNER, U.N., AARTS, H., PAPIES, E.K., AND DE VRIES, N.K. 2011. Paving the path for habit change: 
Cognitive shielding of intentions against habit intrusion. British Journal of Health Psychology 
16, 1, 189–200. 
DANNER, U.N., AARTS, H., AND VRIES, N.K. 2008. Habit vs. intention in the prediction of future behaviour: 
The role of frequency, context stability and mental accessibility of past behaviour. British 
Journal of Social Psychology 47, 2, 245–265. 
DAVIS, J., HSIEH, Y.-H., AND LEE, H.-C. 2015a. Humans perceive flicker artifacts at 500 Hz. Scientific 
Reports 5, 7861. 
DAVIS, R., CAMPBELL, R., HILDON, Z., HOBBS, L., AND MICHIE, S. 2015b. Theories of behaviour and behaviour 
change across the social and behavioural sciences: a scoping review. Health psychology 
review 9, 3, 323–344. 
DAVIS, R.A. 2001. A cognitive-behavioral model of pathological Internet use. Computers in Human 
Behavior 17, 2, 187–195. 
DECI, E.L. AND RYAN, R.M. 2011. Self-determination theory. Handbook of theories of social psychology 
1, 416–433. 
 
| P 9:208 
 
DEHAENE, S., CHANGEUX, J.-P., NACCACHE, L., SACKUR, J., AND SERGENT, C. 2006. Conscious, preconscious, 
and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy. Trends in cognitive sciences 10, 5, 204–211. 
DENNIS, T.A. AND O’TOOLE, L.J. 2014. Mental Health on the Go: Effects of a Gamified Attention-Bias 
Modification Mobile Application in Trait-Anxious Adults. Clinical Psychological Science 2, 5, 
576–590. 
DESHON, R.P. AND LANDIS, R.S. 1997. The Dimensionality of the Hollenbeck, Williams, and Klein (1989) 
Measure of Goal Commitment on Complex Tasks. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes 70, 2, 105–116. 
VAN DEURSEN, A.J., BOLLE, C.L., HEGNER, S.M., AND KOMMERS, P.A. 2015. Modeling habitual and addictive 
smartphone behavior: The role of smartphone usage types, emotional intelligence, social 
stress, self-regulation, age, and gender. Computers in human behavior 45, 411–420. 
DEUTSCH, F.M. 1990. Status, sex, and smiling: The effect of role on smiling in men and women. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 16, 3, 531–540. 
DEUTSCH, R. AND STRACK, F. 2010. Building blocks of social behavior: reflective and impulsive processes. 
In: B. Gawronski and K. Payne, eds., Handbook of implicit social cognition: Measurement, 
theory, and applications. The Guilford Press, New York, NY, USA, 62–79. 
DEVAUL, R.W., PENTLAND,  A., AND COREY, V.R. 2003. The memory glasses: subliminal vs. overt memory 
support with imperfect information. ISWC’03, 146–153. 
DIJKSTERHUIS, A. 2004. I like myself but I don’t know why: enhancing implicit self-esteem by subliminal 
evaluative conditioning. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 86, 2, 345. 
DIJKSTERHUIS, A., AARTS, H., AND SMITH, P.K. 2005. The power of the subliminal: On subliminal 
persuasion and other potential applications. In: R.R. Hassin, J.S. Uleman and J.A. Bargh, eds., 
The new unconscious. Oxford University Press, New York, 1–51. 
DILLARD, J.P. AND SHEN, L. 2005. On the nature of reactance and its role in persuasive health 
communication. Communication Monographs 72, 2, 144–168. 
DING, X., XU, J., WANG, H., CHEN, G., THIND, H., AND ZHANG, Y. 2016. WalkMore: Promoting Walking with 
Just-in-Time Context-Aware Prompts. IEEE Wireless Health, 1–8. 
DIX, A. 2002. Beyond intention-pushing boundaries with incidental interaction. Proceedings of 
Building Bridges: Interdisciplinary Context-Sensitive Computing. 
DIX, A. 2016. Human computer interaction, foundations and new paradigms. Journal of Visual 
Languages & Computing. 
DIX, A. 2017. Gaining Power. Statistics for HCI. http://alandix.com/statistics/tag/gaining-power/. 
DIX, A., FINLAY, J., ABOWD, G.D., AND BEALE, R. 2010. Human-computer interaction. Pearson Prentice-
Hall, Harlow. 
DOLAN, P., HALLSWORTH, M., HALPERN, D., KING, D., METCALFE, R., AND VLAEV, I. 2012. Influencing 
behaviour: The mindspace way. Journal of Economic Psychology 33, 1, 264–277. 
 
| P 9:209 
 
DOSHI, A., PATRICK, K., SALLIS, J.F., AND CALFAS, K. 2003. Evaluation of physical activity web sites for use of 
behavior change theories. Annals of Behavioral Medicine 25, 2, 105–111. 
DRAINE, S.C. AND GREENWALD, A.G. 1998. Replicable unconscious semantic priming. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General 127, 3, 286. 
DRESLER, T., MÉRIAU, K., HEEKEREN, H.R., AND MEER, E. 2009. Emotional Stroop task: effect of word 
arousal and subject anxiety on emotional interference. Psychological Research 73, 3, 364–
371. 
EARP, B.D., DILL, B., HARRIS, J.L., ACKERMAN, J.M., AND BARGH, J.A. 2013. No sign of quitting: Incidental 
exposure to no-smoking signs ironically boosts cigarette-approach tendencies in smokers. 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 43, 10, 2158–2162. 
ECONOMIDES, M., GUITART-MASIP, M., KURTH-NELSON, Z., AND DOLAN, R.J. 2015. Arbitration between 
controlled and impulsive choices. NeuroImage 109, 206–216. 
EFSTRATIOU, C., LEONTIADIS, I., PICONE, M., RACHURI, K.K., MASCOLO, C., AND CROWCROFT, J. 2012. Sense and 
sensibility in a pervasive world. In: Pervasive Computing. Springer, 406–424. 
EHRENBRINK, P., HILLMANN, S., WEISS, B., AND MÖLLER, S. 2016. Psychological reactance in HCI: a method 
towards improving acceptance of devices and services. ACM Press, 478–482. 
EINSTEIN, G.O. AND MCDANIEL, M.A. 2005. Prospective memory multiple retrieval processes. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science 14, 6, 286–290. 
ELHAI, J.D., DVORAK, R.D., LEVINE, J.C., AND HALL, B.J. 2017a. Problematic smartphone use: A conceptual 
overview and systematic review of relations with anxiety and depression psychopathology. 
Journal of Affective Disorders 207, 251–259. 
ELHAI, J.D., LEVINE, J.C., DVORAK, R.D., AND HALL, B.J. 2017b. Non-social features of smartphone use are 
most related to depression, anxiety and problematic smartphone use. Computers in Human 
Behavior 69, 75–82. 
ELZE, T. AND TANNER, T.G. 2012. Temporal properties of liquid crystal displays: Implications for vision 
science experiments. PloS one 7, 9, e44048. 
ENNS, J.T. AND DI LOLLO, V. 2000. What’s new in visual masking? Trends in cognitive sciences 4, 9, 345–
352. 
ENOCK, P.M., HOFMANN, S.G., AND MCNALLY, R.J. 2014. Attention bias modification training via 
smartphone to reduce social anxiety: a randomized, controlled multi-session experiment. 
Cognitive therapy and research 38, 2, 200–216. 
EPSTEIN, D.A., CARAWAY, M., JOHNSTON, C., PING, A., FOGARTY, J., AND MUNSON, S.A. 2016. Beyond 
Abandonment to Next Steps: Understanding and Designing for Life after Personal Informatics 
Tool Use. ACM Press, 1109–1113. 
EREV, I. AND GOPHER, D. 1999. A cognitive game-theoretic analysis of attention strategies, ability, and 
incentives. In: A. Koriat and D. Gopher, eds., Attention and Performance XVII: Cognitive 
 
| P 9:210 
 
Regulation of Performance: Interaction of Theory and Applications. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 343–371. 
EVANS, J. AND FRANKISH, K. 2009. In two minds: Dual processes and beyond. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
EVANS, J.S.B. 2011. Dual-process theories of reasoning: Contemporary issues and developmental 
applications. Developmental Review 31, 2, 86–102. 
EVANS, J.S.B.T. 2008. Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. Annu. 
Rev. Psychol. 59, 255–278. 
FEREBEE, S.S. 2010. Successful Persuasive Technology for Behavior Reduction: Mapping to Fogg’s Gray 
Behavior Grid. Persuasive ’10, 70–81. 
FESTINGER, L. 1957. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press. 
FINDLATER, L., ZHANG, J., FROEHLICH, J.E., AND MOFFATT, K. 2017. Differences in Crowdsourced vs. Lab-
based Mobile and Desktop Input Performance Data. ACM Press, 6813–6824. 
FIORDELLI, M., DIVIANI, N., AND SCHULZ, P.J. 2013. Mapping mHealth research: a decade of evolution. 
Journal of medical Internet research 15, 5. 
FISHBACH, A. AND SHAH, J.Y. 2006. Self-Control in Action: Implicit Dispositions Toward Goals and Away 
From Temptations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90, 5, 820–832. 
FITBIT. 2015. Fitbit homepage. http://www.fitbit.com/uk. 
FITBIT. 2017. Fitbit. Fitbit, Inc. 
FITZGERALD, T.H.B., DOLAN, R.J., AND FRISTON, K.J. 2014. Model averaging, optimal inference, and habit 
formation. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8. 
FOGG, B. 2015. Tiny Habits. http://tinyhabits.com/. 
FOGG, B.J. 2002. Persuasive Technology: Using Computers to Change What We Think and Do. Morgan 
Kaufmann Publishers, San Francisco, CA, USA. 
FOGG, B.J. 2009a. The Behavior Grid: 35 Ways Behavior Can Change. Persuasive ’09, ACM, 42:1–42:5. 
FOGG, B.J. 2009b. A behavior model for persuasive design. Persuasive ’09, ACM, 40. 
FOGG, B.J. AND HREHA, J. 2010. Behavior Wizard: A Method for Matching Target Behaviors with 
Solutions. Persuasive ’10, 117–131. 
FÖRSTER, J., LIBERMAN, N., AND FRIEDMAN, R.S. 2007. Seven principles of goal activation: a systematic 
approach to distinguishing goal priming from priming of non-goal constructs. Personality and 
social psychology review 11, 3, 211–33. 
FOSTER, D., LINEHAN, C., LAWSON, S., AND KIRMAN, B. 2011. Power ballads: deploying aversive energy 
feedback in social media. CHI’11 EA, ACM, 2221–2226. 
 
| P 9:211 
 
FRITZ, T., HUANG, E.M., MURPHY, G.C., AND ZIMMERMANN, T. 2014. Persuasive technology in the real 
world: a study of long-term use of activity sensing devices for fitness. CHI ’14, ACM Press, 
487–496. 
FROEHLICH, J., FINDLATER, L., AND LANDAY, J. 2010. The design of eco-feedback technology. CHI ’10, ACM, 
1999–2008. 
GARDNER, B. 2015. A review and analysis of the use of “habit” in understanding, predicting and 
influencing health-related behaviour. Health Psychology Review 9, 3, 277–295. 
GARDNER, B., ABRAHAM, C., LALLY, P., AND DE BRUIJN, G.-J. 2012a. Towards parsimony in habit 
measurement: Testing the convergent and predictive validity of an automaticity subscale of 
the Self-Report Habit Index. International Journal of Behavioral Nutrition and Physical Activity 
9, 1, 102. 
GARDNER, B., DE BRUIJN, G.-J., AND LALLY, P. 2011. A systematic review and meta-analysis of applications 
of the Self-Report Habit Index to nutrition and physical activity behaviours. Annals of 
Behavioral Medicine 42, 2, 174–87. 
GARDNER, B., LALLY, P., AND WARDLE, J. 2012b. Making health habitual: the psychology of “habit-
formation” and general practice. The British Journal of General Practice 62, 605, 664–6. 
GÄRLING, T. AND FUJII, S. 2009. Travel behavior modification: Theories, methods, and programs. The 
expanding sphere of travel behaviour research, 97–128. 
GARTNER. 2018. Gartner Says Worldwide Device Shipments Will Increase 2.1 Percent in 2018. Gartner 
Newsroom. https://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3849063. 
GASBARRI, A., POMPILI, A., PACKARD, M.G., AND TOMAZ, C. 2014. Habit learning and memory in mammals: 
Behavioral and neural characteristics. Neurobiology of learning and memory 114, 198–208. 
GAWRONSKI, B. AND CREIGHTON, L.A. 2006. Dual-Process Theories. In: D.E. Carlston, ed., The Oxford 
handbook of social cognition. Oxford University Press, New York, NY, USA, 1–35. 
GIMPEL, G., SUDZINA, F., AND PETROVCIKOVA, K. 2016. Mobile ICT use in early adopter vs. late majority 
countries. International Journal of Mobile Communications 14, 6, 610. 
GLASER, J. AND KIHLSTROM, J.F. 2005. Compensatory automaticity: Unconscious volition is not an 
oxymoron. In: Hassin, J.S. Uleman and J.A. Bargh, eds., The new unconscious. Oxford 
University Press, 171–195. 
GOLLWITZER, P.M. 1993. Goal achievement: The role of intentions. European review of social 
psychology 4, 1, 141–185. 
GOLLWITZER, P.M. 1999. Implementation intentions: strong effects of simple plans. American 
Psychologist 54, 7, 493. 
GOLLWITZER, P.M., BAYER, U.C., AND MCCULLOCH, K.C. 2005. The control of the unwanted. The new 
unconscious, 485–515. 
 
| P 9:212 
 
GOLLWITZER, P.M. AND SHEERAN, P. 2006. Implementation intentions and goal achievement: A meta‐
analysis of effects and processes. Advances in experimental social psychology 38, 69–119. 
GOODYEAR, V.A., KERNER, C., AND QUENNERSTEDT, M. 2017. Young people’s uses of wearable healthy 
lifestyle technologies; surveillance, self-surveillance and resistance. Sport, Education and 
Society, 1–14. 
GOOGLE. 2016a. Testing Display Performance. Android Developers. 
http://developer.android.com/training/testing/performance.html. 
GOOGLE. 2016b. Testing Display Performance | Android Developers. 
http://developer.android.com/training/testing/performance.html. 
GOOGLE. 2016c. Choreographer.FrameCallback | Android Developers. 
http://developer.android.com/reference/android/view/Choreographer.FrameCallback.html. 
GOOGLE. 2017. Google Fit - Fitness Tracking. Google Inc. 
GOUVEIA, R., KARAPANOS, E., AND HASSENZAHL, M. 2015. How Do We Engage With Activity Trackers? A 
Longitudinal Study of Habito. UbiComp ’15. 
GRAY, J.S., OZER, D.J., AND ROSENTHAL, R. 2017. Goal conflict and psychological well-being: A meta-
analysis. Journal of Research in Personality 66, 27–37. 
GRAYBIEL, A.M. 2008. Habits, rituals, and the evaluative brain. Annual Review of Neuroscience 31, 
359–87. 
GREENBERG, S., BORING, S., VERMEULEN, J., AND DOSTAL, J. 2014. Dark Patterns in Proxemic Interactions: A 
Critical Perspective. DIS ’14, ACM, 523–532. 
GREENWALD, A.G. AND DRAINE, S.C. 1997. Do subliminal stimuli enter the mind unnoticed? Tests with a 
new method. In: J.D. Cohen and J.W. Schooler, eds., Scientific approaches to consciousness: 
25th Carnegie Symposium on Cognition. Psychology Press, 83–108. 
GREENWALD, A.G., DRAINE, S.C., AND ABRAMS, R.L. 1996. Three cognitive markers of unconscious 
semantic activation. Science 273, 5282, 1699–1702. 
HAGGER, M.S. AND LUSZCZYNSKA, A. 2014. Implementation intention and action planning interventions in 
health contexts: State of the research and proposals for the way forward. Applied 
Psychology: Health and Well‐Being 6, 1, 1–47. 
HAGGER, M.S., REBAR, A.L., MULLAN, B., LIPP, O.V., AND CHATZISARANTIS, N.L.D. 2015. The subjective 
experience of habit captured by self-report indexes may lead to inaccuracies in the 
measurement of habitual action. Health Psychology Review 9, 3, 296–302. 
HAM, J., MIDDEN, C., AND BEUTE, F. 2009. Can ambient persuasive technology persuade unconsciously?: 
using subliminal feedback to influence energy consumption ratings of household appliances. 
Persuasive ’09, ACM, 29:1—-29:6. 
 
| P 9:213 
 
HAM, J. AND MIDDEN, C.J.H. 2010. Ambient Persuasive Technology Needs Little Cognitive Effort: The 
Differential Effects of Cognitive Load on Lighting Feedback versus Factual Feedback. 
Persuasive ’10, 132–142. 
HAMARI, J., KOIVISTO, J., AND PAKKANEN, T. 2014. Do persuasive technologies persuade?-a review of 
empirical studies. International Conference on Persuasive Technology, Springer, 118–136. 
HANKS, A.S., JUST, D.R., SMITH, L.E., AND WANSINK, B. 2012. Healthy convenience: nudging students 
toward healthier choices in the lunchroom. Journal of public health (Oxford, England) 34, 3, 
370–6. 
HARBACH, M., DE LUCA, A., AND EGELMAN, S. 2016. The Anatomy of Smartphone Unlocking: A Field Study 
of Android Lock Screens. ACM Press, 4806–4817. 
HARDEMAN, W., JOHNSTON, M., JOHNSTON, D., BONETTI, D., WAREHAM, N., AND KINMONTH, A.L. 2002. 
Application of the Theory of Planned Behaviour in Behaviour Change Interventions: A 
Systematic Review. Psychology & Health 17, 2, 123–158. 
HARKIN, B., WEBB, T.L., CHANG, B.P.I., ET AL. 2016. Does monitoring goal progress promote goal 
attainment? A meta-analysis of the experimental evidence. Psychological Bulletin 142, 2, 
198–229. 
HARRIS, J., FELIX, L., MINERS, A., ET AL. 2011. Adaptive e-learning to improve dietary behaviour: a 
systematic review and cost-effectiveness analysis. Health Technol Assessment 15, 37. 
HASSENZAHL, M., BEU, A., AND BURMESTER, M. 2001. Engineering joy. Ieee Software 18, 1, 70–76. 
HASSIN, R.R., BARGH, J.A., AND ZIMERMAN, S. 2009. Automatic and flexible: The case of nonconscious goal 
pursuit. Social cognition 27, 1, 20–36. 
HASSINE, A.B.H. 2014. The Effect of Incidental Advertising Exposure on Online Impulse Buying. 
Handbook of Research on Effective Marketing in Contemporary Globalism, 172. 
HAUG, S., CASTRO, R.P., KWON, M., FILLER, A., KOWATSCH, T., AND SCHAUB, M.P. 2015. Smartphone use and 
smartphone addiction among young people in Switzerland. Journal of Behavioral Addictions 
4, 4, 299–307. 
HAWI, N.S. AND SAMAHA, M. 2016. To excel or not to excel: Strong evidence on the adverse effect of 
smartphone addiction on academic performance. Computers & Education 98, 81–89. 
HEITMANN, J., VAN HEMEL-RUITER, M.E., VERMEULEN, K.M., ET AL. 2017. Internet-based attentional bias 
modification training as add-on to regular treatment in alcohol and cannabis dependent 
outpatients: a study protocol of a randomized control trial. BMC Psychiatry 17, 1. 
HEKLER, E.B., KLASNJA, P., FROEHLICH, J.E., AND BUMAN, M.P. 2013. Mind the Theoretical Gap: Interpreting, 
Using, and Developing Behavioral Theory in HCI Research. CHI ’13, ACM, 3307–3316. 
HERTEL, P.T. AND MATHEWS, A. 2011. Cognitive Bias Modification: Past Perspectives, Current Findings, 
and Future Applications. Perspectives on Psychological Science 6, 6, 521–536. 
 
| P 9:214 
 
HILLSDON, M., THOROGOOD, M., WHITE, I., AND FOSTER, CHARLIE. 2002. Advising people to take more 
exercise is ineffective: a randomized controlled trial of physical activity promotion in primary 
care. International Journal of Epidemiology 31, 4, 808–815. 
HINTZE, D., FINDLING, R.D., MUAAZ, M., SCHOLZ, S., AND MAYRHOFER, R. 2014. Diversity in locked and 
unlocked mobile device usage. UbiComp ’14 Adjunct, ACM, 379–384. 
HOFMANN, W., FRIESE, M., AND STRACK, F. 2009. Impulse and self-control from a dual-systems 
perspective. Perspectives on Psychological Science 4, 2, 162–176. 
HOFMANN, W., FRIESE, M., AND WIERS, R.W. 2008. Impulsive versus reflective influences on health 
behavior: a theoretical framework and empirical review. Health Psychology Review 2, 2, 111–
137. 
HOLLANDS, G.J., MARTEAU, T.M., AND FLETCHER, P.C. 2016. Non-conscious processes in changing health-
related behaviour: a conceptual analysis and framework. Health Psychology Review, 1–14. 
HOLLANDS, G.J., SHEMILT, I., MARTEAU, T.M., ET AL. 2013. Altering micro-environments to change 
population health behaviour: towards an evidence base for choice architecture 
interventions. BMC Public Health 13, 1, 1–6. 
HOLLENBECK, J.R., WILLIAMS, C.R., AND KLEIN, H.J. 1989. An Empirical Examination of the Antecedents of 
Commitment to Difficult Goals. Journal of Applied Psychology 74, 1, 18–23. 
HOLLIS, V., KONRAD, A., AND WHITTAKER, S. 2015. Change of Heart: Emotion Tracking to Promote 
Behavior Change. CHI ’15, ACM, 2643–2652. 
HONKA, A., KAIPAINEN, K., HIETALA, H., AND SARANUMMI, N. 2011. Rethinking health: ICT-enabled services 
to empower people to manage their health. Biomedical Engineering, IEEE Reviews in 4, 119–
139. 
HORNBÆK, K. 2011. Some whys and hows of experiments in Human–Computer Interaction. Human–
Computer Interaction 5, 4, 299–373. 
HULL, J.G., SLONE, L.B., METEYER, K.B., AND MATTHEWS, A.R. 2002. The nonconsciousness of self-
consciousness. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 83, 2, 406. 
IF THIS THEN THAT. 2012. IFTTT Blog - One million tasks created. 
http://blog.ifttt.com/post/22129854971/one-million-tasks-created. 
IF THIS THEN THAT. 2015. IFTTT homepage. https://ifttt.com/. 
IJSSELSTEIJN, W., DE KORT, Y., MIDDEN, C., EGGEN, B., AND VAN DEN HOVEN, E. 2006. Persuasive technology 
for human well-being: Setting the scene. Persuasive ’06, 1–5. 
IPSOS. 2015. Ipsos MediaCT Tech Tracker Q1 2015. . 
ISUBLIMINAL. 2015. iSubliminal iOS app. https://itunes.apple.com/GB/app/id556517357. 
JACKSON, T. 2005. Motivating Sustainable Consumption:  a review of evidence on consumer  behaviour 
and behavioural change. . 
 
| P 9:215 
 
JAEGER, T.F. 2008. Categorical data analysis: Away from ANOVAs (transformation or not) and towards 
logit mixed models. Journal of memory and language 59, 4, 434–446. 
JAKICIC, J.M., DAVIS, K.K., ROGERS, R.J., ET AL. 2016. Effect of Wearable Technology Combined With a 
Lifestyle Intervention on Long-term Weight Loss: The IDEA Randomized Clinical Trial. JAMA 
316, 11, 1161. 
JAWBONE. 2015. Jawbone homepage. https://jawbone.com/. 
JEPSON, R., PLATT, S., AND COX, J. 2006. A review of the effectiveness of interventions, approaches and 
models at individual, community and population level that are aimed at changing health 
outcomes through changing knowledge, attitudes and behaviour. Cancer Care Research 
Centre , University of Stirling; Alliance for Self Care Research, University of Abertay. 
JUDD, C.M., WESTFALL, J., AND KENNY, D.A. 2012. Treating stimuli as a random factor in social 
psychology: A new and comprehensive solution to a pervasive but largely ignored problem. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 103, 1, 54–69. 
KAHNEMAN, D. 2003. A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality. American 
psychologist 58, 9, 697. 
KAHNEMAN, D. 2011. Thinking, Fast and SLow. Macmillan. 
KAHNEMAN, D. AND TVERSKY, A. 2000. Choices, values, and frames. Cambridge University Press. 
KAKOSCHKE, N., KEMPS, E., AND TIGGEMANN, M. 2014. Attentional bias modification encourages healthy 
eating. Eating behaviors 15, 1, 120–124. 
KALNIKAITE, V., ROGERS, Y., BIRD, J., ET AL. 2011. How to nudge in Situ: designing lambent devices to 
deliver salient information in supermarkets. UbiComp ’11, ACM, 11–20. 
KEATLEY, D., CLARKE, D.D., AND HAGGER, M.S. 2013. The predictive validity of implicit measures of self-
determined motivation across health-related behaviours: British Journal of Health Psychology 
18, 1, 2–17. 
KEENEY, R.L. 2008. Personal Decisions Are the Leading Cause of Death. Operations Research 56, 6, 
1335–1347. 
KELLEY, C., LEE, B., AND WILCOX, L. 2017. Self-tracking for Mental Wellness: Understanding Expert 
Perspectives and Student Experiences. CHI’17, ACM, 629–641. 
KELLY, M.P. AND BARKER, M. 2016. Why is changing health-related behaviour so difficult? Public health 
136, 109–116. 
KENNEDY, P., LUDE, P., ELFSTRÖM, M., AND COX, A. 2013. Perceptions of Gain Following Spinal Cord Injury: 
A Qualitative Analysis. Topics in Spinal Cord Injury Rehabilitation 19, 3, 202–210. 
KENNEDY, R. AND NORTHOVER, H. 2016. How to Use Neuromeasures to Make Better Advertising 
Decisions: Questions Practitioners Should Ask Vendors and Research Priorities for Scholars. 
Journal of Advertising Research 56, 2, 183. 
 
| P 9:216 
 
KESSLER, K., BIERMANN-RUBEN, K., JONAS, M., ET AL. 2006. Investigating the human mirror neuron system 
by means of cortical synchronization during the imitation of biological movements. 
NeuroImage 33, 1, 227–38. 
KHAN, D., ANANTHANARAYAN, S., LE, A., SCHAEFBAUER, C., AND SIEK, K. 2012. Designing Mobile Snack 
Application for Low Socioeconomic Status Families. Pervasive Health, IEEE, 57–64. 
KHOT, R.A., LEE, J., AGGARWAL, D., HJORTH, L., AND MUELLER, F. “FLOYD.” 2015. TastyBeats: Designing 
Palatable Representations of Physical Activity. CHI’15, ACM, 2933–2942. 
KHUSHABA, R.N., WISE, C., KODAGODA, S., LOUVIERE, J., KAHN, B.E., AND TOWNSEND, C. 2013. Consumer 
neuroscience: Assessing the brain response to marketing stimuli using electroencephalogram 
(EEG) and eye tracking. Expert Systems with Applications 40, 9, 3803–3812. 
KIHLSTROM, J.F., DORFMAN, J., AND PARK, L. 2007. Implicit and explicit memory and learning. In: The 
Blackwell companion to consciousness. Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA. 
KIM, J., PARK, J., AND LEE, U. 2016. EcoMeal: A Smart Tray for Promoting Healthy Dietary Habits. CHI ’16 
EA, ACM Press, 2165–2170. 
KIM, Y., HEO, E., LEE, H., ET AL. 2017a. Prescribing 10,000 Steps Like Aspirin: Designing a Novel Interface 
for Data-Driven Medical Consultations. Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Conference on Human 
Factors in Computing Systems, ACM, 5787–5799. 
KIM, Y.-H., JEON, J.H., LEE, B., CHOE, E.K., AND SEO, J. 2017b. OmniTrack: A Flexible Self-Tracking 
Approach Leveraging Semi-Automated Tracking. Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, 
Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies 1, 3, 67. 
KIRMAN, B., LINEHAN, C., LAWSON, S., FOSTER, D., AND DOUGHTY, M. 2010. There’s a monster in my kitchen: 
using aversive feedback to motivate behaviour change. CHI ’10 EA, ACM, 2685–2694. 
KLASNJA, P., CONSOLVO, S., AND PRATT, W. 2011. How to Evaluate Technologies for Health Behavior 
Change in HCI Research. CHI ’11, 3063–3072. 
KLASNJA, P., HEKLER, E.B., SHIFFMAN, S., ET AL. 2015. Microrandomized trials: An experimental design for 
developing just-in-time adaptive interventions. Health Psychology 34, Suppl, 1220–1228. 
KLASNJA, P. AND PRATT, W. 2012. Healthcare in the pocket: mapping the space of mobile-phone health 
interventions. Journal of biomedical informatics 45, 1, 184–198. 
KLÖCKNER, C.A. 2013. A comprehensive model of the psychology of environmental behaviour - A 
meta-analysis. Global Environmental Change 23, 5, 1028–1038. 
KNÄUPER, B., MCCOLLAM, A., ROSEN-BROWN, A., LACAILLE, J., KELSO, E., AND ROSEMAN, M. 2011. Fruitful 
plans: Adding targeted mental imagery to Implementation Intentions increases fruit 
consumption. Psychology & Health 26, 5, 601–617. 
KONRAD, A., BELLOTTI, V., CRENSHAW, N., ET AL. 2015. Finding the Adaptive Sweet Spot: Balancing 
Compliance and Achievement in Automated Stress Reduction. CHI’15, ACM, 3829–3838. 
 
| P 9:217 
 
KREMERS, S.P., DE BRUIJN, G.-J., VISSCHER, T.L., VAN MECHELEN, W., DE VRIES, N.K., AND BRUG, J. 2006. 
Environmental influences on energy balance-related behaviors: A dual-process view. 
International Journal of Behavioral Nutrition and Physical Activity 3, 1, 9. 
KREMERS, S.P., EVES, F.F., AND ANDERSEN, R.E. 2012. Environmental changes to promote physical activity 
and healthy dietary behavior. Journal of environmental and public health 2012. 
KUNST-WILSON, W.R. AND ZAJONC, R.B. 1980. Affective Discrimination of Stimuli that cannot be 
Recognized. Science 207, 4430, 557–558. 
KUSS, D., HARKIN, L., KANJO, E., AND BILLIEUX, J. 2018. Problematic Smartphone Use: Investigating 
Contemporary Experiences Using a Convergent Design. International Journal of 
Environmental Research and Public Health 15, 1, 142. 
KUZNETSOVA, A., BROCKHOFF, P.B., AND CHRISTENSEN, R.H.B. Tests in Linear Mixed Effects Models [R 
package lmerTest version 2.0-33]. . 
KWON, M., KIM, D.-J., CHO, H., AND YANG, S. 2013. The smartphone addiction scale: development and 
validation of a short version for adolescents. PloS one 8, 12, e83558. 
LALLY, P., CHIPPERFIELD, A., AND WARDLE, J. 2008. Healthy habits: efficacy of simple advice on weight 
control based on a habit-formation model. International journal of obesity 32, 4, 700–707. 
LALLY, P. AND GARDNER, B. 2013. Promoting habit formation. Health Psychology Review 7 (sup 1), S137–
S158. 
LALLY, P., VAN JAARSVELD, C.H.M., POTTS, H.W.W., AND WARDLE, J. 2010. How are habits formed: 
Modelling habit formation in the real world. European Journal of Social Psychology 40, 6, 
998–1009. 
LALLY, P., WARDLE, J., AND GARDNER, B. 2011. Experiences of habit formation: A qualitative study. 
Psychology, health & medicine 16, 4, 484–489. 
LARSON-HALL, J. 2016. A guide to doing statistics in second language research using SPSS and R. . 
LASCHKE, M., HASSENZAHL, M., DIEFENBACH, S., AND TIPPKÄMPER, M. 2011. With a little help from a friend: a 
shower calendar to save water. CHI ’11 Extended Abstracts, ACM, 633–646. 
LATHAM, G.P., BRCIC, J., AND STEINHAUER, A. 2017. Toward an Integration of Goal Setting Theory and the 
Automaticity Model: Goal difficulty, effort and choice. Applied Psychology 66, 1, 25–48. 
LATHIA, N., PEJOVIC, V., RACHURI, K.K., MASCOLO, C., MUSOLESI, M., AND RENTFROW, P.J. 2013. Smartphones 
for large-scale behavior change interventions. IEEE Pervasive Computing 3, 66–73. 
LAWRENCE, N.S., O’SULLIVAN, J., PARSLOW, D., ET AL. 2015. Training response inhibition to food is 
associated with weight loss and reduced energy intake. Appetite 95, 17–28. 
LE LABORATOIRE. 2015. The Olfactive Project | Le Laboratoire. 
http://www.lelaboratoire.org/en/archives-16.php. 
 
| P 9:218 
 
LEDGER, D. AND MCCAFFREY, D. 2014. Inside wearables: how the science of human behavior change 
offers the secret to long-term engagement. Endeavour Partners. 
LEE, J., KIM, S., AND HAM, C.-D. 2016. A Double-Edged Sword? Predicting Consumers Attitudes Toward 
and Sharing Intention of Native Advertising on Social Media. American Behavioral Scientist 
60, 12, 1425–1441. 
LEE, J., WALKER, E., BURLESON, W., AND HEKLER, E.B. 2014. Programming tool of context-aware 
applications for behavior change. UbiComp’14 Adjunct, ACM, 91–94. 
LEE, J., WALKER, E., BURLESON, W., KAY, M., BUMAN, M., AND HEKLER, E.B. 2017a. Self-Experimentation for 
Behavior Change: Design and Formative Evaluation of Two Approaches. CHI ’17, ACM Press, 
6837–6849. 
LEE, J., WALKER, E., BURLESON, W., KAY, M., BUMAN, M., AND HEKLER, E.B. 2017b. Self-Experimentation for 
Behavior Change: Design and Formative Evaluation of Two Approaches. CHI ’17, ACM Press, 
6837–6849. 
LEE, M., KIESLER, S., AND FORLIZZI, J. 2011. Mining behavioral economics to design persuasive technology 
for healthy choices. CHI’11, 325–334. 
LEE, M.R., BOJANOVA, I., AND SUDER, T. 2015. The New Wearable Computing Frontier. IT Professional 17, 
5, 16–19. 
LENTH, R.V. 2016. Least-Squares Means: The R Package lsmeans. Journal of Statistical Software 69, 1, 
1–33. 
LI, I., DEY, A.K., AND FORLIZZI, J. 2012. Using context to reveal factors that affect physical activity. ACM 
Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction (TOCHI) 19, 1, 7. 
LIDDELL, B.J., BROWN, K.J., KEMP, A.H., ET AL. 2005. A direct brainstem–amygdala–cortical ‘alarm’system 
for subliminal signals of fear. Neuroimage 24, 1, 235–243. 
LIMAYEM, M., HIRT, S.G., AND CHEUNG, C.M. 2007. How habit limits the predictive power of intention: 
The case of information systems continuance. MIS quarterly, 705–737. 
LIN, J.J., MAMYKINA, L., LINDTNER, S., DELAJOUX, G., AND STRUB, H.B. 2006. Fish’n’Steps: Encouraging 
physical activity with an interactive computer game. UbiComp 2006, Springer, 261–278. 
LIN, M., LANE, N.D., MOHAMMOD, M., ET AL. 2012. BeWell+: multi-dimensional wellbeing monitoring 
with community-guided user feedback and energy optimization. Proceedings of the 
conference on Wireless Health, ACM, 10. 
LO, S. AND ANDREWS, S. 2015. To transform or not to transform: using generalized linear mixed models 
to analyse reaction time data. Frontiers in Psychology 6. 
LOCKE, E.A. 1996. Motivation through conscious goal setting. Applied and preventive psychology 5, 2, 
117–124. 
LOCKE, E.A. AND LATHAM, G.P. 1990. A theory of goal setting & task performance. Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
 
| P 9:219 
 
LOCKE, E.A. AND LATHAM, G.P. 2002. Building a practically useful theory of goal setting and task 
motivation: A 35-year odyssey. American Psychologist 57, 9, 705. 
LOCKE, E.A. AND LATHAM, G.P. 2006. New Directions in Goal-Setting Theory. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science 15, 5, 265–268. 
LOCKTON, D., HARRISON, D., AND STANTON, N.A. 2010. Design with intent: 101 patterns for influencing 
behaviour through design. Equifine. 
LOIZOU, G. AND KARAGEORGHIS, C.I. 2015. Effects of psychological priming, video, and music on 
anaerobic exercise performance. Scandinavian Journal of Medicine & Science in Sports 25, 6, 
909–920. 
LOMAS, J.D., KOEDINGER, K., PATEL, N., SHODHAN, S., POONWALA, N., AND FORLIZZI, J.L. 2017. Is Difficulty 
Overrated?: The Effects of Choice, Novelty and Suspense on Intrinsic Motivation in 
Educational Games. ACM Press, 1028–1039. 
LUMLEY, J., CHAMBERLAIN, C., DOWSWELL, T., OLIVER, S., OAKLEY, L., AND WATSON, L. 2009. Interventions for 
promoting smoking cessation during pregnancy. Cochrane Database Syst Rev 3. 
MA, D.S., CORRELL, J., AND WITTENBRINK, B. 2015. The Chicago face database: A free stimulus set of faces 
and norming data. Behavior research methods 47, 4, 1122–1135. 
MACLEOD, C., KOSTER, E.H.W., FOX, E., AND OTHERS. 2009. Whither cognitive bias modification research? 
Commentary on the special section articles. Journal of abnormal psychology 118, 1, 89. 
MACMILLAN, N.A. 1986. The psychophysics of subliminal perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9, 
01, 38–39. 
MAGARAGGIA, C., DIMMOCK, J., AND JACKSON, B. 2014. Motivational priming as a strategy for maximising 
exercise outcomes: effects on exercise goals and engagement. Journal of Sports Sciences 32, 
9, 826–835. 
MAIA, T.V. 2009. Reinforcement learning, conditioning, and the brain: Successes and challenges. 
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience 9, 4, 343–364. 
MARÉCHAL, N. 2016. When Bots Tweet: Toward a Normative Framework for Bots on Social Networking 
Sites. International Journal of Communication 10, 10. 
MARSHALL, P., MORRIS, R., ROGERS, Y., KREITMAYER, S., AND DAVIES, M. 2011. Rethinking’multi-user’: an in-
the-wild study of how groups approach a walk-up-and-use tabletop interface. Proceedings of 
the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, ACM, 3033–3042. 
MARSHALL, S. AND BIDDLE, S. 2001. The transtheoretical model of behavior change: a meta-analysis of 
applications to physical activity and exercise. Annals of Behavioral Medicine 23, 4, 229–246. 
MARTEAU, T.M., HOLLANDS, G.J., AND FLETCHER, P.C. 2012. Changing human behavior to prevent disease: 
the importance of targeting automatic processes. Science (New York, N.Y.) 337, 6101, 1492–
5. 
 
| P 9:220 
 
MARTIN, C.A., RIVERA, D.E., RILEY, W.T., ET AL. 2014. A dynamical systems model of social cognitive 
theory. American Control Conference (ACC), 2014, IEEE, 2407–2412. 
MCDONALD, S., QUINN, F., VIEIRA, R., ET AL. 2017. The state of the art and future opportunities for using 
longitudinal n-of-1 methods in health behaviour research: a systematic literature overview. 
Health Psychology Review, 1–17. 
MEGABIT. 2015. Subliminal Messages Lite. 
https://play.google.com/store/apps/developer?id=Subliminal+Affirmations+LLC. 
MEHROTRA, A., PEJOVIC, V., VERMEULEN, J., HENDLEY, R., AND MUSOLESI, M. 2016. My Phone and Me: 
Understanding People’s Receptivity to Mobile Notifications. 2016 ACM International 
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. 
MEINLSCHMIDT, G., LEE, J.-H., STALUJANIS, E., ET AL. 2016. Smartphone-Based Psychotherapeutic Micro-
Interventions to Improve Mood in a Real-World Setting. Frontiers in Psychology 7. 
MENEGUZZO, P., TSAKIRIS, M., SCHIOTH, H.B., STEIN, D.J., AND BROOKS, S.J. 2014. Subliminal versus 
supraliminal stimuli activate neural responses in anterior cingulate cortex, fusiform gyrus and 
insula: a meta-analysis of fMRI studies. BMC psychology 2, 1, 1. 
MENTAL MINT. 2015a. Quit Smoking With Cognitive Bias Modification App. 
http://www.mentalmint.com/apps/quit-smoking-with-cognitive-bias-modification-app/. 
MENTAL MINT. 2015b. CBM Diet App - Develop Cravings for Healthy Food. 
http://www.mentalmint.com/apps/cbm-diet-app/. 
MENTIS, H.M., KOMLODI, A., SCHRADER, K., ET AL. 2017. Crafting a View of Self-Tracking Data in the 
Clinical Visit. Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing 
Systems, ACM, 5800–5812. 
MERIKLE, P.M., SMILEK, D., AND EASTWOOD, J.D. 2001. Perception without awareness: Perspectives from 
cognitive psychology. Cognition 79, 1, 115–134. 
METCALFE, J. AND MISCHEL, W. 1999. A hot/cool-system analysis of delay of gratification: dynamics of 
willpower. Psychological review 106, 1, 3. 
MEYER, J., SIMSKE, S., SIEK, K.A., GURRIN, C.G., AND HERMENS, H. 2014. Beyond quantified self: data for 
wellbeing. ACM Press, 95–98. 
MICHIE, S., ATKINS, L., AND WEST, R. 2014a. The behaviour change wheel: a guide to designing 
interventions. Silverback Publishing. 
MICHIE, S. AND PRESTWICH, A. 2010. Are interventions theory-based? Development of a theory coding 
scheme. Health Psychology 29, 1, 1–8. 
MICHIE, S., RICHARDSON, M., JOHNSTON, M., ET AL. 2013a. The behavior change technique taxonomy (v1) 
of 93 hierarchically clustered techniques: building an international consensus for the 
reporting of behavior change interventions. Annals of behavioral medicine 46, 1, 81–95. 
 
| P 9:221 
 
MICHIE, S., VAN STRALEN, M.M., AND WEST, R. 2011. The behaviour change wheel: A new method for 
characterising and designing behaviour change interventions. Implementation science : IS 6, 
1, 42. 
MICHIE, S., WEST, R., CAMPBELL, R., BROWN, J., AND GAINFORTH, H. 2014b. ABC of behaviour change 
theories. Silverback Publishing, London. 
MICHIE, S., WEST, R., AND SPRING, B. 2013b. Moving from theory to practice and back in social and 
health psychology. Health Psychology 32, 5, 581–585. 
MIDDELWEERD, A., MOLLEE, J.S., VAN DER WAL, C.N., BRUG, J., AND TE VELDE, S.J. 2014. Apps to promote 
physical activity among adults: a review and content analysis. International Journal of 
Behavioral Nutrition and Physical Activity 11, 1. 
MILES, E., SHEERAN, P., BAIRD, H., MACDONALD, I., WEBB, T.L., AND HARRIS, P.R. 2016. Does self-control 
improve with practice? Evidence from a six-week training program. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General 145, 8, 1075–1091. 
MILNE, S., ORBELL, S., AND SHEERAN, P. 2002. Combining motivational and volitional interventions to 
promote exercise participation: Protection motivation theory and Implementation 
Intentions. British journal of health psychology 7, 2, 163–184. 
MOLLER, A.C., MERCHANT, G., CONROY, D.E., ET AL. 2017. Applying and advancing behavior change 
theories and techniques in the context of a digital health revolution: proposals for more 
effectively realizing untapped potential. Journal of Behavioral Medicine 40, 1, 85–98. 
MONAHAN, J.L., MURPHY, S.T., AND ZAJONC, R.B. 2000. Subliminal mere exposure: Specific, general, and 
diffuse effects. Psychological Science 11, 6, 462–466. 
MOODY, G.D. AND SIPONEN, M. 2013. Using the theory of interpersonal behavior to explain non-work-
related personal use of the Internet at work. Information & Management 50, 6, 322–335. 
MOORE, T.E. 1988. The case against subliminal manipulation. Psychology and Marketing 5, 4, 297–
316. 
MUNSON, S.A. AND CONSOLVO, S. 2012. Exploring goal-setting, rewards, self-monitoring, and sharing to 
motivate physical activity. PervasiveHealth, IEEE, 25–32. 
MUNSON, S.A., KRUPKA, E., RICHARDSON, C., AND RESNICK, P. 2015. Effects of Public Commitments and 
Accountability in a Technology-Supported Physical Activity Intervention. CHI’15, ACM, 1135–
1144. 
MURAVEN, M. 2010. Practicing self-control lowers the risk of smoking lapse. Psychology of Addictive 
Behaviors 24, 3, 446–52. 
MURAVEN, M. AND BAUMEISTER, R.F. 2000. Self-regulation and depletion of limited resources: Does self-
control resemble a muscle? Psychological Bulletin 126, 2, 247. 
MURPHY, S.T. AND ZAJONC, R.B. 1993. Affect, cognition, and awareness: affective priming with optimal 
and suboptimal stimulus exposures. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 64, 5, 723. 
 
| P 9:222 
 
NACCACHE, L. AND DEHAENE, S. 2001. Unconscious semantic priming extends to novel unseen stimuli. 
Cognition 80, 3, 215–229. 
NAGELKERKE, N.J. 1991. A note on a general definition of the coefficient of determination. Biometrika 
78, 3, 691–692. 
NAKAGAWA, S. AND SCHIELZETH, H. 2013. A general and simple method for obtaining R2 from generalized 
linear mixed-effects models. Methods in Ecology and Evolution 4, 2, 133–142. 
NEAL, D.T., WOOD, W., AND DROLET, A. 2013. How do people adhere to goals when willpower is low? 
The profits (and pitfalls) of strong habits. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 104, 6, 
959. 
NEAL, D.T., WOOD, W., LABRECQUE, J.S., AND LALLY, P. 2012. How do habits guide behavior? Perceived 
and actual triggers of habits in daily life. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48, 2, 
492–498. 
NEAL, D.T., WOOD, W., AND QUINN, J.M. 2006. Habits—A repeat performance. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science 15, 4, 198–202. 
NEGRI, P., GAMBERINI, L., AND CUTINI, S. 2014. A Review of the Research on Subliminal Techniques for 
Implicit Interaction in Symbiotic Systems. In: Symbiotic Interaction. Springer, 47–58. 
NICHOLLS, J. 2012. Everyday, everywhere: alcohol marketing and social media—current trends. Alcohol 
and Alcoholism 47, 4, 486–493. 
NIKE+. 2013. Fuelband homepage. http://www.nike.com/gb/en_gb/c/nikeplus-fuelband. 
NILSEN, P. 2015. Making sense of implementation theories, models and frameworks. Implementation 
Science 10, 1. 
NILSEN, P., ROBACK, K., BROSTRÖM, A., AND ELLSTRÖM, P.-E. 2012. Creatures of habit: accounting for the 
role of habit in implementation research on clinical behaviour change. Implement Sci 7, 53, 
1–6. 
NIRJON, S., DICKERSON, R.F., LI, Q., ET AL. 2012. Musicalheart: A hearty way of listening to music. SenSys 
’12, ACM, 43–56. 
NOAR, S.M., CHABOT, M., AND ZIMMERMAN, R.S. 2008. Applying health behavior theory to multiple 
behavior change: Considerations and approaches. Preventive Medicine 46, 3, 275–280. 
NORMAN, D.A. AND SHALLICE, T. 1986. Attention to action. Springer. 
OBRIST, M., COMBER, R., SUBRAMANIAN, S., PIQUERAS-FISZMAN, B., VELASCO, C., AND SPENCE, C. 2014. 
Temporal, affective, and embodied characteristics of taste experiences: A framework for 
design. CHI’14, ACM, 2853–2862. 
OCAMPO, B. 2015. Unconscious manipulation of free choice by novel primes. Consciousness and 
cognition 34, 4–9. 
 
| P 9:223 
 
ODUOR, M., ALAHÄIVÄLÄ, T., AND OINAS-KUKKONEN, H. 2014. Persuasive Software Design Patterns for 
Social Influence. Personal Ubiquitous Comput. 18, 7, 1689–1704. 
OLANDER, E.K., FLETCHER, H., WILLIAMS, S., ATKINSON, L., TURNER, A., AND FRENCH, D.P. 2013. What are the 
most effective techniques in changing obese individuals’ physical activity self-efficacy and 
behaviour: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Int J Behav Nutr Phys Act 10, 29, 1–15. 
OLIVER, N. AND FLORES-MANGAS, F. 2006. MPTrain: a mobile, music and physiology-based personal 
trainer. MobileHCI’06, ACM, 21–28. 
ORBELL, S. AND VERPLANKEN, B. 2010. The automatic component of habit in health behavior: habit as 
cue-contingent automaticity. Health Psychology 29, 4, 374–83. 
ORBELL, S. AND VERPLANKEN, B. 2015. The strength of habit. Health psychology review 9, 3, 311–317. 
ORDÓÑEZ, L.D., SCHWEITZER, M.E., GALINSKY, A.D., AND BAZERMAN, M.H. 2009. Goals gone wild: The 
systematic side effects of overprescribing goal setting. The Academy of Management 
Perspectives 23, 1, 6–16. 
ORJI, R. AND MOFFATT, K. 2016. Persuasive technology for health and wellness: State-of-the-art and 
emerging trends. Health Informatics Journal. 
ORJI, R., NACKE, L.E., AND DI MARCO, C. 2017. Towards Personality-driven Persuasive Health Games and 
Gamified Systems. CHI ’17, ACM Press, 1015–1027. 
OSGOOD, C.E. 1952. The nature and measurement of meaning. Psychological Bulletin 49, 3, 197. 
OULASVIRTA, A., RATTENBURY, T., MA, L., AND RAITA, E. 2012. Habits make smartphone use more 
pervasive. Personal and Ubiquitous Computing 16, 1, 105–114. 
PAAY, J., KJELDSKOV, J., SKOV, M.B., LICHON, L., AND RASMUSSEN, S. 2015. Understanding Individual 
Differences for Tailored Smoking Cessation Apps. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM 
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, ACM, 1699–1708. 
PACANOWSKI, C.R., SOBAL, J., LEVITSKY, D.A., ET AL. 2015. Does Measuring Body Weight Impact 
Subsequent Response to Eating Behavior Questions? Journal of the American College of 
Nutrition 34, 3, 199–204. 
PALFAI, T.P., MONTI, P.M., COLBY, S.M., AND ROHSENOW, D.J. 1997. Effects of suppressing the urge to 
drink on the accessibility of alcohol outcome expectancies. Behaviour Research and Therapy 
35, 1, 59–65. 
PAPIES, E.K. 2016. Health goal priming as a situated intervention tool: How to benefit from 
nonconscious motivational routes to health behavior. Health psychology review just-
accepted, 1–35. 
PARK, H. AND GWEON, G. 2015. Initiating Moderation in Problematic Smartphone Usage Patterns. 
CHI’15 Extended Abstracts, ACM, 1585–1590. 
PAVLOK. 2015. Pavlok homepage. http://pavlok.com/. 
 
| P 9:224 
 
PEJOVIC, V. AND MUSOLESI, M. 2014. InterruptMe: designing intelligent prompting mechanisms for 
pervasive applications. UbiComp ’14, ACM, 897–908. 
PEJOVIC, V. AND MUSOLESI, M. 2015. Anticipatory mobile computing: A survey of the state of the art and 
research challenges. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) 47, 3, 47. 
PELS, T., KAO, C., AND GOEL, S. 2014. FatBelt: motivating behavior change through isomorphic feedback. 
UIST’14 Adjunct, ACM, 123–124. 
PESSIGLIONE, M., SCHMIDT, L., DRAGANSKI, B., ET AL. 2007. How the brain translates money into force: a 
neuroimaging study of subliminal motivation. Science 316, 5826, 904–906. 
PETERS, G.-J.Y., RUITER, R.A.C., AND KOK, G. 2013. Threatening communication: a critical re-analysis and 
a revised meta-analytic test of fear appeal theory. Health Psychology Review 7, sup1, S8–S31. 
PETTIGREW, S., JONGENELIS, M., QUESTER, P., CHAPMAN, K., AND MILLER, C. 2015. Dimensions of parents’ 
attitudes to unhealthy foods and beverages. Food Quality and Preference 44, 179–182. 
PFLEGING, B., HENZE, N., SCHMIDT, A., RAU, D., AND REITSCHUSTER, B. 2013. Influence of subliminal cueing 
on visual search tasks. CHI’13 EA, ACM, 1269–1274. 
PHAF, R.H. AND KAN, K.-J. 2007. The automaticity of emotional Stroop: A meta-analysis. Journal of 
behavior therapy and experimental psychiatry 38, 2, 184–199. 
PHELAN, C., LAMPE, C., AND RESNICK, P. 2016. It’s Creepy, But it Doesn’t Bother Me. ACM Press, 5240–
5251. 
PIELOT, M. AND RELLO, L. 2017. Productive, anxious, lonely: 24 hours without push notifications. ACM 
Press, 1–11. 
PINDER, C., VERMEULEN, J., BEALE, R., AND HENDLEY, R. 2015a. Subliminal Priming of Nonconscious Goals 
on Smartphones. MobileHCI’15 Adjunct, ACM, 825–830. 
PINDER, C., VERMEULEN, J., BEALE, R., AND HENDLEY, R. 2015b. Exploring Nonconscious Behaviour Change 
Interventions on Mobile Devices. MobileHCI’15 Adjunct, ACM Press, 1010–1017. 
PINHEIRO, J., BATES, D., DEBROY, S., AND SARKAR, D. 2014. R Core Team (2014) nlme: linear and nonlinear 
mixed effects models. R package version 3.1-117. Available at h ttp://CRAN. R-project. 
org/package= nlme. 
PIPER, A.M., O’BRIEN, E., MORRIS, M.R., AND WINOGRAD, T. 2006. SIDES: a cooperative tabletop computer 
game for social skills development. Proceedings of the 2006 conference on computer 
supported cooperative work, 1–10. 
PIROLLI, P., MOHAN, S., VENKATAKRISHNAN, A., NELSON, L., SILVA, M., AND SPRINGER, A. 2017. Implementation 
Intention and Reminder Effects on Behavior Change in a Mobile Health System: A Predictive 
Cognitive Model. Journal of Medical Internet Research 19, 11, e397. 
PRATKANIS, A.R. 1992. The cargo-cult science of subliminal persuasion. Skeptical Inquirer 16, 3, 260–
272. 
 
| P 9:225 
 
PRESSEAU, J., JOHNSTON, M., HEPONIEMI, T., ET AL. 2014. Reflective and Automatic Processes in Health 
Care Professional Behaviour: a Dual Process Model Tested Across Multiple Behaviours. 
Annals of Behavioral Medicine 48, 3, 347–358. 
PRESTWICH, A., PERUGINI, M., AND HURLING, R. 2010. Can Implementation Intentions and text messages 
promote brisk walking? A randomized trial. Health Psychology 29, 1, 40. 
PROCHASKA, J.O. AND DICLEMENTE, C.C. 1983. Stages and processes of self-change of smoking: toward an 
integrative model of change. Journal of consulting and clinical psychology 51, 3, 390. 
PROCHASKA, J.O. AND VELICER, W.V. 1997. The transtheoretical model of health behavior change. 
American Journal of Health Promotion 12, 1, 38–48. 
PUBLIC HEALTH ENGLAND. 2017. One You Active 10 Walking Tracker. Public Health England. 
RABBI, M., AUNG, M.H., ZHANG, M., AND CHOUDHURY, T. 2015. MyBehavior: Automatic Personalized 
Health Feedback from User Behaviors and Preferences Using Smartphones. UbiComp ’15, 
ACM, 707–718. 
RABINOVITZ, S. AND NAGAR, M. 2015. Possible End to an Endless Quest? Cognitive Bias Modification for 
Excessive Multiplayer Online Gamers. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking 18, 
10, 581–587. 
RANFELT, A.M., WIGRAM, T., AND Ø M, P. 2009. Towards a handy interactive persuasive diary for 
teenagers with a diagnosis of autism. Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on 
Persuasive Technology, ACM, 3:1–3:9. 
REBAR, A.L., DIMMOCK, J.A., JACKSON, B., ET AL. 2016. A Systematic Review of the Effects of Non-
Conscious Regulatory Processes in Physical Activity. Health psychology review just-accepted, 
1–86. 
REDISH, D., JENSEN, S., JOHNSON, A., AND KURTH-NELSON, Z. 2007. Reconciling reinforcement learning 
models with behavioral extinction and renewal: implications for addiction, relapse, and 
problem gambling. Psychological review 114, 3, 784–805. 
RELLO, L. AND BAEZA-YATES, R. 2013. Good fonts for dyslexia. Proceedings of the 15th International ACM 
SIGACCESS Conference on Computers and Accessibility, ACM, 14. 
RELLO, L., PIELOT, M., MARCOS, M.-C., AND CARLINI, R. 2013. Size matters (spacing not): 18 points for a 
dyslexic-friendly Wikipedia. Proceedings of the 10th International Cross-Disciplinary 
Conference on Web Accessibility, ACM, 17. 
RENFREE, I., HARRISON, D., MARSHALL, P., STAWARZ, K., AND COX, A. 2016. Don’t Kick the Habit: The Role of 
Dependency in Habit Formation Apps. CHI’16 Extended Abstracts, ACM, 2932–2939. 
RHODES, R.E., MARK, R.S., AND TEMMEL, C.P. 2012. Adult sedentary behavior: a systematic review. 
American journal of preventive medicine 42, 3, e3–28. 
RICK, J., HARRIS, A., MARSHALL, P., FLECK, R., YUILL, N., AND ROGERS, Y. 2009. Children designing together on 
a multi-touch tabletop: an analysis of spatial orientation and user interactions. Proceedings 
of the 8th International Conference on Interaction Design and Children, ACM, 106–114. 
 
| P 9:226 
 
DE RIDDER, D.T.D., LENSVELT-MULDERS, G., FINKENAUER, C., STOK, F.M., AND BAUMEISTER, R.F. 2012. Taking 
Stock of Self-Control: A Meta-Analysis of How Trait Self-Control Relates to a Wide Range of 
Behaviors. Personality and Social Psychology Review 16, 1, 76–99. 
RIENER, A., KEMPTER, G., SAARI, T., AND REVETT, K. 2011. Subliminal Communication in Human-Computer 
Interaction. Advances in Human-Computer Interaction 2011, 1–3. 
RIENER, A. AND THALLER, H. 2014. Subliminal Visual Information to Enhance Driver Awareness and 
Induce Behavior Change. AutomotiveUI ’14, ACM, 6:1–6:9. 
RILEY, W., RIVERA, D., ATIENZA, A., NILSEN, W., ALLISON, S., AND MERMELSTEIN, R. 2011. Health behavior 
models in the age of mobile interventions: are our theories up to the task? Translational 
Behavioral Medicine 1, 1, 53–71. 
RIMER, B.K. AND GLANZ, K. 2005. Theory at a glance: a guide for health promotion practice. National 
Cancer Institute, US. 
ROBINSON, E., AVEYARD, P., DALEY, A., ET AL. 2013. Eating attentively: a systematic review and meta-
analysis of the effect of food intake memory and awareness on eating. The American journal 
of clinical nutrition, ajcn. 045245. 
ROGERS, Y. 2004. New theoretical approaches for HCI. Annual review of information science and 
technology 38, 1, 87–143. 
ROGERS, Y. 2006. Moving on from Weiser’s vision of calm computing: Engaging ubicomp experiences. 
In: UbiComp 2006. Springer, 404–421. 
ROGERS, Y., HAZLEWOOD, W.R., MARSHALL, P., DALTON, N., AND HERTRICH, S. 2010. Ambient influence: Can 
twinkly lights lure and abstract representations trigger behavioral change? UbiComp ’10, 
ACM, 261–270. 
ROININEN, K., LÄHTEENMÄKI, L., AND TUORILA, H. 1999. Quantification of consumer attitudes to health and 
hedonic characteristics of foods. Appetite 33, 1, 71–88. 
ROININEN, K., TUORILA, H., ZANDSTRA, E.H., ET AL. 2001. Differences in health and taste attitudes and 
reported behaviour among Finnish, Dutch and British consumers: a cross-national validation 
of the Health and Taste Attitude Scales (HTAS). Appetite 37, 1, 33–45. 
ROOKSBY, J., ROST, M., MORRISON, A., AND CHALMERS, M.C. 2014. Personal tracking as lived informatics. 
ACM Press, 1163–1172. 
ROTHMAN, A.J., SHEERAN, P., AND WOOD, W. 2009. Reflective and automatic processes in the initiation 
and maintenance of dietary change. Annals of behavioral medicine : a publication of the 
Society of Behavioral Medicine 38 Suppl 1, S4–17. 
ROUBROEKS, M., MIDDEN, C., AND HAM, J. 2009. Does it make a difference who tells you what to do?: 
exploring the effect of social agency on psychological reactance. Proceedings of the 4th 
International Conference on Persuasive Technology, ACM, 15:1—-15:6. 
SAMAHA, M. AND HAWI, N.S. 2016. Relationships among smartphone addiction, stress, academic 
performance, and satisfaction with life. Computers in Human Behavior 57, 321–325. 
 
| P 9:227 
 
SAND, A. AND NILSSON, M.E. 2016. Subliminal or not? Comparing null-hypothesis and Bayesian methods 
for testing subliminal priming. Consciousness and Cognition 44, 29–40. 
SASSI, F. 2010. Obesity and the economics of prevention: fit not fat. OECD Publishing. 
SCHNEIDER, H., MOSER, K., BUTZ, A., AND ALT, F. 2016. Understanding the Mechanics of Persuasive 
System Design: A Mixed-Method Theory-driven Analysis of Freeletics. ACM Press, 309–320. 
SCOTT-BROWN, K.C., VAN DER POL, M., MONCRIEFFE, C., ET AL. 2012. Service-please: an interactive healthy 
eating serious game application for tablet computer. BCS HCI ’12, BCS, 381–385. 
SEAMON, J.G., MARSH, R.L., AND BRODY, N. 1984. Critical importance of exposure duration for affective 
discrimination of stimuli that are not recognized. Journal of Experimental Psychology 10, 3, 
465. 
SEGERSTÅHL, K., KOTRO, T., AND VÄÄNÄNEN-VAINIO-MATTILA, K. 2010. Pitfalls in Persuasion: How Do Users 
Experience Persuasive Techniques in a Web Service? Persuasive ’10, 211–222. 
SHALEV, I. AND BARGH, J.A. 2011. Use of Priming-Based Interventions to Facilitate Psychological Health 
Commentary on Kazdin and Blase (2011). Perspectives on Psychological Science 6, 5, 488–
492. 
SHANKS, D.R., NEWELL, B.R., LEE, E.H., ET AL. 2013. Priming Intelligent Behavior: An Elusive Phenomenon. 
PLoS ONE 8, 4, e56515. 
SHEERAN, P. 2002. Intention—Behavior Relations: A Conceptual and Empirical Review. European 
Review of Social Psychology 12, 1, 1–36. 
SHEERAN, P., GOLLWITZER, P.M., AND BARGH, J.A. 2013. Nonconscious processes and health. Health 
Psychology 32, 5, 460. 
SHEERAN, P., KLEIN, W.M., AND ROTHMAN, A.J. 2017. Health behavior change: Moving from observation 
to intervention. Annual Review of Psychology 68, 573–600. 
SHEERAN, P., MILNE, S., WEBB, T.L., AND GOLLWITZER, P.M. 2005a. Implementation intentions and health 
behaviour. Bibliothek der Universität Konstanz. 
SHEERAN, P., WEBB, T.L., AND GOLLWITZER, P.M. 2005b. The interplay between goal intentions and 
Implementation Intentions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 31, 1, 87–98. 
SHILTS, M.K., HOROWITZ, M., AND TOWNSEND, M.S. 2004. Goal setting as a strategy for dietary and 
physical activity behavior change: a review of the literature. American Journal of Health 
Promotion 19, 2, 81–93. 
SINGMANN, H. 2017. afex. . 
SKINNER, B.F. 1938. The behavior of organisms: An experimental analysis. . 
SLADEK, R.M., PHILLIPS, P.A., AND BOND, M.J. 2006. Implementation science: a role for parallel dual 
processing models of reasoning? Implementation Science 1, 1. 
 
| P 9:228 
 
SLEEPER, M., ACQUISTI, A., CRANOR, L.F., KELLEY, P.G., MUNSON, S.A., AND SADEH, N. 2015. I Would Like To..., 
I Shouldn’t..., I Wish I...: Exploring Behavior-Change Goals for Social Networking Sites. CSCW 
’15, ACM, 1058–1069. 
SLOMAN, A. 2002. How many separately evolved emotional beasties live within us. Emotions in 
humans and artifacts, 35–114. 
SNIEHOTTA, F.F. AND PRESSEAU, J. 2012. The Habitual Use of the Self-report Habit Index. Annals of 
Behavioral Medicine 43, 1, 139–140. 
SNIEHOTTA, F.F., PRESSEAU, J., AND ARAÚJO-SOARES, V. 2014. Time to retire the theory of planned 
behaviour. Health Psychology Review 8, 1, 1–7. 
SNYDER, M. 1974. Self-monitoring of expressive behavior. Journal of personality and social psychology 
30, 4, 526. 
SOUTHERN, C., CHENG, Y., ZHANG, C., AND ABOWD, G.D. 2017. Understanding the Cost of Driving Trips. 
CHI’17, ACM Press, 430–434. 
SPALDING, L.R. AND HARDIN, C.D. 1999. Unconscious unease and self-handicapping: Behavioral 
consequences of individual differences in implicit and explicit self-esteem. Psychological 
Science 10, 6, 535–539. 
SPENCE, C. AND SHANKAR, M. 2010. The influence of auditory cues on the perception of, and responses 
to, food and drink. Journal of Sensory Studies 25, 3, 406–430. 
SPERDIN, H.F., REPNOW, M., HERZOG, M.H., AND LANDIS, T. 2013. An LCD tachistoscope with 
submillisecond precision. Behavior research methods 45, 4, 1347–1357. 
ST QUINTON, T. AND BRUNTON, J.A. 2017. Implicit Processes, Self-Regulation, and Interventions for 
Behavior Change. Frontiers in Psychology 8. 
STADDON, J.E.R. AND CERUTTI, D.T. 2003. Operant Conditioning. Annual Review of Psychology 54, 1, 115–
144. 
STAJKOVIC, A.D., LOCKE, E. A, AND BLAIR, E.S. 2006. A first examination of the relationships between 
primed subconscious goals, assigned conscious goals, and task performance. The Journal of 
applied psychology 91, 5, 1172–80. 
STANOVICH, K. 2011. Rationality and the reflective mind. Oxford University Press. 
STANOVICH, K.E. 2005. The robot’s rebellion: Finding meaning in the age of Darwin. University of 
Chicago Press. 
STAWARZ, K., COX, A.L., AND BLANDFORD, A. 2015. Beyond Self-Tracking and Reminders: Designing 
Smartphone Apps That Support Habit Formation. CHI ’15, 2653–2662. 
STRACK, F. AND DEUTSCH, R. 2004. Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior. Personality 
and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social 
Psychology, Inc 8, 3, 220–47. 
 
| P 9:229 
 
STRACK, F. AND DEUTSCH, R. 2014. The reflective–impulsive model. In: J.W. Sherman, B. Gawronski and 
Y. Trope, eds., Dual-process theories of the social mind. The Guilford Press, New York, NY, 
USA, 92–104. 
STRAHAN, E.J., SPENCER, S.J., AND ZANNA, M.P. 2002. Subliminal priming and persuasion: Striking while 
the iron is hot. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 38, 6, 556–568. 
SUGARMAN, V. AND LANK, E. 2015. Designing Persuasive Technology to Manage Peak Electricity Demand 
in Ontario Homes. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems, ACM, 1975–1984. 
SUH, M.M. AND HSIEH, G. 2016. Designing for Future Behaviors: Understanding the Effect of Temporal 
Distance on Planned Behaviors. Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems, ACM, 1084–1096. 
SUN, R., SLUSARZ, P., AND TERRY, C. 2005. The Interaction of the Explicit and the Implicit in Skill Learning: 
A Dual-Process Approach. Psychological Review 112, 1, 159–192. 
SUNSTEIN, C.R. 2016. Fifty Shades of Manipulation. Journal of Marketing Behavior 1, 3–4, 214–244. 
TANG, L.M. AND KAY, J. 2017a. Harnessing Long Term Physical Activity Data—How Long-term Trackers 
Use Data and How an Adherence-based Interface Supports New Insights. Proceedings of the 
ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies 1, 2, 1–28. 
TANG, L.M. AND KAY, J. 2017b. Harnessing Long Term Physical Activity Data—How Long-term Trackers 
Use Data and How an Adherence-based Interface Supports New Insights. Proceedings of the 
ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies 1, 2, 1–28. 
TASKER. 2016. Tasker for Android. http://tasker.dinglisch.net/. 
TAYLOR, D., BURY, M., CAMPLING, N., ET AL. 2006. A Review of the use of the Health Belief Model (HBM), 
the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) and the Trans-
Theoretical Model (TTM) to study and predict health related behaviour change. National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, London, UK. 
TAYLOR, N., CONNER, M., AND LAWTON, R. 2012. The impact of theory on the effectiveness of worksite 
physical activity interventions: a meta-analysis and meta-regression. Health Psychology 
Review 6, 1, 33–73. 
TAYLOR, S.B., LEWIS, C.R., AND OLIVE, M.F. 2013. The neurocircuitry of illicit psychostimulant addiction: 
acute and chronic effects in humans. Substance Abuse and Rehabilitation, 29. 
THALER, R.H. AND SUNSTEIN, C.R. 2008. Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. 
Yale Univ Pr. 
THOMPSON, D., BHATT, R., LAZARUS, M., CULLEN, K., BARANOWSKI, J., AND BARANOWSKI, T. 2012. A serious 
video game to increase fruit and vegetable consumption among elementary aged youth 
(Squire’s Quest! II): Rationale, design, and methods. JMIR research protocols 1, 2. 
 
| P 9:230 
 
TICE, D.M., BRATSLAVSKY, E., AND BAUMEISTER, R.F. 2001. Emotional distress regulation takes precedence 
over impulse control: If you feel bad, do it! Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80, 1, 
53–67. 
TIGWELL, G.W. AND FLATLA, D.R. 2016. Oh that’s what you meant!: reducing emoji misunderstanding. 
MobileHCI ’16 Adjunct, ACM, 859–866. 
TOBIAS, R. 2009. Changing behavior by memory aids: a social psychological model of prospective 
memory and habit development tested with dynamic field data. Psychological review 116, 2, 
408. 
TRIANDIS, H.C. 1977. Interpersonal behavior. Brooks/Cole Publishing Company Monterey, CA. 
TRUONG, K.N., SHIHIPAR, T., AND WIGDOR, D.J. 2014. Slide to X: unlocking the potential of smartphone 
unlocking. Proceedings of the 32nd annual ACM conference on Human factors in computing 
systems, ACM, 3635–3644. 
VAN TURNHOUT, K., BAKKER, R., BENNIS, A., ET AL. 2014. Design patterns for mixed-method research in 
HCI. ACM Press, 361–370. 
UR, B., MCMANUS, E., PAK YONG HO, M., AND LITTMAN, M.L. 2014. Practical trigger-action programming in 
the smart home. CHI ’14, ACM, 803–812. 
UR, B., PAK YONG HO, M., BRAWNER, S., ET AL. 2016. Trigger-Action Programming in the Wild: An Analysis 
of 200,000 IFTTT Recipes. CHI ’16, ACM, 3227–3231. 
VAN BAVEL, J.J., MENDE-SIEDLECKI, P., BRADY, W.J., AND REINERO, D.A. 2016. Contextual sensitivity in 
scientific reproducibility. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, 23, 6454–
6459. 
VELING, H., VAN KONINGSBRUGGEN, G.M., AARTS, H., AND STROEBE, W. 2014. Targeting impulsive processes 
of eating behavior via the internet. Effects on body weight. Appetite 78, 102–109. 
VELTKAMP, M., CUSTERS, R., AND AARTS, H. 2011. Motivating consumer behavior by subliminal 
conditioning in the absence of basic needs: Striking even while the iron is cold. Journal of 
Consumer Psychology 21, 1, 49–56. 
VERBEEK, P.-P. 2009. Ambient intelligence and persuasive technology: the blurring boundaries 
between human and technology. NanoEthics 3, 3, 231–242. 
VERBRUGGEN, F. AND LOGAN, G.D. 2009. Automatic and Controlled Response Inhibition: Associative 
Learning in the Go/No-Go and Stop-Signal Paradigms. Journal of Experimental Psychology 
137, 4, 649–672. 
VERHOEVEN, A.A., ADRIAANSE, M.A., DE VET, E., FENNIS, B.M., AND DE RIDDER, D.T. 2014. Identifying the 
‘if’for ‘if-then’plans: Combining Implementation Intentions with cue-monitoring targeting 
unhealthy snacking behaviour. Psychology & health 29, 12, 1476–1492. 
VERMEULEN, J., LUYTEN, K., VAN DEN HOVEN, E., AND CONINX, K. 2013. Crossing the bridge over Norman’s 
Gulf of Execution: revealing feedforward’s true identity. Proceedings of the SIGCHI 
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, ACM, 1931–1940. 
 
| P 9:231 
 
VERNON, L., MODECKI, K.L., AND BARBER, B.L. 2018. Mobile Phones in the Bedroom: Trajectories of Sleep 
Habits and Subsequent Adolescent Psychosocial Development. Child Development 89, 1, 66–
77. 
VERPLANKEN, B. AND AARTS, H. 1999. Habit, Attitude, and Planned Behaviour: Is Habit an Empty 
Construct or an Interesting Case of Goal-directed Automaticity? European Review of Social 
Psychology 10, 1, 101–134. 
VERPLANKEN, B. AND ORBELL, S. 2003. Reflections on Past Behavior: A Self-Report Index of Habit 
Strength. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 33, 6, 1313–1330. 
VERPLANKEN, B. AND WOOD, W. 2006. Interventions to Break and Create Consumer Interventions 
Habits. Journal of Public Policy 25, 1, 90–103. 
VILLAMARÍN-SALOMÓN, R.M. AND BRUSTOLONI, J.C. 2010. Using Reinforcement to Strengthen Users’ 
Secure Behaviors. CHI ’10, ACM, 363–372. 
WALLACE, F.L., FLANERY, J.M., AND KNEZEK, G.A. 1991. The effect of subliminal help presentations on 
learning a text editor. Information processing & management 27, 2, 211–218. 
WALLACE, J.R., HOUBEN, S., ANSLOW, C., LUCERO, A., ROGERS, Y., AND SCOTT, S.D. 2017. The Disappearing 
Tabletop: Social and Technical Challenges for Cross-Surface Collaboration. In: ACM 
International Conference on Interactive Surfaces and Spaces. ACM. 
WALSH, J.C., CORBETT, T., HOGAN, M., DUGGAN, J., AND MCNAMARA, A. 2016. An mHealth Intervention 
Using a Smartphone App to Increase Walking Behavior in Young Adults: A Pilot Study. JMIR 
mHealth and uHealth 4, 3, e109. 
WANG, Y., LEON, P.G., ACQUISTI, A., CRANOR, L.F., FORGET, A., AND SADEH, N. 2014. A Field Trial of Privacy 
Nudges for Facebook. CHI’14, ACM, 2367–2376. 
WANSINK, B. 2010. From mindless eating to mindlessly eating better. Physiology & behavior 100, 5, 
454–63. 
WANSINK, B. AND CHANDON, P. 2014. Slim by design: Redirecting the accidental drivers of mindless 
overeating. Journal of Consumer Psychology 24, 3, 413–431. 
WEBB, T.L., JOSEPH, J., YARDLEY, L., AND MICHIE, S. 2010a. Using the Internet to Promote Health Behavior 
Change: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of the Impact of Theoretical Basis, Use of 
Behavior Change Techniques, and Mode of Delivery on Efficacy. Journal of Internet Medical 
Research 12, 1. 
WEBB, T.L. AND SHEERAN, P. 2006. Does changing behavioral intentions engender behavior change? A 
meta-analysis of the experimental evidence. Psychological bulletin 132, 2, 249–68. 
WEBB, T.L. AND SHEERAN, P. 2008. Mechanisms of Implementation Intention effects: the role of goal 
intentions, self‐efficacy, and accessibility of plan components. British Journal of Social 
Psychology 47, 3, 373–395. 
WEBB, T.L., SNIEHOTTA, F.F., AND MICHIE, S. 2010b. Using theories of behaviour change to inform 
interventions for addictive behaviours. Addiction (Abingdon, England) 105, 11, 1879–92. 
 
| P 9:232 
 
WEI, J. 2014. How Wearables Intersect with the Cloud and the Internet of Things: Considerations for 
the developers of wearables. Consumer Electronics Magazine 3, 3, 53–56. 
WEST, R. 2005. Time for a change: putting the Transtheoretical (Stages of Change) Model to rest. 
Addiction 100, 8, 1036–9. 
WEST, R. 2006. Theory of addiction. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford. 
WESTERMANN, T., MÖLLER, S., AND WECHSUNG, I. 2015. Assessing the Relationship between Technical 
Affinity, Stress and Notifications on Smartphones. ACM Press, 652–659. 
WETHERILL, R.R., CHILDRESS, A.R., JAGANNATHAN, K., ET AL. 2014. Neural responses to subliminally 
presented cannabis and other emotionally evocative cues in cannabis-dependent individuals. 
Psychopharmacology 231, 7, 1397–1407. 
WHO. 2009. Global health risks. World Health Organization. 
WIAFE, I. AND NAKATA, K. 2012. Bibliographic Analysis of Persuasive Systems: Techniques, Methods and 
Domains of Application. Persuasive Technology, 61–64. 
WIENS, S. AND ÖHMAN, A. 2007. Probing unconscious emotional processes. Handbook of emotion 
elicitation and assessment, 65–90. 
WIERS, R.W., EBERL, C., RINCK, M., BECKER, E.S., AND LINDENMEYER, J. 2011. Retraining automatic action 
tendencies changes alcoholic patients’ approach bias for alcohol and improves treatment 
outcome. Psychological Science 22, 4, 490–7. 
WIERS, R.W., GLADWIN, T.E., HOFMANN, W., SALEMINK, E., AND RIDDERINKHOF, K.R. 2013. Cognitive Bias 
Modification and Cognitive Control Training in Addiction and Related Psychopathology: 
Mechanisms, Clinical Perspectives, and Ways Forward. Clinical Psychological Science 1, 2, 
192–212. 
WILLIAMS, J.M., MATHEWS, A., AND MACLEOD, C. 1996. The emotional Stroop task and psychopathology. 
Psychological Bulletin 120, 1, 3–24. 
WILMER, H.H., SHERMAN, L.E., AND CHEIN, J.M. 2017. Smartphones and Cognition: A Review of Research 
Exploring the Links between Mobile Technology Habits and Cognitive Functioning. Frontiers 
in Psychology 8. 
WILSON, K. AND BROOKFIELD, D. 2009. Effect of goal setting on motivation and adherence in a six-week 
exercise program. International Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology 7, 1, 89–100. 
WING, R.R., TATE, D.F., GORIN, A.A., RAYNOR, H.A., AND FAVA, J.L. 2006. A Self-Regulation Program for 
Maintenance of Weight Loss. New England Journal of Medicine 355, 15, 1563–1571. 
WINKIELMAN, P., ZAJONC, R.B., AND SCHWARZ, N. 1997. Subliminal Affective Priming Resists Attributional 
Interventions. Cognition & Emotion 11, 4, 433–465. 
WIT, S. AND DICKINSON, A. 2009. Associative theories of goal-directed behaviour: a case for animal–
human translational models. Psychological Research Psychologische Forschung 73, 4, 463–
476. 
 
| P 9:233 
 
WITTEKIND, C.E., FEIST, A., SCHNEIDER, B.C., MORITZ, S., AND FRITZSCHE, A. 2015. The approach-avoidance 
task as an online intervention in cigarette smoking: A pilot study. Journal of behavior therapy 
and experimental psychiatry 46, 115–120. 
WOHN, D., VELASQUEZ, A., BJORNRUD, T., AND LAMPE, C. 2012. Habit as an explanation of participation in 
an online peer-production community. Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human 
Factors in Computing Systems, ACM, 2905–2914. 
WOLFRAM. Bonferroni Correction. Wolfram MathWorld. 
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/BonferroniCorrection.html. 
WOLNIEWICZ, C.A., TIAMIYU, M.F., WEEKS, J.W., AND ELHAI, J.D. 2017. Problematic smartphone use and 
relations with negative affect, fear of missing out, and fear of negative and positive 
evaluation. Psychiatry research. 
WOOD, W., LABRECQUE, J.S., LIN, P.-Y., AND RÜNGER, D. 2014. Habits in Dual Process Models. In: J. 
Sherman, B. Gawronski and Y. Trope, eds., Dual-process theories of the social mind. 371. 
WOOD, W. AND NEAL, D.T. 2007. A new look at habits and the habit-goal interface. Psychological review 
114, 4, 843–63. 
WOOD, W., QUINN, J.M., AND KASHY, D.A. 2002. Habits in everyday life: thought, emotion, and action. 
Journal of personality and social psychology 83, 6, 1281. 
WOOD, W. AND RÜNGER, D. 2016. Psychology of Habit. Annual Review of Psychology 67, 1, 289–314. 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION. 2014. Public health implications of excessive use of the internet, 
computers, smartphones  and similar electronic devices. . 
YANG, R., SHIN, E., NEWMAN, M.W., AND ACKERMAN, M.S. 2015. When Fitness Trackers Don’t “Fit”: End -
User Difficulties in the Assessment of Personal Tracking Device Accuracy. UbiComp ’15. 
YIN, H.H. AND KNOWLTON, B.J. 2006. The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience 7, 6, 464–476. 
ZAJONC, R.B. 1968a. Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 9, 
2 part 2, 1–26. 
ZAJONC, R.B. 1968b. Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. Journal of personality and social psychology 
9, 2p2, 1. 
ZOMBIESRUNGAME. 2015. Zombies, Run! Zombies, Run! https://www.zombiesrungame.com. 
ZUCKERMAN, O. AND GAL-OZ, A. 2014. Deconstructing gamification: evaluating the effectiveness of 
continuous measurement, virtual rewards, and social comparison for promoting physical 
activity. Personal and Ubiquitous Computing 18, 7, 1705–1719. 
 
| P 10:234 
 
10. APPENDIX 
A1  CHAPTER 4  IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS  
4.1  PILOT  
CONSENT FORM  
Developing mobile application to promote Implementation Intentions as a trigger for building a 
habit  
Experiment Purpose & Procedure 
The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the impact of mobile application that applies the 
theory of Implementation Intentions for building new habit.  
The experiment is divided into three different phases. In the first phase, you need to complete a pre-
questionnaire. In the second phase, you will be asked to install an app in your phone. The app will let 
you to create a specific goal that you want to build as a habit. You have to select at least one 
situational cue for the goal you want to create. When a condition meets the contextual cues you 
have defined before, a notification will be triggered to remind you in pursuing your goal. The third 
phase of this research is you will be asked to complete a post-questionnaire. 
Confidentiality 
The following data will be recorded in a file in your device: the goal and cues you have created, 
sensor data from your mobile phone (including: accelerometer, location, wi-fi, phone and connection 
state, app log, battery, and screen on/off state). 
All data will be coded so that your anonymity will be protected in any research papers and 
presentations that result from this work. 
If you are interested to find out the result from this research, you can contact the researcher:  
 
Record of Consent 
Thank you for your interest in our research. Your signature below indicates that you have understood 
the information about the experiment to evaluate the impact of mobile application that applies the 
theory of Implementation Intentions for building new habit and consent to your participation. The 
participation is voluntary and you may refuse to answer certain questions on the questionnaire and 
withdraw from the study at any time with no penalty. If you have further questions related to this 
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QUESTIONNAIRES  
PRE – SELF-REPORT HABIT INDEX SUB-SCALE 
This questionnaire will ask you about a behaviour that you want to do and make it as a habit. Firstly, 
you need to write a specific behaviour that you want to do (for example: eating fruit when having 
breakfast, drinking a bottle of water when having lunch, running for 15 minutes at afternoon, etc). 
Secondly, you need to answer the following questions by choosing the right scale that represents 
your perception towards a behaviour that you are intending to do. Below is the guidance on the 
degree of agreement from each scale: 
1 – Strongly disagree 
2 – Disagree 
3 – Somewhat disagree 
4 – Neither agree or disagree 
5 – Somewhat agree 
6 – Agree 
7 – Strongly agree 
Name * 
Email address *  
What kind of behaviour do you want to make as a habit? * 
1-7 Likert items: 
 ^ I do that behaviour automatically * 
 ^ I do that behaviour without having to consciously remember * 
 That behaviour makes me feel weird if I do not do it * 
 ^ I do that behaviour without thinking * 
 That behaviour would require effort not to do it * 
 ^ I start doing that behaviour before I realise I am doing it * 
 I would find hard not to do that behaviour * 
 I have no need to think about doing that behaviour * 
^ are Self-Report Behavioural Automaticity Index items 
POST SELF-REPORT HABIT INDEX SUB-SCALE 
As you already had the intention to build a new habit, this questionnaire will ask your progress in 
forming the habit. These items will ask your perception towards a new behaviour that you want to 
make it as a new habit.  
Questionnaire items as above 
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SYSTEM USABILITY SCALE 
The following questions will ask your perception towards the Implementation Intentions app as a 
tool to form a new habit.  
Likert items 1-5: 
 I think that I would like to use this system frequently. * 
 I found the system unnecessarily complex. * 
 I thought the system was easy to use. * 
 I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this system. * 
 I found the various functions in this system were well integrated. * 
 I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system. * 
 I would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very quickly. * 
 I found the system very cumbersome to use. * 
 I felt very confident using the system. * 
 I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this system. * 
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4.2  FOLLOW-UP SURVEY  
CONSENT  
The following questionnaire seeks to understand more about habits to try to support people to 
change their behaviours as part of research at the HCI Centre at the University of Birmingham, UK. 
Please first think about any bad habits you have formed (i.e. repetitive behaviour that you may find it 
difficult to control) and what new habits you would like to form. Then read each question carefully 
and answer it as truthfully as you can. There are no correct or incorrect responses; we are simply 
interested in your personal point of view. Your data will be stored confidentially and in accordance to 
University of Birmingham policy. If you have any questions about the survey, please contact the lead 
researcher  At the end of the survey, you will have an option to enter your 
email address for a prize draw of a £15 Marks & Spencer voucher. Your email address will be used for 
prize draw purposes only. Thanks again for participating. 
By continuing, I confirm that I am over 18 years of age, and I understand that I can withdraw at any 
time. 
DEMOGRAPHICS  
1. What is your age?  
2. Gender  
3. Approximately how many times do you unlock your smartphone each day?  
4. What is your profession? If you are a student, please state level (e.g. Masters, PhD) and subject.  
ENVIRONMENTAL TRIGGERS 
The following questions seek to understand which environments may trigger bad and good habits, 
and explores the use of technology proximity triggers placed in those environments to try to support 
people to change their behaviours. Please think about any bad habits you have formed (i.e. repetitive 
behaviour that you may find it difficult to control) and where you perform them, and any new habits 
you wish to form and where you want to form them. 
1. Imagine that you could place proximity triggers in your workplace or the immediate surrounds, 
so that you could be alerted when you are near it. Where would you place them?  
2. Why did you choose those places?  
3. If you had an app on your phone that responded to the proximity trigger, how should it alert 
you?  
4. What would the app say?  
5. What other information might the app need (e.g. only alert you at a certain time of day)?  
6. How successful do you think this might be to change your behaviour?  
7. Why do you think this would be successful/not successful?  
8. Where would you place similar proximity triggers at home, and why? 
9. Any other comments?  
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A2  CHAPTER 5  COGNITIVE BIAS MODIFICATION 
5.1  ACCEPT THE BANANA  
ELICITATION STUDY INSTRUCTIONS &  CONSENT FORM  
Thank you for your interest in our research: we really appreciate people helping us out with our 
work. 
Experiment Purpose & Procedure 
The purpose of this experiment is identify the gestures that people would use to reject or accept 
objects in mobile devices. 
The experiment consist of 10 images (triangles and rectangles), during you will be asked to perform 
any kind of gesture in the mobile phone to accept or reject the figures.  
Please note that the task is not a test of your personal intelligence or ability. The objective is to test 
the usability of some gestures in order to use it to develop an application to reject and accept some 
features. 
Confidentiality 
The following data will be recorded: gestures performed in the mobile device All data will be coded 
so that your anonymity will be protected in any research papers and presentations that result from 
this work. 
Finding out about result 
If interested, you can find out the result of the study by contacting the researcher  
 
Record of Consent 
Your signature below indicates that you have understood the information about the experiment to 
identify common gestures for mobile devices and consent to your participation. The participation is 
voluntary and you may refuse to answer certain questions on the questionnaire and withdraw from 
the study at any time with no penalty. If you have further questions related to this research, please 
contact the researcher. 
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INSTRUCTION AND EXAMPLE STUDY SCREENS 
 
MAIN STUDY INSTRUCTIONS &  CONSENT FORM  
Experiment to evaluate the effects of CBM-A modifying bias towards healthy food using mobile 
technology 
Experiment Purpose & Procedure: 
The purpose of this experiment is evaluating the extent in which attentional bias towards healthy 
food can be changed using mobiles phones. The experiment is divided into three phases. In the first 
and third part you will complete a questionnaire. In the second part you will be asked to install an 
app in your phone. The app will trigger a task when the screen turns on which will overlie the lock 
screen. You will be asked to perform a gesture to accept healthy food (check mark ✓) or a gesture to 
reject unhealthy food (cross mark ⨯). You will have three chances to perform the correct gesture. 
When you perform the right gesture or after the third attempt the task will be closed. 
Since the task is before your lock screen you will have to perform a double-unlock. However, to avoid 
it you can disable your existing locking.    
Confidentiality 
The following data will be recorded in a file in your device: date, time, picture, gesture, and number 
of attempts. 
All data will be coded so that your anonymity will be protected in any research papers and 
presentations that result from this work. 
Finding out about result 
If interested, you can find out the result of the study by contacting the researcher  
 
Record of Consent 
Thank you for your interest in our research: we really appreciate people helping us out with our 
work. Your signature below indicates that you have understood the information about the 
experiment to evaluate the effects of CBM-A modifying bias towards healthy food using mobile 
Perform any gesture 
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technology and consent to your participation. The participation is voluntary and you may refuse to 
answer certain questions on the questionnaire and withdraw from the study at any time with no 
penalty. If you have further questions related to this research, please contact the researcher. 
ONLINE ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE  
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
1. What is your age?  
2. Gender  
3. Approximately how many times do you unlock your smartphone each day?  
4. What make and model is your phone?  
5. What is your native language?  
6. What is your profession? If you are a student, please state level (e.g. Masters, PhD) and subject.  
7. Health declaration: I have no known health issues that mean I should not be more active  
a. I have no health issues I have no health issues 
b. I'm not sure, or I do have some health issues I'm not sure, or I do have some health 
issues 
8. Please enter your email address. This will only be used to contact you about the experiment and 
for no other purposes.  
THE HTAS GENERAL HEALTH INTEREST SCALE  (7-POINT LIKERT SCALES) 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
a. The healthiness of food has little impact on my food choices (R) . 
b. I am very particular about the healthiness of food I eat. 
c. I eat what I like and I do not worry much about the healthiness of food (R). 
d. It is important for me that my diet is low in fat. 
e. I always follow a healthy and balanced diet. 
f. It is important for me that my daily diet contains a lot of vitamins and minerals.  
g. The healthiness of snacks makes no difference to me (R) . 
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THE HTAS TASTE-RELATED FACTORS 
Craving for sweet foods  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
a. In my opinion it is strange that some people have cravings for chocolate (R) 
b. In my opinion it is strange that some people have cravings for sweets (R) 
c. In my opinion it is strange that some people have cravings for ice-cream (R) 
d. I often have cravings for sweets 
e. I often have cravings for chocolate 
f. I often have cravings for ice-cream 
 
Using food as a reward  
a. I reward myself by buying something really tasty. 
b. I indulge myself by buying something really delicious. 
c. When I am feeling down I want to treat myself with something really delicious.  
d. I avoid rewarding myself with food (R). 
e. In my opinion, comforting oneself by eating is self-deception (R) . 
f. I try to avoid eating delicious food when I am feeling down (R). 
Pleasure 
a. I do not believe that food should always be source of pleasure (R) . 
b. The appearance of food makes no difference to me (R) . 
c. When I eat, I concentrate on enjoying the taste of food. 
d. It is important for me to eat delicious food on weekdays as well as weekends. 
e. An essential part of my weekend is eating delicious food. 
f. I finish my meal even when I do not like the taste of a food (R).  
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HEALTHY AND UNHEALTHY FOOD PICTURE RATING 
Rate the pleasantness of each food (7-point Likert scale from extremely unpleasant to extremely 
pleasant).  
a. Apple 



















SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
 How you feel using the app?  
 What was annoying? 
 What was helpful?  
 What do you think about using these technologies to help people in their habits? 
 Which other bad habits can we change using this kind of apps? 
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5.2  FOLLOW-UP SURVEY  
CONSENT  
Same as 4.2 Consent 
DEMOGRAPHICS  
Same as 4.2 Demographics 
SELECTING AND DESELECTING ITEMS  
Research has shown that repetitively selecting or deselecting items make that item more or less 
available in memory. This may help people to overcome a bad habit triggered by a cue item and/or 
help them form a good habit triggered by a cue item. For example, a smoker might be asked to swipe 
away images of cigarettes, and swipe towards them an image of chewing gum, or someone wishing 
to eat more healthily might choose images of celery and ignore images of a chocolate biscuit. 
1. What pairs of select/deselect items would you choose in a similar training scenario?  Please give 
examples of paired bad-good items e.g. cigarette-chewing gum, chocolate-apple, sofa-sneakers. 
Give as many examples as you think would be useful to you. 
2. Why have you chosen these pairs?  
3. What words would you use instead of “select” and “deselect”?  
4. How successful do you think this sort of select/deselect training might be to change your 
behaviour?  
5. Why do you think this would be successful/not successful?  
6. Any other comments?  
5.3  PUSH AWAY THE SMARTPHONE  
CONSENT  
The following questionnaire seeks to understand more about smartphone addiction and ways to 
counter this problem, as part of my summer project for the MSc in Human Computer Interaction at 
the University of Birmingham, UK. 
Please first think about your daily smartphone usage and habits. Then read each question carefully 
and answer it as truthfully as you can. There are no correct or incorrect responses. 
Your data will be stored confidentially and in accordance to the University of Birmingham policies. 
If you have any questions about the survey, please contact me at  
Thanks again for participating. 









3) What is your profession? If you are a student, please state level (e.g. Undergraduate, Masters, 
PhD) and subject.  
4) Approximately how many hours do you spend on your smartphone per day? 
5) Approximately how many times do you check your smartphone each day? 
6) Do you think you have maladaptive dependency or addiction over your Smartphone usage? 
a) Yes, I'm addicted to my Smartphone 
b) No, I'm not addicted 
c) I don't know 
 
SMARTPHONE ADDICTION SCALE (SAS-SV)  [KWON ET AL.  2013] 
For each question please rate the answer according to how true you feel it is for you (6-point Likert): 
1) I miss planned work due to my Smartphone use 
2) Due to my Smartphone use, I can find it hard to focus while working, doing assignments or 
attending classes 
3) I feel pain in the wrists or at the back of the neck while using a Smartphone 
4) I would not bear not having a Smartphone 
5) I feel impatient and worried when I am not carrying my Smartphone 
6) I have my Smartphone in my mind even when I am not using it 
7) I will never give up using my smartphone even when my daily life is already greatly affected by it 
8) I constantly check my Smartphone so as not to miss conversations between other people on 
Twitter, Facebook or other Social Networks 
9) I find myself using my Smartphone longer than I originally intended 
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A3  CHAPTER 6  SUBLIMINAL PRIMING  
EXPERIMENT 6.1  INSTRUCTIONS &  CONSENT FORM  
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET –active :) experiment 
Thank you for your interest in participating in our research. Please read this form carefully. 
Research study title: Pervasive persuasive: interventions to change habitual behaviour 
Description: A study to investigate active behaviour goals supported by mobile devices. 
What participation entails: 
Thank you  for  your  interest  in  participating  in  the  study.  The participation  in  this research is 
entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time. This  research  will  be  conducted  via  
your  browser  and  your  own  Android  mobile  phone. You  will  need  a  phone  with Android  
version 4.1  (JellyBean) or  greater  without  a custom  lock  screen. Please ensure you have enabled 
the phone’s default lock screen (PIN or pattern) for the duration of the experiment. This  research  
will  run  over 1 week,  although  your  total  participation  time  should  be around 1 hour.  
You will be asked to do the following: 
 Follow an online procedure to form an activity goal –you will be guided through the steps to 
form a simple, specific goal to increase your activity (e.g. walk for at least 1 hour a day) for 
the duration of the experiment.  
 Complete a brief survey online (approx. 10 mins). 
 Install  an  app  onto  your  phone  which  tracks  your  lock/unlock  usage  (no  other personal 
information such as location or call or messaging activity is tracked) and which may give you 
goal prompts when you unlock your phone. 
 Complete a brief colour-naming task on your phone (approx. 5 mins) 
 1 week later, repeat the colour naming task and a final survey online (approx. 15 mins max). 
Data  recording  your  interactions  with  the  app  and  your  phone  (including  no  location data, and 
no personal data other than an assigned ID) will be sent via Wi-Fi to be stored in a secured database 
in Computer Science.  
Please be  aware  that  this  monitoring and data  transfer  uses  battery:  you  may  need  to charge 
your mobile every day.  
You will receive an Amazon voucher of £5 for completing the research, including running the app on 
your phone for 1 week, and completing the task and surveys. 
Mobile Application 
The research team has made every effort to test the application before the experiment. However, 
problems and software bugs do occur. If you have difficulties then you should contact  the  research  
team  for  assistance  via describing  the problem as clearly as you can.  
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The mobile application needs to exchange a small amount of data with our servers from time to time. 
To do this it needs a data connection. This can be either be via WiFi or your mobile  data  network.  
Be  aware  that,  just like  any  other  mobile  application,  this  will  be included  in  whatever  data  
allowance  you  have  and  thus  may  incur  charges  depending upon your mobile tariff.  
If  for  any  reason  you  feel  the  application  is  causing  immediate  problems  then  please uninstall 
the application and contact the research team at   
Again please be aware that you are free to withdraw from the experiment and uninstall the 
application at any point. If you withdraw unfortunately we will not be able to provide you with the 
£5Amazon voucher. 
In addition to withdrawing from the experiment, you can also request that your data is removed 
from the experiment: if you request this, any data gathered up until that point will be destroyed. 
Confidentiality/anonymity and data security 
All of your data will be stored confidentially and given a unique identification code. 
The data we collect will be stored securely. Only members of the project team will have access to  
this data.  Data will  be  stored  as  per  University  policy  and  any  personal  data gathered for 
recruitment will be destroyed upon completion of the experiment. 
Results of the study 
The results  of  the  study  will  be  written up  for  academic  publication. This research  may also be 
presented at national and international conferences and events. If you would like feedback from the 
study feel free to email the lead researchers below who will be able to help with your request. 
For  further  information: If  you  would  like  any  further  information  about  the  study please email 
 
EXPERIMENT 6.1  GOAL SETTING INSTRUCTIONS 
Now it's time for you to set an active :) goal that you will try to stick to during the experiment.  
Goal setting theory suggests that the best sort of goals are clear and specific (i.e. "I will walk for 30 
minutes total a day" rather than "I will try and walk more each day") and somewhat hard to achieve - 
so please choose an active :) goal that will stretch you, rather than one you are sure that you can 
easily achieve. You should also be committed to achieving your active :) goal.  
Please take a few minutes to think about a suitable active :) goal.  
Once you have chosen your active :) goal, please write it in the box below. 
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EXPERIMENT 6.3/6.3B  INSTRUCTIONS &  CONSENT FORM 
Thank you for supporting our research :). Please read this page carefully before you start - it sets out 
what the task is, what data we gather and how we use the data.  
Research study title: Visual discrimination tasks on smartphones 
Research description: A study to investigate visual discrimination tasks on mobile devices 
Task details 
1. We'll first ask some brief demographics details. 
2. The main task is a brief (~5 mins) set of simple image choices. You'll be shown images 
one by one for a very short space of time, then asked to choose between two 
images, one of which you may have been shown before. Do not worry if you can't 
see the image. You will also get a chance to have a practice first. 
3. Your participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time. 
Confidentiality/anonymity and data security  
All of your data will be stored confidentially and given a unique identification code. The data we 
collect will be stored securely. Only members of the project team will have access to this data. Data 
will be stored as per University policy.  
Results of the study 
The anonymised results of the study will be written up for academic publication and may be 
presented at conferences and events. For further information: please email   
If you're happy with the above, and you are 18 years or over, please tap the button below to 
proceed. Thanks again for your help :). 
EXPERIMENT 6.4  CONSENT FORM  
Thank you for supporting our research :). Please read this page carefully before you start - it sets out 
what the task is, what data we gather and how we use the data. 
Research study title: Number sorting tasks on smartphones 
Research description: A study to investigate number sorting tasks on mobile devices 
Task details 
1. We'll first ask some demographics details. 
2. The main task is a brief (~10 mins) number sorting task. You'll be shown a number between 1 and 
9 and asked to categorise it as less than or more than 5.  
Full instructions will be given and you will get a chance to have a practice first. 
3. Your participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time 
 
| P 10:249 
 
Confidentiality/anonymity and data security: All of your data will be stored confidentially and given a 
unique identification code. The data we collect will be stored securely. Only members of the project 
team will have access to this data. Data will be stored as per University policy. 
Results of the study: The anonymised results of the study will be written up for academic publication 
and may be presented at conferences and events. For further information: please email 
 
If you're happy with the above, and you are 18 years or over, please tap the button below to 
proceed. Thanks again for your help :). 
EXPERIMENT 6.4  INSTRUCTIONS  
Number sorting task 
A number between 1 and 9 will appear in the centre of the screen. Your task is to classify the number 
as less than or greater than 5. 
If the number is less than 5, press the left hand less than “<” button 
If the number is more than 5, press the right hand more than “>” button 
If a '#' symbol appears, freely and randomly choose a button to press. Please try to avoid a fixed 
pattern in your free choice responses (e.g. don't do left, then right, then left) and only decide which 
button to press when the '#' appears rather than pre-planning. 
Each trial begins with a neutral visual symbol to warn you that the number is about to appear. 
You'll have 1.5 seconds to respond, and the app will tell you if you get the answer wrong or you time 
out. 
When you are ready for a practice run, tap  "START". 
  
 
| P 10:250 
 
EXPERIMENT 6.4  VISIBILITY TASK INSTRUCTIONS  
Well done, that's the end of the first part of the experiment! 
 A little more about the task you've just completed: the images you were shown just before the 
target number actually contained a 'prime' - another number (1,2,3,4,6,7,8 or 9), presented for a very 
short space of time (~35ms) in between 2 letter masks. 
You were shown a letter mask, then a prime, then another letter mask and then the target number 
as shown below: 
 
For the final task, we will re-run a small part of the experiment but this time try to see ONLY the 
prime, and answer whether it was less than or greater than 5. 
Ignore the final target number that you were concentrating on in the first task. 
 
If you can't see the prime, which only appears for a very short space of time, please just guess. 
There are only 3 blocks in this test. 
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A4  CHAPTER 7  QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF GOALS 
RAW GOALS DATA  
id goal 
1 I will walk for 60 minutes a day and swim for 45 minutes twice a week 
2 I shall walk a minimum of 5 minutes a day, every day of the week. 
3 I will do 30 press ups a day. 15 morning and evening 
4 i will walk for 90 minutes each day 
5 I will either walk for an hour each day, OR do more vigorous exercise for 20 minutes (jog/cycle etc) -
depending upon my time commitments that day 
6 I will walk 1 hour per dag 
7 I will leave home at 7.20am Monday- Friday to get to university 
8 I will run 3 times in the next week and have totalled more than 25km by Sunday. 
9 I will do sit ups every day for 30 minutes. 
 10 I will be active (walking or gym) for 1 hour total a day 
11 I will walk for 60 minutes a day 
12 I will do 5 sets of 10 push ups each day 
13 I will run 3 times a week for 30 minutes each 
14 I will walk for 30 mins total per day 
15 Walking or running at least 20 minutes a day. 
16 I will complete my push up routine every day 
17 To walk for 90 minutes total each day 
18 Walk everyday for 45 minutes or more 
19 I will walk 1 mile a day 
20 I will do 100 push ups a day, 5 times a week. 
21 Walk for 20 minutes for 3 days in the week. 
22 Walk for 20 minutes a day 
23 I will walk for 30 minutes each day. 
24 I will do two 15 mins walks a day. 
25 I will perform vigorous exercise 5 days a week 
26 At work, I will not take the lift but instead, take the stairs. 
27 Have at least 4 Parkour session per week (each should last around 1 hour) 
28 I will go for a run every other day 
29 I will walk for 1 hour total a day 
30 I will walk for a total of 45 minutes each day 
31 Instead of walking, I will go and come back from the gym running. About 15 minutes running. 
32 I will drink 8 glasses (or equivalent) of water a day 
33 I will do 30 minutes fitness exercises each day i.e pilates 
34 I will complete physio exercises daily for 30 mins 
35 I will walk or run 20000 steps a day 
36 I will try and walk 10000 steps each day 
37 To walk or run for 30 minutes each day 
38 I will walk for over an hour every day this week 
39 Walk for 30 minutes a day (outside of commuting to lectures) 
40 i will walk 30 mins a day 
41 i will walk no less then 30 min a day 
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id goal 
42 I will power walk for 20 minutes a day on top of my normal walking daily 
43 Go to two spinning classes (>45 min each) per week. 
44 I will walk over 10,000 steps every day 
45 Complete 10000 steps a day 
46 I will reach 8000steps every day 
47 I will walk for 60 minutes total a day 
48 I will do a 10 minute high intensity workout each day. 
49 I will go swimming before work three times this week. 
50 High intensity exercise 30 minutes at least a day 
51 I will do yoga on 4 days 
52 I will cardio train (run  skip and cycle) for 30 minutes total a day. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
